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From the third to the seventh centuries, the area now known as Surat Thani was called the 
Panpan Kingdom, whose rulers sent tribute missions to China. From the seventh to the 
fourteenth centuries, Surat Thani was the regional centre of the Srivijaya Kingdom. In the 
thirteen and fourteenth centuries, it was a place where Chinese merchants uploaded their 
cargoes for transportation overland before returning to China. In the early twentieth 
century, Surat Thani became an important port where migrants from across China met, a 
diversity which made the characteristics of migrant communities and their associated 
networks rather complex. This research explores Chinese migration and the 
transformation of ethnic Chinese identities during the first half of the twentieth century in 
Surat Thani by observing the role of Chinese temples and their schools. Drawing on 
diverse primary materials, historical artefacts, oral history interviews, together with an 
engagement with the secondary literature on the subject, the research found that the 
industrial revolution and colonisation led to a huge migration of Chinese into Surat Thani 
from the late nineteenth century. The Chinese established their native-place associations 
through the construction of temples and schools to serve migrants who spoke common 
dialects based on their birth regions. They saw themselves as Hokkien, Cantonese, 
Teochew, Hainanese and Hakka. After encountering the modern concept of the “nation-
state” and the movement to use a Chinese national language based on Mandarin as the 
language of instruction in Chinese schools in the late 1920s, diverse ethnic Chinese 
consciousnesses were gradually transformed into a united national Chinese 
consciousness. During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), many Chinese 
politically and culturally identified with their motherland. Therefore, they contributed to 
the Chinese war effort to help China fight against the Japanese. When Japanese troops 
landed in Surat Thani in 1941, the Chinese armed themselves to resist. During World 
War II, the Chinese were largely split into two groups: those who supported the Japanese 
and those who did not. In the post-war years, the Chinese were again essentially divided 
into two: pro-Chinese Nationalist Party and pro-Chinese Communist Party. In brief, the 
migrant communities in Surat Thani and also in greater Thailand had fluid and 
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According to archaeological evidence and shipwreck excavations, relations between 
China and the area which is now known as Surat Thani, a province in Southern Thailand, 
date back almost two thousand years.2 From the third to the seventh centuries, Panpan 
Kingdom, whose rulers sent numerous tribute missions to China, was located in Surat 
Thani.3 From the seventh to the fourteenth centuries, the province of Surat Thani was the 
regional centre of the Srivijaya Kingdom. Surat Thani, together with its neighbouring 
provinces, was the first region that drew Chinese merchants, with their junks stopping at 
many ports and settlements because the merchants, who were travelling to India and 
further west, may have gone with the northeast monsoon only as far as these sites. Before 
returning to China with the southwest monsoon, they uploaded their cargoes for 
transshipment overland.4 From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, the province was 
an important port for trade with China and the main traded good with Fujian was rice.5 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Chinese population rose rapidly (see 
Chapter One).  
 
 
I.         Chinese Migration to South East Asia  
 
The period under study in this thesis is a particularly interesting one in the history of 
migration. Michael H. Fisher has noted that in the modern period, from the late 
eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries, there were massive global people movements 
due to the end of slavery and the industrial revolution, which led to an increased demand 
                                                
2 Chinese earthenware during the Western Han dynasty, from the first to the second centuries, has been 
discovered in Surat Thani. See Jeffery Sng and Pimpraphai Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese 
(Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2015), 17.  
3 Panpan Kingdom was mentioned in the History of Liang Dynasty. Su Jiqing (蘇繼廎), ‘後漢書究不事人
老,’ Journal of the South Seas Society 6, no. 1 (1950): 17-19. Lawrence Palmer Briggs, “The Khmer 
Empire and the Malay Peninsula,” The Far Eastern Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1950): 256-305. See Chen Hongyu 
(陳鴻瑜), 泰國史 (The History of Thailand) (Taibei: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 2014), 33. 
4	G. William Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1957), 1.	
5 Viraphol Sarasin, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade 1652-1853 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1977), 215. 
	 18	
for labourers in new industries.6 He added that migration also stemmed from war. The 
First World War and the Second World War in the first half of the twentieth century 
displaced people across the world.7 During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
there were also huge movements of Chinese abroad. Fan Yuchun has written that the 
Chinese migration to South East Asia is the largest of all Chinese migrations.8 Su Lin 
Lewis has argued that twentieth-century Asia was characterised by movement, migration, 
and bustling cities.9 Nevertheless, throughout Chinese history, there has been ceaseless, 
large-scale migration in various forms.  
 
From the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries, China was governed by 
the Qing dynasty. The early Qing occupation drove tens of millions of people to migrate. 
There were consecutive waves of flight resulting from the brutality of the Manchu 
conquest. This transition made the population diminish substantially in many areas due to 
the ferocity of the rebellions and wars between the Ming and Qing. However, the Qing, 
the new authority, tempted people to migrate to the depopulated areas with tax incentives 
and the provision of seeds and farming equipment. Some exiles migrated to Taiwan, 
headed by Zheng Chenggong (鄭成功, 1624-1662). To prevent their return and to fight 
the anti-Qing movement based in Taiwan, in 1661 the demarcation line was drawn along 
the coast from Guangdong to Zhejiang in southern China, and overseas navigation was 
prohibited. Forts were built and people were told to move inland.10 Claudine Salmon has 
written that the commercial networks between China and South East Asia stopped for 
many years. After the grandson of Zheng was sent to Beijing and Taiwan was integrated 
into China, the order was removed in 1683 and the ban on overseas navigation was lifted 
a year later. Seagoing merchants in South East Asia were quick to recommence their 
                                                
6 Michael H. Fisher, Migration: A World History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 76-78, 86-
89.  
7 Fisher, Migration, 105-108.  
8 For the original work of Fan Yuchun, please see Diana Lary, Chinese Migrations: The Movement of 
People, Goods, and Ideas over Four Millennia (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 92.  
9 Su Lin Lewis, Cities in Motion: Urban Life and Cosmopolitanism in Southeast Asia, 1920-1940 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 2.  
10 Lary, Chinese Migrations, 75-78.  
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relations with Guangdong.11 Diana Lary has argued that this brutal policy instilled in 
local people a burning resentment towards the Qing dynasty.12 These histories provide a 
valuable background to the understanding of Chinese revolutionaries such as Seow 
Hoodseng in Siam during the late Qing dynasty, as some of their ancestors fled to South 
East Asia after the integration of Taiwan in 1683 (see Chapter Three).13  
 
In the late Qing period, huge movements of people were caused by two 
disruptions: the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) and globalisation. The Taiping Rebellion 
caused people to migrate within and away from China. Within China, there were two 
waves of movements. The first wave was from those who escaped the rebellion to 
Shanghai and the latter from the Taipings to Southwest China after the Taipings were 
ferociously subdued by the Qing.14 As for globalisation, economics drove many Chinese 
to migrate as free or indentured labour.15 There was a massive need for labourers to 
construct railways, dams, and canals. For example, Chinese labourers were employed by 
contractors in the Chinatowns of San Francisco and Vancouver to build the western 
sections of the Transcontinental Railway, which was finished in 1869.16 Indeed the 
migration was so sizeable that Chinese migrants to North America began to experience 
racism. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act was passed by Congress to prohibit all Chinese, 
both skilled and unskilled, from working in mining and entering the US (the law was 
rescinded in 1943).17 In the US and Canada, Chinese communities were male “bachelor 
societies”. “Space of difference” and “islands of externalities” were appropriate terms 
used to describe Chinatowns which, built through the “mechanism of spatialization” 
which evolved in urban society, occupied the least desirable areas of a city’s spatial 
                                                
11 Claudine Salmon, “Transnational Networks as Reflected in Epigraphy: The Case of Chinese Buddhist 
Bells in Southeast Asia,” in Chinese Migration, Research and Documentation, eds. Tan Chee-Beng, Colin 
Storey, and Julia Zimmerman (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2007), 23. 
12 Lary, Chinese Migrations, 75-78.  
13 “Siam” was an official name of the country until 24 June 1939 when it was changed to “Thailand”. 
14 Lary, Chinese Migrations, 92.  
15 Fisher, Migration, 83.  
16 Lary, Chinese Migrations, 98-99.  
17 Fisher, Migration, 101.  
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structure.18 Wang Yuchun has studied how tremendous numbers of Chinese migrated 
abroad in the mid-nineteenth century after five ports were opened for foreign trade as a 
result of the end of the First Opium War in 1842 and ten new ports were opened 
following the Second Opium War in 1860.19 The work of Yuchun is most in tune with the 
analysis of this research, which examines the massive movements of the Chinese to Surat 
Thani in the mid-nineteenth century (see Chapter One).   
 
In South East Asia, Chinese, mostly from Southern Fujian, or Minnan (閩南), 
migrated to trade and work in plantations until there were only women, children, and 
elders left in some of their villages in China.20 Of all of the overseas Chinese, there were 
five major native-places and dialect groups. The first to come in numbers were the 
Hokkien (福建) from southern Fujian, followed by the Cantonese (廣東) from the rural 
areas near Canton, and the Teochew (潮州) from Chaozhou and Shantou in Guangdong 
province. The Hainanese (海南) from Hainan had started trading in this region in the 
eighteenth century, and were established in some numbers by the early nineteenth century. 
The Hakka (客家), from disseminated hilly regions in northern Guangdong and southern 
Fujian, migrated through Teochew ports in the mid-nineteenth century. 21  Chinese 
migrants who came from the same region were inclined to settle in the same destination. 
For example, the Hokkien was the majority of Chinese migrants in the Philippines, the 
Teochew in Bangkok, Toishan from Guangdong in California, and Shandong in Korea.22 
The existence of one more dialect group - the Tanka (蜑家) - has not been mentioned in 
the existing scholarship. Although Wang Yuchun did write about the Tanka in Hainan, he 
failed to mention that the Tanka did in fact migrate to South East Asia.23 This thesis 
                                                
18 Michel S. Laguerre, The Global Ethnopolis: Chinatown, Japantown and Manilatown in American 
Society (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 155.  
19 Wang Yuchun, ประวตักิารอพยพของชาวจนีไหหลํา 海南移民史志 (History of the Hainanese migration) 
(Bangkok: Hainan Education and Cultural Foundation of Thailand, 2014), 233-234. 
20 C. F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), 180.  
21 Laurence J.C. Ma, “Space, Place, and Transnationalism in the Chinese Diaspora,” in The Chinese 
Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility and Identity, eds. Laurence J.C. Ma and Carolyn Cartier (Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 20 and G. William Skinner, Leadership and Power in the Chinese 
Community of Thailand (New York: Cornell University Press, 1958), 4-5. 
22 Ma, “Space, Place, and Transnationalism in the Chinese Diaspora,” 20.  
23 Yuchun, ประวตักิารอพยพของชาวจนีไหหลํา 海南移民史志, 114-115, 138-139, 190.  
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makes up for this lapse in the scholarship by recording this ethnic subgroup in Surat 
Thani. 
 
In South East Asia, their settlements were socially divided and their economic 
activities were organised along occupational lines based on place of origin.24 In Thailand, 
in 1837 George Winsor Earl observed that the dialect groups strenuously opposed one 
another as if they belonged to rival nations.25 Su Lin Lewis has also argued that multi-
ethnic port-cities such as Penang, Rangoon, and Bangkok were sites of tensions and 
conflicts between many ethnicities and religions. The influential colonial scholar J.S. 
Furnivall has argued that these communities were “plural societies” in which people self-
segregated and interacted with one another only in the realm of commerce. For example, 
in Singapore people from different communities lived essentially separate lives, engaging 
only in the market area. They were distinct ethnic communities.26  
 
The findings of this thesis reflect the idea of what Furnivall called “plural socities” 
in the colonial era. The spatial geography of Surat Thani is a testament to this idea that 
there were ethnic enclaves of native Thai and Chinese communities. The majority of the 
Chinese stayed together in the market areas in most disticts, while most of the native Thai 
lived in distant rural areas. In Bandon, for example, the commercial heart of the province 
was dominated by most Chinese. In other words, they founded a local ethnic space within 
a wider pluralist society. Within their space, there were also many other smaller spaces 
created in which each Chinese dialect group had its own temples, native-place 
associations, and cemeteries, and where its members interacted with one another. Prior to 
the late 1920s, for example, even Chinese schools were separated from one another based 
on the use of language of instruction (see Chapter One and Chapter Four).  
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Despite the insularity of the Chinese community, there were cases of inter-cultural 
exchange and interaction with the native Thai community. This thesis reveals that a small 
number of Chinese, namely those that had established small Chinese communities in 
rural areas, had to dwell together with locals. Therefore, they had many opportunities to 
interact with ethnic Thai people, who, as noted above, mostly lived in the countryside. 
The hybrid Sino-Thai nature of some temples in Surat Thani are representative of this 
assimilation process. In Tha Chang district, for example, a hybrid temple was created by 
a lukchin, a Chinese child who was the product of an intermarriage between a Thai and a 
Chinese, to serve a small number of Chinese and native Thais. In addition, the locally-
made bells in some Chinese temples, exhibiting a hybrid style, reflected the gradual 
process of assimilation of some Chinese into the wider Thai society. These hybrid bells 
could be purchased by Sino-Thais (see Chapter One). 
 
Surat Thani’s Chinese community also interacted with the Bangkok-centred 
Siamese nation-state and Siamese elites in Southern Siam. The closeness of the Chinese 
community leaders to Siamese royalty and elites reflected the interactions between them. 
Through the patronage of Phraya Nakhon Si Thammarat, the governor of Nakhon Si 
Thammarat, Liao Chiangsoon, a Teochew migrant from Bangkok, had established 
himself in Bandon’s Chinatown and successfully controlled the birds’ nest industry in the 
country at the turn of the twentieth century. Liao also had a close relationship with King 
Vadjiravudh and supplied his birds’ nests to the palace in Bangkok. He was also 
appointed to the title of phraya by the king. Due to his connections with Siamese royalty 
and elites, he was granted exceptional privileges (see Chapter Three). The role of Liao 
also highlights the close connections between the Chinese community in Surat Thani and 
Bangkok. 
 
Su Lin Lewis, in her book Cities in Motion, which studies the connections 
between port-cities in South East Asia, has written that a regional rail network knitted 
Bangkok, Penang, and Singapore together, facilitating intercity travel. Increasing 
connections produced new modes of belonging to new regional and transnational 
communities. Lewis has further described that Penang was a regional hub for English and 
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Chinese secondary education, which attracted students from all over the region.27 The 
study also looks at the connections between Penang and Surat Thani, a node in the rail 
network. It found that in the first half of the twentieth century Penang was closely 
connected to Surat Thani once the railway had been built. Many Chinese in Surat Thani 
not only shared trading connections with those Chinese in Penang, but also family ties 
and a hybrid culture (see Chapter Two and Chapter Three).  
 
Several studies of Chinese communities in South East Asia have focused on the 
three major Chinese traditional religions: Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. Evelyn 
Lip has proposed that Shenism and ancestor worship should be added to these groups,28 
whilst Stephen Feuchtwang has written that popular religion in China comprises some 
elements of both Buddhism and the imperial cults, more of Daoism, but is singularly 
identifiable with none of them. He has further described that “religion” here is a category, 
not a singular thing, and it is also “popular in the sense of being local and true of the 
China of the Han, or Chinese-speaking people, where every place had or has its local 
cults and the festivals peculiar to them.”29 Religion influences the designs of local 
festivals and temples, which are ubiquitous in the lives of the Chinese.  
 
In her survey, Teresita Ang See found that 83 percent of the Chinese in the 
Philipines identified themselves as Christians. She has insisted that religious syncretism 
is the norm because Chinese Catholics continue to practise Chinese popular religion. She 
has concluded that Chineseness is not defined by religion, as one is free to choose one’s 
religion and even practice syncretism. Others have emphasised that while this may be 
true, religion nevertheless occupies a crucial role in the construction of Chinese cultural 
identity. Myron Cohen, for example, has suggested that amongst the major features of 
Chinese culture are a particular family organisation, land-based economic structures, 
great value associated with education in Chinese Classics, ritual life based on Confucian 
ethics and filial piety, pride in the local place of origin, and popular religion. Cohen has 
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claimed that part of being Chinese was a consciousness of participation in the political, 
cultural, and social arrangement of Chinese civilisation. The hierarchy of deities in 
popular religion reflects the imperial bureaucracy of dynastic rule. Arthur Wolf has 
written that the connection between gods and ancestors is a way of comprehending one’s 
social world and the cosmos.30 In other words, there is a hierarchy in the spirit world, 
known as the ‘imperial metaphor’ in Chinese popular religion.31  
 
Aristotle Dy has studied Chinese Buddhism in the Philippines, arguing that 
religion performs a substantial role in the preservation of ethnic identity for Chinese 
Buddhists in there. Under Spanish rule for more than 300 years, the Chinese secretly 
worshipped the bodhisattava Guanyin in their private homes. Later, Chinese temples 
were allowed to be built under American colonisation in the early twentieth century. Dy 
has described how many temples, such as Seng Guan Temple, built Buddhist schools in 
the vincinity of the temples but independent. There were Chinese language lessons 
focusing on Confucian teachings, and Buddhist religion classes. Chinese language and 
culture could be preserved through these schools. Additionally, once the schools were 
founded, intermarriage between Chinese and native Filipinos was rare. Dy has written 
that temples did not serve only a religious function, but were community centres for first 
and second-generation immigrants. People shared a common identity through rituals and 
many activities. They were the only places where the Chinese could feel secure and pray 
to their deities for divine assistance. In his research, Dy challenged the Teresita Ang See 
by concluding that the connection of religion with ethnic and cultural identity in the 
Buddhist community is more natural compared with the Christian because all the people, 
language, and festivals are Chinese. Hence, the sense of being Chinese is automatically 
asserted.32 
 
                                                
30 For original works of Teresita Ang See, Myron Cohen, and Arthur P. Wolf, please see Aristotle Dy, 
“Chinese Buddhism and Ethnic Identity in Catholic Philippines,” Contemporary Buddhism 13, no. 2 
(2012): 248-249, 255.  
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Some, such as Bernard Formoso and Tan Chee-Beng, have seen temples as a 
window on the history of Chinese migration to South East Asia. They have examined the 
role of the charitable temple (善堂), describing how charitable temples in South East 
Asia and in Chaoshan in China are organised mostly around the worship of Song Dafeng. 
Each is a separate temple, enjoying local and transnational networks with other charitable 
temples. They simultaneously conduct both religious and charitable work. For example, 
as Chinese education has a great deal to do with Chinese identity, charitable temples in 
Singapore and Malaysia mostly donate money for Chinese education. Formoso and Chee-
Beng have argued that their charitable actions tend to be received by local people as a 
verification of Chinese integration, and to reduce their prejudice in terms of the reputedly 
selfish Chinese. Mutual help amongst migrants has its roots in the charitable temples. 
Moreover, help provided to kinsmen, clan members, and people of the same origin is an 
essential determinant of economic success, social adaptation, and the preservation of 
identity.33 However, such scholarship, studying Chinese traditional religions in South 
East Asia, has failed to engage with hybrid temples that serve both Chinese migrants and 
local people (see Chapter One). 
 
There has been a comparatively large amount of research conducted on Chinese 
migration to Thailand. The Chinese have been migrating to Thailand for centuries. 
During the reign of King Narai (1656-88), the king of Ayutthaya, the former capital of 
Thailand, there were only around 3,000 Chinese permanently settled in the country.34 In 
the late eighteenth century, after Ayutthaya was invaded and burnt down by the Burmese 
army in 1767, the Chinese population in Siam grew several fold due to the accession to 
the throne of King Taksin, the son of a Chinese migrant from Shantou in Guangdong. 
Chinese migration sharply increased during his reign (1767-1782) and maintained high 
levels throughout all of the early Chakri kings.35 Purcell argued that in the late nineteenth 
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and early twentieth centuries the increase in the number of Chinese was due to the 
expansion of Siam’s export trade, the chaotic state of China following the 1911 
revolution and the barriers against Chinese migration in French Indochina.36 Ian Brown 
has described how Siam carried out reforms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries that attracted Chinese migrants.37  
 
There was an increase in Chinese nationalism amongst the Chinese in South East 
Asia after China’s defeat by Japan in 1895. Overseas Chinese took part in the royalist 
reform party and the revolutionary movement, with Singapore at its centre. Newspapers 
serving as mouthpieces to both royalists and revolutionaries were published in the city. In 
Bangkok, a branch of the revolutionary movement was also established. A well-known 
leader of the revolutionists in Siam was Seow Hoodseng, who was appointed chairman of 
the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1906. In that year he also 
founded bilingual newspapers to support the movement.38 Penpisut Intarapirom has 
studied the political role of Seow from 1907 to 1931, finding that his interests in both 
Chinese and Thai national politics reflected his “Sino-Siamese” identity.39 Jeffery Sng 
and Pimpraphai Bisalputra have written that the involvement of leading Teochew 
families in Thailand was due to their networking with Seow.40 Eiji Murashima has 
studied the political role of certain Teochew families from Surat Thani.41 However, the 
historical analysis of the networks between leading families from Surat Thani and other 
families has been neglected.  
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During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Thai people also 
developed a spirit of nationalism. They accused the Chinese of crowding them out of 
trade and industry, of degrading native Thais with their gambling, and of being the Jews 
of Siam. Thai people first fully realised how dependent they were on the Chinese when 
they were severely inconvenienced by a Chinese strike in 1910 due to the 
misunderstandings of taxes payable to the government. 42  A serious campaign of 
suppression was launched after King Rama VI came to the throne. Rapid decline of secret 
societies led to the establishment of the CCC (Chinese Chamber of Commerce hereafter), 
which Skinner has described as the most essential Chinese organisation in Bangkok and 
one which managed to represent the Chinese community as a whole.43  
 
In the early twentieth century, the first Chinese schools in Bangkok were also 
founded along political lines. For example, the Huayi School was established by the 
Chinese Association, a front organisation for the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance 
founded by Seow in 1908, and the Zhonghua School was established by royalists between 
1909 and 1911. Later, other schools were also founded, of which Xinmin School, 
established under the auspices of the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance, was the most 
important. All five major dialect groups also supported Xinmin School, but the school 
used Teochew as the language of instruction. Therefore, it failed to meet the needs of 
other dialect groups and they founded their own schools: Jin Tek School by the Hakka in 
1913, Ming-te School by the Cantonese in 1914, Pei-yuan School by the Hokkien in 1916, 
and Yu-min School by the Hainanese in 1921.44  
 
After the Nationalists successfully reunited China in 1928, the idea of Chinese 
national identity, which revolved around the concept of the Republican citizen, was 
transmitted to the Chinese community in Siam. According to Wang Guangwu, the 
introduction of modern Chinese schools was a factor for rapid change and the idea of the 
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national was quickly implanted into the consciousness of local-born Chinese students.45 
A Chinese national language based on Northern Mandarin was also introduced as the 
language of instruction in Chinese schools. Narong Phuangphit has studied the policy on 
Chinese education during the reign of King Prajadhipok (1925-1935), arguing that 
Chinese schools had become a problem since they perpetuated Chinese nationalism and 
refused to engender assimilation into Siamese society. Therefore, an education law was 
launched to control Chinese schools more effectively as part of the Thai-ification policy 
to force the Chinese to become Thai.46 However, Phuangphit failed to examine the 
response of the Chinese to the education policy, a part of Thai-ification programme.  
 
Another wave of Chinese nationalism in the Chinese community in Thailand was 
sparked by the Second Sino-Japanese War (SSJW hereafter) of 1937-1945. Chinese 
migrants around the world who identified strongly with their homeland were associated 
with displays of patriotism and support for China’s war effort against Japan.47 William 
Skinner has described the political action organisations that were established in 1937-
1938 to help China’s cause and whose goals were to enforce an anti-Japanese boycott and 
collect and remit funds for the Chinese war effort. However, all these activities were 
illegal as the Thai government sought to reconcile themselves with growing Japanese 
power in the region. As a result, in 1939 many Chinese leaders were arrested for 
involvement in anti-Japanese activities.48 Skinner’s study failed to provide a full picture 
of the boycott leading up to 1937, an activity that caused severe damage to the Japanese 
economy. In addition, the Chinese used it to respond to Japanese agitation in China even 
before the start of the war in 1937 (see Chapter Three).  
 
                                                
45 Wang Gungwu, “Local and National: A Dialogue between Tradition and Modernity,” in Ethnic Chinese 
in Singapore and Malaysia: A Dialogue between Tradition and Modernity, ed. Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: 
Times Academic Press, 2002), 5. 
46 Narong Phuangphit, นโยบายเกี)ยวกบัการศกึษาของคนจนีในประเทศไทยในรัชสมยัพระบาทสมเด็จพระปก 
เกลา้เจา้อยูห่วั (The policy on the education of the Chinese in Thailand during the reign of King 
Prajadhipok) (Bangkok: Bhannakij Publishing, 1975), 56-115.  
47 Ernest Koh, Diaspora at War: the Chinese of Singapore between Empire and Nation, 1937-1945 
(Leiden: Brill, 2013), 59. 
48 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 261-272.  
	 29	
Ernest Koh, in his book Diaspora at War, which studied Singapore’s Chinese 
who identified politically with China and contributed to China’s war effort during the 
SSJW, proposed that “diaspora” narrates an ideological relationship that can be 
constructed between centres and peripheries. Therefore, China diaspora is used rather 
than Chinese diaspora to capture better the connection between overseas Chinese and 
China because an idea of China existed around the 1930s.49 However, Koh fails to 
recognise that the surge of Chinese nationalism and the anti-Japanese sentiment amongst 
the diaspora in South East Asia had been brewing for decades long prior to the 1930s. For 
example, the Chinese in Siam responded to the Japanese agitation in China by boycotting 
Japanese merchandise in events such as the Twenty-One Demands in 1915 and the May 
Fourth Movement in 1919 (see Chapter Three).  
 
In 1938, Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram became the Prime Minister of 
Thailand. The subsequent year was the worst year for Thailand’s Chinese community. All 
Chinese schools were closed down by the Phibun government. 50  Whilst Phichai 
Rattanapon claimed that every Chinese school in Thailand was closed down between 
1938 and 1940.51 Research has revealed that Chinese schools, newspapers, and banks 
collaborated closely with secret societies operating against the Japanese.  
 
On 8 December 1941, Japanese troops landed in Thailand and the Thai 
government decided to co-operate with the Japanese. Many leading Chinese leaders who 
were supporting Chinese anti-Japanese organisations were arrested. Only the CCC and 
native-place associations were allowed to remain open as usual. In 1943, the Chinese 
were persuaded to work on the Death Railway and the CCC organised recruitment for it. 
By the end of the Pacific War in 1945, there were many underground groups operating 
against the Japanese and many of them were co-operating with the Free Thai 
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Movement.52 However, conflict between Chinese collaborators with the Japanese and 
patriotic Chinese has been neglected in the scholarship on this subject.  
 
The end of the Second World War saw a resurgence in Chinese nationalism. 
Phuwadol Songprasert has noted how the Chinese in Bangkok and other big cities 
celebrated the victory over Japan. Moreover, the Chinese circulated rumours that 
Guomindang (GMD hereafter) troops were set to arrive to occupy Thailand. Some 
Chinese physically attacked Thai people in acts of revenge for perceived injustices which 
had occurred during the war and the Japanese occupation. The flag of the Republic of 
China was also hung to celebrate and challenge the Thai authorities. 53  However, 
Songprasert’s analysis failed to fully explain how the tensions between Thais and 
Chinese were resolved.  
 
Many scholars have researched the Chinese community in southern Thailand. 
Skinner has written that the Southern Peninsula was the first region that attracted Chinese 
and foreign merchants. Fleets of Chinese junks stopped at numerous ports and 
settlements on the east side of the peninsula.54 From around 1850 to 1870 there was an 
expansion of rice cultivation for export, making mainland South East Asia pre-eminent in 
the world rice trade. The financing, the transportation, milling, and export of the rice crop 
had increasingly fallen under the sway of Chinese merchants over the second half of the 
nineteenth century.55 At the same time, Chinese migrants from the tin districts of the 
peninsula moved to Central Siam and other ports. 56  These and other economic 
developments had a significant effect on Chinese migration to the region.  
 
The reformed system of provincial administration which took effect in 1894 
changed the face of the peninsula. A provincial office of the Department of Mines was 
founded in Phuket, the capital of tin, appointing a mines commissioner with 
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responsibility for issuing concessions and inspecting leases. By 1915, there were six 
mines officials positioned in the southern provinces, namely Phuket, Nakhon 
Sithammarat, Kedah, Pattani, Phang Nga, and Ranong.57 A southern railway was also 
constructed down the east side of the peninsula, with the Siamese government hoping that 
the railway would encourage foreign investment in mining and help to develop 
agriculture and forestry in South Siam.58 The scholarship shows that the reforms and the 
railway were important, and this thesis adds to this scholarship by revealing that these 
two developments were key factors causing the Chinese to migrate to Surat Thani.  
 
Their networks and connections with Siam’s royal family are also important for 
the success of the Chinese in Siam. Skinner has argued that Wu Yang’s family (吳陽) 
was famous because he was the first Chinese in Siam allowed to become a governor, 
paving the way for other Chinese migrants such as Kaw Suchiang (許泗章). Wu Yang, a 
Hokkien, came to Songkhla by junk in 1750 from Fujian. When King Taksin 
consolidated his power in the peninsula in 1769, Wu reported his estates and presented 
fifty cases of tobacco to the King. In 1775, Taksin made him governor of Songkhla. Nine 
Songkhla governors were from his family until the reformed system of provincial 
administration. Kaw Suchiang, another Hokkien, had migrated to Penang about 1810 to 
work as a coolie. He saved money to do business in South Siam. In Ranong, Kaw 
expanded coastal trading and established a tin mining company. Later, he was appointed 
to governor of Ranong. His son, Kaw Simbee, also served as the governor of Phuket in 
1901. Simbee encouraged Chinese migration, primarily Hokkiens, from Penang, in 
British Malaya, to Phuket and gave them funds to start working in the tin mining.59 This 
study shows how such Chinese families were successful because they had networks and 
connections with the royal family (see Chapter Three). The research also explores the 
networks of the Hokkien tin miners between Penang and two southern provinces, Ranong 
and Phuket. This thesis found that the tin mining industry in Surat Thani attracted Hakka 
tin miners from Penang (see Chapter Three).  
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Supakarn Siripaisan’s research on the history of the Chinese community in Hat 
Yai, a district in Songkhla, noted how Hat Yai, a small village at the time, became an 
important port and a big city in Thailand after the railway arrived. During the 
construction of the railway, many Chinese migrated here. The major dialect groups, 
ordered by population size, were Hakka, Teochew, Cantonese, and Hainanese. The most 
remarkable Chinese in Hat Yai was Chia Kisi (謝樞泗), a successful Hakka railway 
contractor.60 However, Siripaisan’s study did not cover Surat Thani, which had also 
benefited from and had grown in size as a result of the railway.  
 
Many scholars have studied the transnational networks and cross-border links 
between the Chinese community in Southern Thailand and Northern Malaya. Wong Yee 
Tuan has researched Penang’s big five Hokkien families and Southern Siam during the 
nineteenth century, revealing the existence of interaction in the Penang-Southern Siam 
linkage and the role of Penang’s Hokkien business networks in enabling the big five 
families to advance their business interests in Southern Siam.61 In his research Wong 
proposed that the family networks bound the five families together through strategic 
cross-family marriages and shared place of origin in China.62 To establish their business 
interests in Southern Siam, the five families intermarried with other prominent Hokkien 
families in the Southern Peninsula, especially the Kaw family who controlled the Penang-
oriented commercial economy of the west coast of Southern Siam. For example, two 
daughters of the Cheah family were married to two sons of Kaw Suchiang, Kaw Simtek 
and Kaw Simkong, who served as governors of Langsuan in the 1870s and Ranong in 
1877, respectively. Therefore, living in the fluid and plural environment of the region, the 
big five families utilised intermarriage within their own dialect group to expand their 
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business interests from Penang to the Southern Peninsula.63 Additionally, Wong argued 
that the five families not only intermarried and formed alliances with other Hokkien elites, 
but also Hakka elites who controlled tin mining businesses in Penang and Perak, 
Penang’s neighbouring state.64 Nevertheless, little is known about the network of the 
Hakka families who migrated from Penang and Perak and controlled the tin mining 
industry of Surat Thani. Further research is required to determine whether the families of 
Penang’s Hakka tin miners in Surat Thani were related to the big five. 
 
In his research article, “Chinese-Malay-Thai Interactions and the Making of 
Kelantan Peranakan Chinese Ethnicity,” Teo Kok Seong has studied the assimilation 
process of the rural Chinese, whom are often labelled ‘Peranakan Chinese,’ into the local 
Malay and Thai population in Kelantan, which is a north-eastern state of Peninsular 
Malaysia and shared a border with Southern Thailand. Teo wrote that the earliest 
Peranakan Chinese of Kelantan came from Chinese-Siamese intermarriages. Historically, 
these Peranakan Chinese fled from Patani to Kelantan when it was attacked by Siam in 
the late seventeenth century. By the late eighteenth century, Chinese settlements in 
Kelantan were firmly established, with Chinese-Siamese intermarriages and adoption of 
Malay customs.65 Living in rural areas, the Peranakan Chinese, who were entirely 
Hokkien, had many opportunities for interactions with Malay and Siamese communities 
in Kelantan, and so they were more assimilated with local Malays and Siamese. Their 
language, food and costume represented this assimilation process. The version of 
Hokkien spoken by them was influenced by the Malay dialect and Thai language. In 
cuisine pork, the staple Chinese meat, was cooked with Malay and Thai ingredients. And 
in society women wore a sarong kebaya, Malay-style costume.66 This thesis thus shows 
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that the migration of the Chinese tin miners from Penang in the early twentieth century 
marked the beginning of the Peranakan community in Surat Thani.  
 
Teo, in his research conclusion, wrote that even though the Kelantan Peranakan 
did not feel offended with by the label ‘Peranakan Chinese’, they referred to themselves 
as “Tng-lang” (唐人), or ‘people of the Tang dynasty’, a term exclusive to “Chinese”. 
They also called themselves “Thai-Chinese” and “Siamese-Hokkiens” in order to 
distinguish themselves from town Chinese. Indeed, they became aware of the “Peranakan” 
term only with the founding of Kelantan Chinese Peranakan Association, which was 
established in 1987 at a Thai temple.67 Similarly, in Surat Thani, people who were born 
of Hainanese fathers and Thai mothers called themselves “Deng-nang,” a Hainanese 
version of “Tng-lang” (see Chapter One). Moreover, before the late 1930s, women’s 
costumes distinguished the Peranakan family from the Dengnang’s, who had settled in 
the coastal areas and on the islands of Surat Thani. While the Peranakan Chinese women 
dressed in sarong kebaya, a Malay-style cloth, the daughters of the latter wore chong 
kraben, a Siamese-style cloth. However, Dengnang women started to wear a Malay-style 
batik sarong after Phibun had encouraged women to wear western skirts or sarongs and 
finally issued a law on dress in 1941 that forced people to stop wearing chong kraben. 
Therefore, clear identification of Peranakan women gradually became less apparent (see 
Chapter Four).68 
 
Michael J. Montesano has utilised Chinese-sponsored education in Trang as a tool 
to investigate developments in Chinese society on the west coast of Southern Thailand 
during the twentieth century, arguing that Chinese schools, which were supported by the 
Chinese community in Trang, reflected close connections between Southern Thailand and 
                                                
67 Teo, “Chinese-Malay-Thai Interactions and the Making of Kelantan Peranakan Chinese Ethnicity,” 229-
230. 
68 During my field research trip to Surat Thani in 2015, I found that many dengnangs in the coastal areas of 
Surat Thani, both men and women, have begun to refer to themselves as “Baba,” which simply means 
“Peranakan”. Perhaps, this was the result of Phibun’s cultural Thai-ification programme, which forced the 
dengnangs to incorporate aspects of Malay culture. Further research is needed in this area. 
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Malaya.69 Trang’s Chinese community long had close ties with Penang. The Hokkien and 
the Cantonese had throughout the course of many generations migrated to Trang from 
Penang. In the early 1920s, two Chinese primary schools were established by Trang’s 
Chinese.70 Montesano has claimed that their ability to establish these schools was derived 
from interaction with external capital. The involvement of Trang in the rubber trade 
strengthened connections with British Malaya due to the fact that the output of rubber in 
Trang, as well as other provinces along the Southern Peninsula, was exported to global 
markets through Malaya. In other words, the integration into the global rubber economy 
enabled the Chinese to support their Chinese schools adequately.71 Similar to Trang, 
rubber also connected Surat Thani’s Chinese with Malaya. Surat Thani, one of the rubber 
centres in Southern Siam, drew Chinese immigrants who were rubber planters from 
Northern Malaya. Furthermore, some supporters of Chinese schools in Surat Thani 
owned rubber plantations. Liao Jingsong, a founder of Tao Ing School in the Chinese-
dominated Bandon, for example, had a rubber plantation (see Chapter Four).  
 
Montesano also proposed that education bound Trang, as well as other provinces 
in the Thai South, to Penang, a great centre of South East Asia and a crucial node in the 
educational network. A large number of Chinese in Trang and across the Southern 
Peninsula sent their children there for Chinese and English education. Studying there not 
only offered high academic standards but also economic opportunity and the opportunity 
to establish fruitful business connections. A lot of leading Chinese from the region were 
the products of a Penang education. Many chairmen of Chinese associations in Trang 
enrolled at Chung Ling High School (鍾靈中學校), a hotbed of anti-Japanese sentiment 
and a source of fundraising against the Japanese prior to the Pacific War. In other words, 
it made Trang’s Chinese orient towards Penang.72 Many leading Chinese in Surat Thani 
                                                
69 Michael J. Montesano, “Capital, State, and Society in the History of Chinese-Sponsored Education in 
Trang,” in Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on the Plural Peninsula, eds. Michael J. 
Montesano and Patrick Jory (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), 269.  
70 Montesano, “Capital, State, and Society in the History of Chinese-Sponsored Education in Trang,” 233.  
71 Montesano, “Capital, State, and Society in the History of Chinese-Sponsored Education in Trang,” 256-
261. 
72 Montesano, “Capital, State, and Society in the History of Chinese-Sponsored Education in Trang,” 238-
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also studied in Penang. For example, Shou Kiangjiao, whose family had financially 
supported a post-war Chinese school in Surat Thani, graduated from Chung Ling High 
School, where Shou also established a connection with other prominent Chinese from 
Trang and across southern Thailand. Zhan Kimha, who donated all of his guns and bullets 
to the fight against the Japanese during the invasion of Surat Thani in 1941, also received 
a Chinese education from Penang (see Chapter Three). Thus, it would not be incorrect to 
state that the Chinese communities in Surat Thani and Penang were connected via 
education.  
 
With regards to notions of identity, Supang Chantavanich, in her research article 
“From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai,” which studies the interaction between Thai 
and Chinese nationalism and its impact on the identity of the overseas Chinese in 
Thailand, has argued that the five major Chinese dialect groups had been very conscious 
of their ethnic Chinese identities in the late nineteenth century. She added that the 
Chinese in Siam referred to themselves as “Siamese-Chinese,” or Xian Hua (暹華), a 
dubious term criticised by King Vajiravudh (1910-1925) because it suggests that they 
were considered Siamese only once they had proclaimed their allegiance to Siam. 
Additionally, she claimed that leading Chinese luminaries proved their loyalty to Siam by 
adopting Siamese family names in an attempt to keep a dual identity.73 On the contrary, 
this thesis points out that the Chinese were still Chinese, but that they formed different 
identities to negotiate with the Siamese authorities in order to preserve their Chinese 
identity. For example, after the Thai-ification programme was rigorously enforced to 
control Chinese nationalism and the CCP’s activities, many managers, who were Chinese 
elites, signed their names in Thai with a royal title, attempting to show loyalty to the 
Siamese authorities in order to preserve their schools (see Chapter Two).  
 
Chantavanich has also proposed that Chinese identities shifted from ethnic to 
national after Chinese schools in Siam began to use Mandarin as the language of 
                                                
73 Supang Chantavanich, “From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai: Political Conditions and Identity Shifts 
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Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), 232-233, 236-237.  
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instruction in 1930, in contrast to the majority of Chinese schools in South East Asia, 
which still used dialects as the language of instruction.74 In terms of the shifting identities 
of ethnic Chinese, her argument is analogous to this thesis. Nevertheless, in the late 
1920s there was a movement to use Mandarin in Chinese schools not only in Siam but 
also elsewhere across South East Asia.  
 
According to Chantavanich, when Phibun became Prime Minister in 1938, the 
two factors underpinning the need for a stronger sense of Thai nationalism were Chinese 
nationalism and communism. She further noted that Phibun’s purpose was to protect 
social cohesion and public order.75 However, this thesis has argued that Phibun launched 
the Thai-ification policies with the aim of overturning the economic domination of 
Thailand by the Chinese (see Chapter Four). Moreover, Phibun became staunchly anti-
communist following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 
and subsequently imposed a series of anti-communist laws to suppress the Chinese (see 
Chapter Five). Chantavanich has further described that during World War II, the Chinese 
gradually began to lose their Chinese identity after the Chinese Daily News (中原報), the 
only Chinese newspaper that was allowed to publish at the time, was taken over by the 
Japanese in 1941.76 In contrast, this thesis emphasises that the Chinese still preserved 
their Chinese identity to a great extent, even though they had changed their nationality to 
Thai. Essentially, with a shared anti-Japanese sentiment, the Chinese were still the 
Chinese (see Chapter Four).  
 
Chantavanich has contended that, after the end of World War II, the Chinese 
could not continue to preserve their Chinese nationalist ideology. 77  However, 
Chantavanich fails to realise the fact that there was actually a resurgence of Chinese 
nationalism when the war came to an end as the Chinese in Thailand celebrated the 
victory over Japan. Moreover, the Chinese Embassy was founded partly to protect the 
Chinese in Thailand and one consequence was that Chinese education thrived (see 
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Chapter Five). Chantavanich also fails to provide an adequate picture of the ideological 
conflict between GMD and CCP sympathisers in the post-war years. In her research, she 
concluded that the defeat of the PRC in 1949 accelerated the identity shift of the Chinese 
towards Thailand. The majority of the Siamese-Chinese became Thai citizens; therefore, 
they should be termed “Chinese-Thais,” or “Sino-Thais”.78 
 
Richard Coughlin, in his book Double Identity, noted that Sino-Thai people were 
the offspring of intermarriage between Chinese and Thais. He further noted that such 
persons were also called lukchin, or “Chinese child”, by Thais, but in practice this term 
might be applied to all persons who had some Thai blood.79 Coughlin has observed the 
role of the CCC as an intermediary between the Chinese and the Thai authorities and that 
its highest officials were mostly leading Sino-Thai elites, who interceded for the Chinese 
who were experiencing problems with the Thai authorities. In other words, the Sino-Thai 
took positions as intermediaries. Moreover, Coughlin also proposed that most Sino-Thai 
identified themselves with either the Chinese or Thais and that both the Thais and the 
Chinese accepted them without prejudice.80 Although Coughlin’s idea of the Sino-Thai as 
intermediaries is true to a degree, he fails to emphasise the fact that these Sino-Thai elites 
utilised their Thai identity for the benefit of the Chinese community. In contrast, this 
thesis has revealed that in the first half of the twentieth century the majority of Sino-
Thais were more Chinese-oriented than they were Thai. It should also be borne in mind 
that there was significant prejudice against Sino-Thais remained. For example, in the late 
1920s, the Siamese authorities wanted to inspect Chinese textbooks but they distrusted 
the translators because they were lukchin (see Chapter Two). Also, during the Pacific 
War the Thai government also monitored closely Sino-Thais who worked in the 
government sectors (see Chapter Four). Coughlin acknowledges that, unlike the 
peranakan Chinese, Sino-Thais were indistinct socially and did not form a separate part 
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of the population.81 This underlines the fact that during the first half of the twentieth 
century most Sino-Thai identified themselves as Chinese. 
 
To comprehend mass movements of people, one recent theoretical approach is the 
theory of transnationalism, which comprises two important elements: transmigration and 
diaspora.82 Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton have proposed 
that transnationalism is the process through which immigrants create social fields 
connecting together their country of origin and their country of settlement. Those who 
build the social fields integral to this process are termed “transmigrants”.83 As for 
“diaspora”, the etymology of the term is Greek, and the word was used by the ancient 
Greeks to refer to migration and colonisation.84 “Diaspora” was used to describe the 
dispersed Jews after their temple in Jerusalem was destroyed by the Babylonian army in 
586 BC. The dispersal of the Jews was later heightened by the conquest of the Holy Land 
by the Romans in 643 BC. The African diaspora refers to enslaved migrants across the 
Atlantic and Indian Oceans from the sixteenth through to the nineteenth centuries. Today, 
the Irish, Chinese, Indians, and others use the term to describe the emigrees from their 
homelands.85 
 
For Michael Fisher, the term “diaspora” has been replaced by “migration” in 
recent years. Laurence Ma sees the word as signifying loss of homeland, uprootedness, 
expulsion, oppression, moral degradation, a collective memory of the homeland, and a 
strong desire to return to it one day. In other words, it depicts a process of scattering in 
space and is replete with emotional connotations.86 Diaspora can refer to a group of 
people who have scattered from the same ancestral homeland and have established 
themselves in different locations. Ma has also argued that diaspora symbolises 
interconnected sets of places and spatial processes created by transmigration and 
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transnational economic activity.87 However, Ma fails to explore the complex nature of 
space creation. For example, within a space there are many smaller spaces created and 
interacted in by migrants, and these spaces can be also shifting and fluid (see Chapter 
One).  
  
The term “overseas Chinese” is not easy to define.88 Historically, the Chinese 
government began to use the term huaqiao (華僑), or overseas Chinese, in the nineteenth 
century to refer to Chinese citizens working or living abroad. This word has been largely 
used to define Chinese living abroad despite their citizenship, a definition followed by 
this thesis.89 Wang Gungwu has proposed that this term should be used to refer to 
Chinese citizens abroad only, while Ma has argued that it should be used to define all 
ethnic Chinese outside China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan regardless of citizenship.90 This 
term is identical to haiwaihuaren (海外華人), or Chinese living overseas, and Chinese 
descendent (華裔).91 
 
In addition to transnationalism, six other theories account for international 
migration: neoclassical economics, the new economics of migration, the segmented 
labour market, world systems, migrant networks, and cumulative causation. Neoclassical 
economic theory holds that migration is caused by such factors as spatial disparity in 
employment opportunities, local pay differences, expected income gaps for individuals or 
households, and changes in the structure of the economy which provoke economic 
disruptions. The second concept is the new economics of migration, which argues that 
international migration is caused by market failures where migrants come from. In third 
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view, the segmented labour market, global migration is seen as resulting from demand in 
advanced industrial societies, where a two-sector economy prevails in which labour is 
categorised under two sectors: primary and secondary. Capable local labourers are 
employed in the primary sector, but incapable or low-skilled labourers are hired in the 
secondary. The fourth is the theory of world systems, which focuses on connections 
between core and peripheral economies, especially in “global” and “local” contexts. The 
fifth is migrant networks, seen as sets of interpersonal ties that link together migrants, 
former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination locations through ties of 
kinship, friendship, and shared community origin. The final theory, cumulative causation, 
records how migration experiences exert an impact on future migrations. It is used to 
analyse places where migration has happened again and again, particularly migrants from 
coastal provinces of South China, whose migration is based on the accumulative 
knowledge of past migrations.92  
 
Ma has criticised these six theoretical approaches on account of the fact that they 
neglect the place-based qualities and spatial processes of Chinese diasporic migration.93 
Therefore, the most appropriate and most recent theory that can be used to account for the 
intricate nature of modern migrant geographies, social behaviours, economic activities, 
and changing cultural identities is transnationalism. As mentioned above, this approach 
focuses on the process that migrants create social fields connecting their home country 
and the host country. In the first half of the twentieth century, Chinese migrants to Surat 
Thani and elsewhere were often involved in two or more societies and through them still 
preserved strong relations with China. For example, they remitted money home and took 
part in Chinese national politics. Additionally, transnationalism is characterised by the 
movement of people, capital, goods, ideas and information across networked spaces 
between homeland and settled land where a diasporic person has settled.94 It is thus most 
fitting with this research’s aim to investigate the creation of space and the creation of 
identity within that space by Chinese migrants in Surat Thani. 
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These six aspects can be included in the theory of transnationalism and can be 
deployed in this research. The first theory is useful for explaining why the Chinese in the 
nineteenth century, following economic disruptions, migrated to Surat Thani. Migrant 
networks can be used to account for the networks of relationships, especially in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when there was a huge influx of Teochew into 
Thailand owing to the accession to the throne of King Taksin. Cumulative causation can 
be applied to explain how Chinese migrations to Surat Thani, particularly those from 




II.        Why Surat Thani?   
 
As noted, Surat Thani has a lengthy history of contact with China. Victor Purcell has 
written about how a large proportion of the city of Bandon’s 20,000 inhabitants was 
Chinese by the second half of the nineteenth century. There were Hainanese, Hokkiens 
and Cantonese involved in the export of timber, rattans, skins, and other jungle products, 
transported mainly by a large fleet of Chinese junks. The Chinese, who tried to control 
the trade as much as possible, successfully boycotted Bangkok-based steamers.95 Surat 
Thani was at the centres of many important trade routes, and had long been a port for 
trading with China, Japan, Taiwan, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Bangkok, and other southern provinces in Thailand such as Chumphon, Nakhon Si 
Thammarat, Phuket, and Songkhla. A study which focuses on Surat Thani, therefore, can 
illuminate aspects of the wider history of trading networks in this region.  
 
In terms of its political importance, in 1899, under the reformed system of 
provincial administration, King Chulalongkorn (1853-1910) merged Bandon with 
Chaiya, a former city and a modern district in Surat Thani, making Bandon the provincial 
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centre. Connected with other regions by footpaths and by sea before 1909, in that year the 
government began to construct the southern railway which was to connect Surat Thani 
and other southern provinces with Bangkok.96 Due to these two factors (the reform and 
the railway), Surat Thani became an important port, a development which attracted many 
Chinese migrants from different parts of China to the province. In the early twentieth 
century, Surat Thani came under the administration of Monthon Chumphon, which was 
later incorporated into Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat in 1925 until the monthon system 
was abolished in 1932 and the top-level administrative division was the province (see 
Chapter One).97 
 
Despite the fact that Surat Thani has a long history of contact with China, the 
history of Chinese migration to the area has not been studied extensively in prior research 
on Chinese migration to Thailand. For example, the Chinese community in Surat Thani is 
hardly mentioned at all in G. William Skinner’s classic text Chinese Society in Thailand: 
An Analytical History.98 Jeffery Sng and Pimpraphai Bisalputra devote only a page and a 
half of text in their A History of the Thai-Chinese to what they describe as the family 
background of Liao Chiangsoon, a southern tycoon, and his son, Liao Jingsong, from 
Surat Thani, totally ignoring the history of the wider Chinese community in Surat 
Thani.99 Although Kanok Nganphairot writes a short article about the history of Chinese 
schools in Bandon, the capital district of Surat Thani, many details, such as the year of 
the establishment of some schools, are incorrect.100 These details have been reproduced 
as newspaper articles such as newspaper articles in the Mueangtai News, a monthly 
newspaper, dated November 2015 and March 2017.  
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The history of Chinese migration to Surat Thani is therefore scant at best, despite 
the fact that it was among the first regions of Thailand to attract Chinese migrations. It is 
clear, then, that using Surat Thani as a case study is both groundbreaking and important 
to this field of research. The methodologies employed in this thesis are rich and 
interdisciplinary. Combining archival materials with a wide range of other sources 
collected from temple visits, family histories and oral history interviews, this thesis 
provides invaluable insights into our understanding of the shared history of Thailand and 
China.  
 
In terms of scholarly contributions, this study serves as a window into successive 
Chinese migrations to Surat Thani and explores the shifting identities of ethnic Chinese 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century. The migrant communities in Surat 
Thani and also in greater Thailand had fluid identities and complicated characteristics 
that were susceptible to change over time. From the late nineteenth century, the Chinese 
saw themselves as Hokkien, Cantonese, Teochew, Hainanese, and Hakka. In the late 
1920s, multiple ethnic Chinese consciousnesses were gradually transformed into a 
unified national Chinese consciousness. The Chinese contributed to the Chinese war 
effort against the Japanese after the SSJW broke out in 1937, and armed themselves to 
fight against the Japanese when Japanese troops landed in Surat Thani in 1941. During 
the Second World War, the Chinese found themselves split into two groups: those who 
supported the Japanese and those who did not. In the post-war years, the Chinese were 
again essentially divided into two: pro-GMD and pro-Chinese Communist Party (CCP).   
 
This thesis also highlights the transnational networks which were established 
between the Chinese communities in Surat Thani and those in Northern Malaya, in 
particular those in Penang in the first half of the twentieth century. Many Chinese in 
Surat Thani not only enjoyed trading networks with those Chinese in Northern Malaya, 
but also family and educational networks. The tin mining industry of Ban Na San was 
chiefly owned and operated by Hakka tin miners who had migrated from Northern 
Malaya. The Peranakan community reflected relations between the Hakka peranakan in 
Surat Thani with Northern Malaya. Education linked Surat Thani Chinese to Northern 
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Malaya, with many Chinese parents sending their children to Penang to receive an 
education. In fact, many leading Chinese were the product of a Penang Chinese education. 
Before the Japanese invasion of the Southern Peninsula in 1941, some Chinese also took 
refuge in Penang.  
 
It came as a great surprise during the research in this thesis that during the Second 
World War the Chinese who were working for the Japanese and those who had changed 
their Chinese nationality to Japanese in order to assume for themselves the power to 
indulge in illegal activities were called “Taiwan,” a term meaning “traitors” at that time 
because Taiwan was then under Japanese rule and some Taiwanese in Thailand identified 
politically with the Japanese.   
 
In South East Asia, Surat Thani was one of the most important hubs in the 
Hainanese and CCP networks. The largest dialect group in Surat Thani was the 
Hainanese, and it should be pointed out that most of the CCP members in South East 
Asia were also Hainanese. Since the late 1920s, the CCP had been politically active in 
Surat Thani, where CCP activities were undertaken in Chinese schools, leading to the 
arrest and deportation of many Chinese teachers. In addition, this study has underlined 
the networks between the CCP members in Thailand and those in British Malaya. These 
transnational political organisations were closely interconnected.  
 
This thesis not only brings the existence of the Peranakan community in Surat 
Thani to light but also the Tanka, an ethnic subgroup. Importantly, the Tanka had also 
migrated to the coastal parts where the Hainanese community has settled in Surat Thani. 




III.      The Structure of the Thesis  
 
This thesis explores Chinese migration and the transformation of ethnic Chinese 
identities in the first half of the twentieth century in Surat Thani by exploring the role of 
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Chinese temples and their schools. Surat Thani was a meeting place for migrants from 
many different parts of China, which made the characteristics of migrant communities 
and their associated networks quite complicated. The rich picture of the Chinese 
community in Surat Thani provides excellent opportunities for examination and raises 
four central areas of enquiry. The first issue is how Chinese identities, including notions 
of clan, nationality, and local identities, changed over time. Secondly, how did migrants 
struggle to balance their identities with others in new places and new environments, both 
politically and economically? Third, how did migrants establish and use their 
transnational networks in the new spaces? The final issue concerns the impact of the two 
distinct colonial periods, Western and Japanese colonialism, and the interactions between 
them.  
 
Using the theoretical lens of transnationalism, especially the notion of spatial 
interaction, these areas of enquiry are explored through a focus on Chinese temples and 
their schools, which serve as a window into the Chinese migrations and the 
transformation of Chinese identities throughout the first half of the twentieth century. 
This thesis draws on diverse primary materials, historical artefacts, oral history 
interviews, together with the relevant existing secondary literature. The National 
Archives of the United Kingdom has a huge collection of records on Siam and China 
during the first half of the twentieth century. However, the collections during and after 
the Pacific War are of particular interest for the subject of Chinese migration to Thailand 
because large-scale immigration by Chinese into South East Asia in 1943 attracted the 
interest of the British government. The collection of the War Office also has various 
memorandums and reports about the Chinese in Thailand, Sino-Thai relations, and 
political divisions. The Foreign Office’s collection has also been invaluable. There are 
extracts from English newspapers such as Bangkok Post, Liberty, The Malaya Tribune, 




During a nine-month field research trip in Thailand, the bulk of primary materials 
from the National Archives of Thailand proved useful.101 Not only have many collections 
been investigated and selected from various ministries, but many photos in the archive 
have also been used. The collection of the Ministry of Education has provided letters, 
reports, and newspaper articles about Chinese schools in Surat Thani during the early 
twentieth century. Large amounts of archival documents have provided useful 
information about the development of Chinese nationalism and the education law of Siam. 
There are also many illuminating documents in this collection about Thai-nationalism 
and Thai-ification policies after Phibun came to power in 1938. The highlights of one of 
the sources in this archive are Chinese and Siamese newspaper articles, records, letters 
and reports on microfilms about anti-Japanese campaigns and initiatives, particularly the 
boycotts of Japanese products in the early twentieth century. The collection of the 
Secretariat of the Cabinet details the conflicts between the Chinese who joined the 
boycott and those who did not.  
 
During 1941 to 1945, one of the collections of this period is the collection of the 
Ministry of Education, which presents a detailed account of the damage which occurred 
during and after the Japanese invasion of Thailand. Additionally, the details on the Thai-
ification programme during the war period can be found in this collection. Many 
documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs show the military, political, and 
economic co-operation between Thailand and Japan. There are also telegraphs about the 
attempt to exchange diplomatic relations between Bangkok and Nanking, led respectively 
by Phibun and Wang Jingwei, the head of the Nanjing government. Rich sources on 
Chinese underground activities against the Japanese are also in this collection. The 
collection of the Ministry of Interior provided an account of Chinese reaction to the 
Japanese occupation in the southern provinces, including Surat Thani. The hardships of 
the Chinese community in the region are described in the Secretariat of Cabinet’s 
collection. The useful collection of the Supreme Command Headquarters gave 
information about Chinese underground activities. The collections of the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs, the Secretariat of Cabinet, and the Ministry of Education provided many 
illuminating documents about the position of Chinese schools, as well as Sino-Thai 
relations and tensions during the post-war years. A rich source of information on the 
conflagration that swept through the downtown of Bandon in 1953 is contained in the 
Secretariat of the Cabinet.  
 
During the trip to Thailand, I travelled to Phuket, Songkhla, and Surat Thani in 
order to survey the Chinese community and collect data from Chinese temples, Thai 
temples, Chinese native-place associations, and graveyards. The data collected proved 
useful. For example, the mural painting at Matchimawat temple in Songkhla provided an 
insightful picture of the Chinese community in the Malay peninsula during the nineteenth 
century. In a cemetery in Phuket, many Peranakans exerted their identity on their 
tombstones.102 Artefact evidence can highlight the gaps in written documents. To convey 
their thoughts and feelings through buildings and temples, overseas Chinese recorded this 
style of writing on wooden plates, door frames, candlesticks, bells, drums, and altar tables. 
Two bells dating to the late sixteenth century, presently in Chaiya National Museum, 
symbolise early Chinese settlement in Surat Thani. Moreover, these artefacts cannot only 
be used to trace the history of each Chinese community, but also the transnational 
networks of the migrants. A huge amount of artefacts from eighteen temples and native-
place associations established in the first half of the nineteenth and the second half of the 
twentieth centuries across Surat Thani have been thoroughly examined in this thesis.  
 
Eyewitness testimonies help researchers to complete the picture when there are 
gaps in the archival evidence and when data is absent from archives. Oral history 
emerged as an acceptable form of primary source material when there was the revolt 
against the elitism that was seen as limiting intellectual historical inquiry in the 1960s.103 
During the field research, a total of sixty-three interviews with eye-witnesses were 
                                                
102 I was surprised to find that there were also Peranakans in Surat Thani, as some scholars, such as 
Caroline S. Hau, tend to focus on the Peranakan community in Phuket. See Caroline S. Hau, The Chinese 
Question: Ethnicity, Nation, and Region in and beyond the Philippines (Singapore: Kyoto University Press, 
2014), 251-252.  
103 Koh, “Introduction,” 8-9.  
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conducted. However, I was somewhat wary about any over-reliance on oral history. The 
nature of memory is that it is not a precise source, shaped as it is by such factors as the 
passage of time and experiences since the event. Yet oral history can provide useful 
insights if deployed carefully and corroborated with available archival materials.104 In 
this thesis, therefore, only twenty interviews were conducted (see Appendix Two).  
 
The first chapter of this thesis explores the migration of ethnic Chinese, their 
settlement, networks, and the transformation of their identities from ethnic to national 
from the late nineteenth century to 1927. It found that the industrial revolution and 
colonialism caused massive migration of Chinese to Surat Thani. Once Chinese migrants 
decided to settle in a particular place, they established their native-place associations 
through the construction of temples to serve as centres of networks. Nevertheless, each 
temple was built to serve migrants, who spoke a common language based on the regions 
where they were from. They saw themselves as Hokkien, Cantonese, Teochew, 
Hainanese, and Hakka. In the late 1920s, the introduction of the Chinese national 
language as the language of instruction in Chinese schools was the first sign of the 
transformation of Chinese identities from different ethnic groups to a single national one.  
 
The second chapter examines the Chinese response to the Thai-ification 
programme, from 1928 to 1937. After the Chinese Nationalist government was founded 
in Nanjing in 1928, veneration of Sun Yat-sen became a hallmark of Chinese nationalism. 
Therefore, different ethnic Chinese consciousnesses gradually evolved into a united 
national Chinese consciousness. Chinese schools were not only founded to perpetuate 
Sun’s revolutionary cause, but also that of communism. Knowing that both of these 
political ideas would threaten the notion of an absolute monarchy, the Siamese 
government introduced the Private School Act of 1927 to control Chinese schools. The 
operation of Chinese schools was seriously affected by the law. Some managers 
demonstrated loyalty to the monarchy by signing their names in Thai with a royal title, 
hoping to preserve their positions. Yet by 1933 Keemong School was the single school 
left in Surat Thani. In 1936, the Private School Act was amended to allow the Chinese 
                                                
104 Koh, “Introduction,” 9.  
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language to be taught for only two hours per week. Many Chinese parents thus sent their 
children to study abroad.  
 
The third chapter looks at the Chinese reaction to the Japanese invasion of both 
China and Thailand from 1937 to 1941. It opens with a brief history of the conflict 
between China and Japan and recounts the anti-Japanese feelings amongst the overseas 
Chinese. Before 1937, the overseas Chinese responded to Japanese agitation in China by 
boycotting Japanese products. Leading Chinese from Surat Thani also participated in 
various anti-Japanese movements in Siam. The connections of Liao Chiangsoon, the 
ninth chairman of the CCC, with leading Chinese in the country influenced his son, Liao 
Jingsong, to become involved in politics. Liao Jingsong and his friends were mentored by 
Seow Hoodseng, the leader of anti-Japanese movements in Siam. Liao, together with his 
friends, established the Teochew Association in 1938 as a vehicle to contribute to the 
Chinese war effort and undertake anti-Japanese activities. When the Japanese landed in 
Thailand in December 1941, Liao was arrested by the Japanese army whilst Chinese in 
Surat Thani armed themselves to fight against the Japanese when they landed in Bandon.  
 
The fourth chapter deals with the splits within the Chinese community during 
Thailand’s military alliance with Japan, from 1941 to 1945. Under Japanese occupation, 
the Chinese were faced with the dilemma of deciding whether or not to cooperate in spite 
of their anti-Japanese sentiments. While Liao Jingsong refused to collaborate with the 
Japanese and was immediately put into prison, Tan Siewmeng and Wang Jingwei chose 
the opposite path, leading to accusations of treason by non-cooperating, patriotic Chinese.  
 
The final chapter investigates the ideological conflict between GMD and CCP 
sympathisers, mirrored in the division of Chinese native-place associations and schools in 
Surat Thani from 1945 to 1949. After the GMD and the CCP went to war, Chinese 
native-place associations and schools were essentially divided into two: pro-GMD and 
pro-CCP. In the meantime, Phibun carried out a coup and became prime minister, and, 
exploiting the political upheaval in China, resumed the Thai-ification programme and 
closed many Chinese schools. Chinese secret associations that were collecting money to 
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finance the Chinese Civil War were also cracked down on by Phibun, who met with great 
success in his anti-Chinese policies, representing a victory for the Thai government over 



























Chinese Diaspora, Settlement, and Networks in Surat Thani 




I.         Introduction 
 
Archaeological evidence and shipwreck excavations reveal that China’s relationship with 
the area which is now known as Surat Thani, located on the east side of the Malay 
peninsula and the gulf of Siam105, dates back almost two thousand years.106 From the 
third to the seventh centuries, Panpan Kingdom (盤盤國), which was mentioned in 
Liangshu (梁書), or the History of Liang Dynasty, whose rulers sent many tribute 
missions to China, was believed to be located in the province of Surat Thani.107 Chaiya, 
now a small town in Surat Thani, was the regional centre of the Srivijaya Kingdom from 
the seventh to the fourteenth centuries. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries it was a 
place where Chinese merchants unloaded their cargoes for transportation overland before 
returning to China with the opening southwest monsoon.108 From the sixteenth to the 
nineteenth centuries the city was an important port for trade with China. In 1827 there 
were around 2,000 Chinese persons there, and rice was the chief trade good with 
Fujian.109 The Chinese population, however, increased rapidly during the second half of 
the nineteenth century.  
 
                                                
105 ‘Siam’ was the official name of the country until 24 June 1939 when it was changed to ‘Thailand’. 
106 Chinese earthenware during the Western Han dynasty, from the first to the second centuries, has been 
found in the city. See Jeffery Sng and Pimpraphai Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese (Singapore: 
Editions Didier Millet, 2015), 17. 
107 Su Jiqing (蘇繼廎), “後漢書究不事人老,” Journal of the South Seas Society 6, no. 1 (1950): 17-19. 
Lawrence Palmer Briggs, “The Khmer Empire and the Malay Peninsula,” The Far Eastern Quarterly 9, no. 
3 (1950): 256-305. See Chen Hongyu (陳鴻瑜 ), 泰國史  (The History of Thailand) (Taibei: The 
Commercial Press, Ltd., 2014), 33. Chen also stated that the argument was highly possible see Ibid.  
108 William Nunn, “Some Notes upon the Development of the Commerce of Siam,” Journal of the Siam 
Society, no. 15 (1922): 78-102. 
109 Viraphol Sarasin, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade 1652-1853 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1977), 215. 
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In 1832, King Nangklao, reigning from 1824-1851, established a shipyard in 
Bandon (萬崙) for making royal barges and warships. Bandon, today’s city centre of 
Surat Thani, had quickly developed into another port city as many people migrated into 
this area and many shops were established. Therefore, King Mongkut, reigning from 
1851-1868, moved the capital district from Tha Thong, today’s Kanchanadit, to 
Bandon.110  
 
Bandon was a small city port and market town; however, under the reformed 
system of provincial administration in the late nineteenth century, together with the 
construction of the railway in the early twentieth century, it became an important port, 
benefitting greatly from these two factors. During the reign of King Chulalongkorn 
(1868-1910), the king combined Bandon with Chaiya in 1899 and the new province was 
named Chaiya, whose provincial centre was Bandon. The province was under the 
administration of Monthon Chumphon.111 Later, the city hall of Monthon Chumphon was 
moved from Chumphon to Bandon. In 1915 in the second reform during the reign of 
King Vajiravudh (1910-1925), the province of Chiaya was renamed Surat Thani and 
Monthon Chumphon was renamed Monthon Surat. In 1925, Monthon Surat was 
incorporated into Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat.112 Nevertheless, the monthon system 
was abolished after the Siamese Revolution of 1932 and the province became the top-
level administrative division. Surat Thani was one of four key locations on the coast of 
South Siam, along with Chumphon, Nakhon Si Thammarat and Prachuap Khiri Khan, 
where the Japanese chose to land in Thailand in 1941 to secure railway stations and 
airfields.113  
 
                                                
110 In the meantime, Tha Thong was severely damaged from the Burmese invasion during the Burmese-
Siamese War (1785-1786). Prathum Chumpengphan, ประวตัศิาสตรอ์ารยธรรมภาคใต ้ แหลง่ประวตัศิาสตร ์
และโบราณคดทีี-สําคญัในประเทศไทย (History of Civilisation in Southern Thailand: important historical 
and archaeological sites in Thailand) (Bangkok: Chomromdek, 2002), 81-82.  
111 Monthon was an administrative subdivision of Siam in the late nineteenth century. Monthon Chumphon 
consisted of Chumphon, Langsuan and Chaiya.  
112	Ibid., 77-83. 	
113 E. Bruce Reynolds, Thailand and Japan’s Southern Advance 1940-1945 (New York: Macmillan Press, 
1994), 78.	
	 54	
There were five major ethnic groups of importance among Chinese migrants to 
Siam: Hokkien (福建), Cantonese (廣東), Teochew (潮州), Hainanese (海南), and Hakka 
(客家).114 In Surat Thani in 1848 early Hainanese migrants established Wangao Temple 
(萬高廟) in Ko Pha-ngan (帕岸島), which was the first Chinese temple in Surat Thani. 
This chapter seeks to engage with the migration of ethnic Chinese, their settlement, and 
networks in Surat Thani from the late 19th century to 1927. Through observation of the 
role played by Chinese temples and schools, the chapter is constructed around four major 
conceptual points: the establishment of native-place associations as the centres of 
networks, both national and transnational; the improvement in the economy and 
transportation, especially the construction of the railway due to industrialisation; the 
immigration of Chinese women; and the establishment of Chinese schools in the early 
twentieth century. All of these had a considerable effect on Chinese migration and the 
resulting communities. Therefore, they provide considerable opportunities to examine 
how Chinese migrants built their networks; how industrialisation had an impact on 
migration; how the immigration of Chinese women had an effect on the Chinese 
community; and how Chinese schools were used to preserve Chinese ethnic identity. 
Prior to the twentieth century, women rarely migrated from China so Chinese men 
assimilated into the host society through intermarriage with local women. This fluidity is 
another interesting characteristic of Chinese migration and identity. The first chapter is 
divided into four sections: the origins of Chinese penetration into Southern Siam; 
networking through Chinese temples and native-place associations; the immigration of 
Chinese women; and Chinese schools and the preservation of Chinese ethnic identity.  
 
II.        The Origins of Chinese Penetration into Southern Siam 
 
To better understand the Chinese diaspora and the transformation of identity, it is 
essential to appreciate the historical background of Chinese migration into Surat Thani 
and other parts of the peninsula, which shows that the early contact by the Chinese in the 
area had a great deal to do with trade and the economy. In the nineteenth century, 
industrialisation, along with colonialism, came to remodel migration patterns, adding to 
                                                
114 ‘Ethnic group’ means subdivisions of the Chinese population speaking a common dialect based on 
regions where they are from. 	
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large-scale movements of people around the world, as they were both quicker and in 
greater safety, these greater volumes in turn have had a significant impact on identity. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: A Chinese junk, Chinese shopkeepers and coolies in traditional Chinese townhouses. Mural 
      painted during the reign of King Mongkut (1804-1868) at Matchimawat temple, which had been 
patronised by Hokkien governors of Songkhla, a province on the east side of the peninsula. 
 
Tin, spices and many forest products had traditionally been the major goods that 
attracted the attention of the Chinese in South Siam. South East Asian rulers wanted to 
sell these goods to the Chinese and in return desired luxury Chinese goods such as 
ceramics, tea and silk, which were considered to be status symbols, and other necessary 
products and metals such as iron and copper.115 Siamese territories on the Malay 
Peninsula were the first regions that attracted Chinese and other foreign merchants, with 
fleets of Chinese junks stopping at various ports and settlements on the eastern side.116 
Abundant evidence has been found confirming that in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries Chinese merchants travelling to India and further west may have gone with the 
northeast monsoon only as far as Chumphon, Surat Thani (Bandon) or Nakhon Si 
Thammarat (Ligor). At these sites, their cargoes were unloaded for transshipment 
                                                
115 Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 17.  
116 G. William Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1957), 1. 
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overland, before returning to China with the southwest monsoon.117 It is hypothesised 
that earlier trade was engaged mostly by land or through foreign vessels manned by 
Persians, Arabs, Indians, Javanese, Malays and other merchants of coastal South East 
Asia, because China only developed its own high-seas merchant fleet during the Song 
dynasty (after the 10th and 11th centuries).118   
 
There is no evidence that the Chinese permanently settled in the area prior to the 
sixteenth century. However, two Chinese bells dating to the late sixteenth century, 
presently kept in the local museum in Chaiya, were found in a Siamese temple (see figs. 
1.2 and 1.3). A tombstone of a Chinese lady, dated 1592, was also found in Pattani, one 
of the southernmost provinces in Thailand.119 These can be interpreted as early signs of 
Chinese settlement in the area before the twentieth century and also reveals their 
relationship with local temples. Early migrants might donate these bells for religious 
purposes as there was as yet no Chinese temple in the area to serve them. Moreover, it is 
also the first sign of the exertion of Chinese identity and the assimilation of the Chinese 
into the local space and society. This is a characteristic of a diaspora which is connected 
to all phenomena that develop transnational movements in which cultural introduction 
and plural societies’ formation are among them.120  
 
                                                    
Figure 1.2: The bell dated Wanli (萬曆 ) 6 (1578).        Figure 1.3: A similar bell dated 1596 on which     
                                                                                                                the inscription is quite blurred.     
                                                
117 Nunn, “Some Notes upon the Development of the Commerce of Siam”.  
118 Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 17. 
119 Ibid., 27.  
120 Khachig Tӧlӧlyan, “The Nation-State and Its Others: In Lieu of a Preface,” Diaspora 1, no. 1 (1991): 5.	
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From the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth century, there were 
massive movements of people around the world due to the end of slavery and the 
industrial revolution, and both these factors led to the need for labourers in new 
industries. Moreover, transmigration would not have been possible without the transport 
revolution which caused a huge increase in migration.121 Colonisation was such an 
important factor affecting migration the ancient Greeks applied the term diaspora to refer 
to both migration and colonisation.122 Transnationalism itself is interpreted as a process 
in which immigrants create social fields connecting together their country of origin and 
their country of settlement. Those who construct these social fields are termed 
“transmigrants.” Transmigrants expand and preserve their diverse relations with which 
the familial, economic, social, organisational, and religious aspects are all included and 
often intertwined, and within social networks that link transmigrants to two or more 
societies together, they establish their own identities.123   
 
The nineteenth century was an era of colonisation and imperialism in South East 
Asia. During the reign of King Mongkut, Siam was in a critical stage in its history. China 
was forced to sign the Treaty of Nanjing (南京條約) as a result of losing the First Opium 
War (1839-1842). Burma was also defeated by Britain in the Second Anglo-Burmese 
War (1852-1853). Faced with the might of the British army, Mongkut agreed to sign the 
Bowring Treaty in 1855 after Bowring, the Governor of the British colony of Hong Kong, 
came to negotiate a treaty to open up Siam to Western trade. Under the agreement, the 
prohibition on rice export was lifted. Mongkut began to embrace Western innovations 
and initiate Siam’s modernisation.  
 
The economic changes experienced by Siam during the decades of late European 
imperialism echoed those of the evolution of the economies of British Burma and French 
                                                
121 Michael H. Fisher, Migration: A World History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 76-78, 86-
89. 
122 Diana Lary, Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas over Four Millennia 
(Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 7.	
123	Ibid., 4.  
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Indo-China in the period beginning from the mid-nineteenth century.124 Colonialism was 
a main contributing factor to the modernisation of Siam and had a great impact on 
Chinese migration. Within three decades, around 1850-1870, there was an expansion of 
rice cultivation for export in the delta areas of the Irrawaddy, Chaophraya, and Mekong 
rivers, making mainland South East Asia pre-eminent in the world rice trade. The 
cultivation of rice was carried out by the indigenous population while “the financing, 
transportation, milling and export of the crop increasingly became the preserve of the 
immigrant Asian communities which grew rapidly in size and economic influence 
throughout mainland South East Asia in the second half of the 19th century.”125 It was 
later followed by a growth in production for export of other primary goods including 
teak, tin and rubber, the latter two of which had hitherto been the major products in South 
Siam.  
 
In this age of imperialism, Siam went through drastic reforms from the reign of 
King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) to that of Vajiravudh (1910-1925). In 1925, Siamese 
society had undergone a radical transformation from the first year of King 
Chulalongkorn’s reign in 1868. The most active reforms occurred in 1892, particularly an 
improvement in the internal communication network focused on the railways, which 
contributed to greater economic coherence in the immediate hinterland of the port. By 
1900, the ports of Rangoon, Bangkok, and Saigon had evolved into major centres of 
commerce in the Far East. Numerous local craft and ocean-going vessels were not only 
loaded with commodities but also carried immigrants from India or China.126  
 
The economic situation in the country affected Chinese migration. The growing 
importance of rice exports made the Chinese migrate from the tin capital Phuket to other 
ports. Tin was a major product in South Siam, but in the early 1890s its production 
decreased owing to many factors. In this decade, peninsular Siam did not possess either 
the port facilities or internal communications that would allow an expansion in tin 
                                                
124 Ian Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam, c.1890-1920 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 
1988), 1.  
125 Ibid., 1-3.   
126 Ibid., 3-4.  
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excavation and subsequent exporting.127 Another factor was a serious shortage of Chinese 
coolie labour in the tin districts. There had been a considerable influx of Chinese labour 
into Phuket in the 1860s and 1870s,128 but most of the coolie migrants recruited in China 
were leaving ship on arrival in either Singapore or Penang rather than going on to the 
Siamese port.129 The final factor was the increase in demand for manual labour in Central 
Siam from the late 1880s, diverting Chinese migrants away from the tin districts of the 
peninsula.130 There had been approximately 50,000 Chinese tin-miners in Phuket in the 
mid-1880s, but this figure had dropped to only 11,000 a decade later.131  
      
From 1894, the reformed system of provincial administration in the country had 
changed the face of the peninsula.132 A provincial office of the Department of Mines was 
founded in Phuket to which a mines commissioner was appointed with responsibility for 
issuing concessions and inspecting leases throughout the peninsular provinces.133 By 
1915 there were six mines officials employed in the south.134 Local Chinese capitalists 
with major interests in tin were appointed to significant political positions in the region 
because the Bangkok administration had sought to “blunt the forward drive of British 
economic incursions” in the south.135 Strong local administration also controlled the riots 
and gang-warfare which often erupted among the Chinese coolie population in the tin 
districts.136 
 
Globally, the improvement in the transportation system, especially the 
construction of the railways, had an impact on migration patterns. Many Chinese were 
                                                
127 Ibid., 95-96.  
128 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 110.  
129 Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam, 96.  
130 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 110.  
131 Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam, 96.  
132 The centralised system of provincial administration was known as the Thesaphiban system between 
1892 and 1899, but its implementation and development occurred between 1899 and 1915.  
133 Tej Bunnag, The Provincial Administration of Siam, 1892-1915 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), 97.  
134 Phuket, Nakhon Sithammarat, Kedah, Pattani, Phang-nga and Ranong. See Bunnag, The Provincial 
Administration of Siam, 223-224.  
135 Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam, 102.   
136 Ibid., 103.  
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hired to construct the peninsular railways as there was a great need for labourers to build 
railways, dams and canals. Chinese labourers, employed by labour contractors in the 
Chinatowns of San Francisco and Vancouver, were employed to build the western 
sections of the US Transcontinental Railway (finished in 1869). The eastern sections of 
the five-thousand-mile Trans-Siberian Railway across Russia, as well as the Panama 
Canal (1880-1914), were also built by Chinese labourers.137   
 
After Siam and Britain reached an agreement over the transfer of the four 
northern Malay States to British authority in March 1909, the government decided to 
proceed with the construction of the peninsular railway, which was financed by a loan 
from the Federated Malay States.138 The railway was laid on the east side at the insistence 
of the Singapore business community, which wanted that port rather than Penang to 
benefit from the new line owing to the commercial potential of the tin deposits. However, 
afraid that the area would be flooded with concession hunters, in August 1909 Prince 
Damrong proposed that “for an appropriate period no further licenses or mining leases be 
issued for Monthon Chumphon139, Nakhon Si Thammarat, and Pattani.”140 In 1911, the 
new minister accepted that the southern railway would encourage foreign investment in 
mining together with agriculture and forestry in the south, and so the prohibition was 
lifted in 1912. Before 1920, tin exports from the southern provinces were all sent to 
Penang. In 1918, Koh Tiew Lim, a Chinese businessman in Ranong, wrote a petition to 
King Vajiravudh to construct smelting facilities in Phuket but it was not until the mid-
1960s that a modern tin smelter was established on the island.141       
      
After the building of the peninsular railway, Hat Yai, a small village in Songkhla, 
became an important port and big city in Siam, with many Chinese having migrated there 
during the construction of the railway. The major ethnic groups in the city were Hakka, 
Teochew, Cantonese, and Hainanese respectively. The most remarkable Hakka Chinese 
                                                
137 Lary, Chinese Migrations, 98-99.  
138 Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam, 104. 
139 Surat Thani was under the administration of Chumphon at that time.   
140 Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam, 106.  
141 Ibid., 108-109.  
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was Jia Geesee (謝樞泗) or Khun Niphatchinnakorn, the railway contractor, who decided 
to settle down there.142 Phunphin, a small city near Bandon, also the site of the railway 
station of Surat Thani, became an important locale that attracted large numbers of 
Chinese. 
 
Trade and economy had a considerable effect on Chinese migration as they had 
traded within the area for a long time, based on evidence quite possibly establishing their 
network and choosing to settle permanently as early as the sixteenth century. These early 
transmigrants exerted their identity through local temples, which was the beginning of 
their assimilation into local society. However, industrialisation and colonialism greatly 
affected Chinese migration, causing massive movements of people to and within many 
ports in Siam. An influx of the Chinese in the period led to their permanent establishment 
as well as that of native-place associations as the centres of their networks, both national 




III.       Networking through Chinese Temples and Native-place Associations  
 
Early migrants who settled in Siam in the sixteenth century and assimilated into local 
society established their networks and exerted their identity within local temples based on 
the aforementioned evidence. Nevertheless, after the industrial revolution, together with 
colonialism, there was a huge influx of Chinese into Siam. Once they decided to settle in 
a particular place, Chinese migrants in the modern period established their native-place 
associations through the construction of temples to serve as centres of networks. In 
addition, materials in Chinese temples and native-place associations not only reflected the 
beliefs of the migrants, but the epigraphy on the bells and wooden plates also revealed the 
transnational networks. This section discusses the establishment of Chinese temples and 
native-place associations as centres of networks in Surat Thani during the second half of 
the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.  
                                                
142 Supakarn Siripaisan, จนีหาดใหญ ่ (Hat Yai Chinese) (Songkhla: Thaksin University Book Centre, 
2007), 1-103.  
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Early Chinese communities must have at least one temple to serve them. These 
temples did not only serve a religious function but were also community centres for the 
first and second generations of immigrants. People shared a common identity through 
rituals and many other activities. Aristotle Dy carried out research on Chinese Buddhism 
in the Philippines and argues that religion performed a substantial role in the preservation 
of ethnic identity for the Chinese Buddhists of the Philippines. He also asserts that they 
were the only places where the Chinese could feel secure and pray to their deities for 
divine assistance.143 This situation was echoed in Surat Thani, where a temple was built 
as the centre of the Chinese community. In 1848, early Hainanese migrants built Wangao 
Temple, the first Chinese temple in Surat Thani, to be a centre of the Chinese community 
in Ko Pha-ngan.  
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143	Aristotle Dy, “Chinese Buddhism and ethnic identity in Catholic Philippines,” 13, no. 2 (2012): 242-
262.  
144 The data was collected during my field research in Thailand from 6 August to 11 October 2015 and 
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According to Table 1.1, there were eleven Chinese temples established in coastal 
areas and islands across Bandon bay in Surat Thani from 1848 through to the second half 
of the nineteenth century. Ten of these temples belonged to the Hainanese whereas one 
was of an unknown origin. Owing to the number of temples, Surat Thani was one of the 
most important strongholds of the Hainanese diaspora. The number also represented the 
wealth and members of a clan.    
 
                                                
145 The temple claimed that it was built in the second year of the reign of Tongzhi Emperor (1863), but 
there is no evidence. There is a bell, but its inscription is blurred by the new colour. 	
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There are internal and external factors influencing the reasons why Surat Thani 
was the base for transnational Hainanese networks. Looking at the internal factors, Siam 
experienced an economic evolution during the decades of late European imperialism (see 
above, Section II). Around the 1850s, there was the expansion of rice cultivation for 
export. The financing, transportation, milling and export of the crop were all done by the 
Chinese while local people carried out the cultivation of rice. 
 
In addition, the geography of the city bears a distinct resemblance to Hainan. 
Based on field research, many Hainanese in the coastal areas and islands worked as 
fishermen. The price of coconuts was also controlled by the Hainanese.146 Following 
Skinner’s concept of the “ethnic division of labour”, “occupational specialization” by 
Chinese ethnic groups occurred, in which different geographical locations in the native 
places of origin account for the distinct positions of each ethnic group. It also helps to 
explain the reasons why the Hainanese settled down in Surat Thani.147 
 
By looking at the external factors, there were massive movements of Hainanese 
abroad in the mid-nineteenth century. After the end of the First Opium War, the Treaty of 
Nanjing was signed in 1842, opening up five ports for foreign trade. Additionally, the 
Treaty of Tianjin (天津條約) was signed in 1858 following the end of the Second Opium 
War (1856-1860), opening up ten new ports, including one in Hainan. These events 
caused a huge influx of Hainanese into Surat Thani and other parts of South East Asia.148  
 
In addition, Chinese temples were constructed not only for religious purposes, but 
also for the establishment of their native-place associations to serve as centres of 
transnational networks to help each other. They were also accommodations for newly 
arrived migrants. The Hainanese established their native-place association, Kengjiu 
Huiguan (瓊州會館), throughout Surat Thani and South East Asia.  In Singapore, the 
                                                
146	NAT, MOE 54.5/13 เรื$องขอตั *งโรงเรยีนของนายมุย้เกยีบ (Asking for the permission to establish a 
school by Mui Kiab), document dated 4/11/1927, 1-28.	
147 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 135-136, 214-216, 315-318.  
148 Wang Yuchun, ประวตักิารอพยพของชาวจนีไหหลํา 海南移民史志 (History of the Hainanese migration) 
(Bangkok: Hainan Education and Cultural Foundation of Thailand, 2014), 233-234. 	
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Kengjiu association was established in 1854. In 1870, the Hainanese in Penang, British 
Malaya, founded an association.149 The wooden plate depicted in Fig. 1.4, located at the 
Hainanese temple in Pak Kradae, a coastal village in Surat Thani, reads “Kengjiu 
Association,” testifying that the temple in the second half of the nineteenth century was 
used as an ethnic association.  
 
 
              Figure 1.4: Wooden plate at a Hainanese temple of Pak Kradae 
 
Interestingly, Tanka people (Dankae, or Boat people) (蜑家 or 蜑民) also 
migrated to the coastal parts of the Hainanese community in Ko Pha-ngan and Ko Samui. 
They, however, lived on junks. The Tankas are an ethnic subgroup and Cantonese-
speaking people in Hainan that migrated from Guangdong and Guangxi during the Tang 
dynasty and were historically called Jiaoren (鮫人), or mermaid. Both in Hainan and 
Surat Thani, they were considered to be outcasts by the Hainanese, and therefore known 
as Huannang (番人), barbarians.150  
 
The Tanka in Surat Thani fished for a living and stayed on junks, although today 
many of them live onshore and refer to themselves as being Cantonese.151 There were 
often conflicts amongst the Hainanese and Tankas as the Hainanese often looked down 
                                                
149 Ibid., 234. 	
150 Ibid., 114-115. 	
151 Ruemun. Interview, 18 March 2017. Ruemun, aged more than 80, had been living on a junk with her 
family members. She started to live onshore in Ko Pha-ngan when she was 13 after the junk was damaged. 
She refers herself as being Cantonese. 	
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on them, whilst children who were born of Hainanese fathers and Siamese mothers were 
called Dengnangkia (唐人仔), or Chinese children. The word Dankae can be also used to 
refer to children who were born of Hainanese and Tanka parents as some Hainanese men 
married Tanka women.152 
 
Materials in Chinese temples not only show the religious needs of Chinese 
migrants in the communities, but associated objects of belief such as deities, bells and 
wooden plates also reveal economic and commercial networks linking the country of 
origin with the country of settlement. Moreover, they also portray the identity of the 
migrants as well as the historical development of the Chinese communities.  
 
While the sixteenth century migrants exerted their identity in the local space by 
donating two bells to the Siamese temple, subsequent migrants created their own space in 
the country of settlement though the establishment of Chinese temples as the centres 
where they could fully exert their identity through religious objects. Since long ago, 
educated high officials and noble lords had inscribed articles to convey their thoughts and 
feelings through their buildings and temples. This style of writing was also introduced by 
overseas Chinese and recorded in wooden plates, door flames, candlesticks, bells and 
drum, and altar tables, among other objects.153  
 
The bells in the temples also reveal the history of the development of a Chinese 
community. Figure 1.5 shows a bell cast in 1885 which was offered to the Wangdi deity, 
Wuzu deity, Bentougong and Bentouma. The year on the bell might be related to the year 
of Hainanese migration to Bandon. Nevertheless, the patron saint of the temple nowadays 
is Mazu, or the Sea goddess. It is believed her power is extended to protect all professions 
including fishermen, farmers, merchants, artisans, and even government officials. Zheng 
He (鄭和), who was a court eunuch, diplomat, explorer and fleet admiral, also believed in 
                                                
152	Khuay Ngiyuat, also known as Prayat Saekhuay, a guardian of Guanshengdijun Temple at Ko Pha-ngan 
district. Interview, 19 March 2017. 	
153 Zhang Xun, “東南亞媽祖銘刻萃編,” (A collection of the inscription dedicated to Mazu deity in 
Southeast Asia) 東南亞區域研究通訊 (A report on a research on Southeast Asia), no. 5 (1988): 3.  
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Mazu when he travelled to South East Asia during the Ming dynasty.154 Therefore, the 
deity in the temples also portrays the various professions of migrants in a community. It 
is possible that the belief in those deities was changed to Mazu to protect all walks of life 
when the Chinese community became larger in the early twentieth century.  
 
 
Figure 1.5: A bell in a Hainanese temple in Bandon cast in 1885 
 
Almost all temples had spirit mediums acting as moral guides and protectors. At 
Guan Yu Temple of Hua Thanon, Ko Samui, spirit mediums acted as doctors in advising 
believers to use plants to make herbs to cure their illnesses. When the gods wanted to 
communicate with people in a community, a bell was used to call members of the 
Hainanese community to meet. Sometimes they sprinkled holy water on people to cure 
illness or fishermen before they went to sea. The power of Guan Yu, or the God of War, 
spread through the community the belief that in 1941 rocks in the sea in front of the 
temple had transformed into soldiers to scare Japanese troops away when their warships 
first passed the community.155  
 
In front of the temple building there are two bells. The first bell has become 
blurred by new colours, and another was cast in 1899 and offered to the God of War. 
Some characters on the bell read as follows: “沐 恩信商” (Blessing to merchants who 
believe), and this inscription is often followed by the names of the donators. Some bells 
                                                
154 Ibid., 4.  
155	Pu Gui, or Gui Saepu. Interview, 2 October 2015. Pu is a guardian of Guan Yu Temple and Association 
of Hua Thanon at Ko Samui district.  
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are transcribed to bless “信民”, people who believe. The word, “沐” (mu) also depicts a 
picture of the acting of sprinkling holy water. Therefore, every time a bell was rung, it 
not only symbolised that donators or believers would get a blessing from the god but also 
represented the power of the god and importance of the temple that served as the centre 
of the community.  
 
 
Figure 1.6: Prescription of Chinese medicine after the practice of fortune sticks in a temple in Phuket 
 
Although the role of the mediums as doctors in advising people to buy Chinese 
medicine or make herbs has disappeared today, possibly because of the establishment and 
improvement of modern hospitals, people still pray to the god when suffering from a fatal 
illness. In some temples, fortune sticks indicating the names of diseases and Chinese 
medicines have been provided for believers, as in Figure 1.6.  
 
Yongtao Du and Jeff Kyong-McClain propose that in the core area, where the 
Han Chinese resided, the connection between the local, regional, and national identities 
has served as a long-term conundrum that had an effect on power relations and 
perceptions of belonging and identity.156 Although the centralised bureaucracy gained 
control over the hundreds of local prefectures and counties through the institutionally-
enhanced fiscal and administrative powers of the throne, together with the establishment 
                                                
156	Yongtao Du and Jeff Kyong-McClain, eds., Chinese History in Geographical Perspective (Plymouth: 
Lexington Books, 2013), 6.  
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of a centralised recruitment (examination) system that infiltrated deeply into local 
societies, the local was never defined only by the hierarchy of the imperial administration. 
Since the Southern Song the literati elites were extremely oriented to the local in their 
cares and family strategies.157 In other words, they “married locally, lived locally and in 
many ways thought and acted locally.”158  
 
In the late nineteenth century, the production of thousands of local gazetteers and 
local anthologies represented a particularly strong articulation of local identity and highly 
developed local communities. This was a consequence of dual developments in imperial 
polity and elite disposition.159 The articulation of local identity in the Chinese diasporic 
communities in Surat Thani was also reflected in many bells and wooden plates, 
particularly from the nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. After the Song dynasty, 
the county and prefecture had the power to carry their own budget and quota of taxation 
and own quota of candidates in examinations. County and prefecture identities visibly 
expressed by the literati were by some means “a ‘felt identity’ that grew out of the 
imperial state’s ‘marked identity’ of the local.”160  
 
 
Figure 1.7: A wooden plate in a Hainanese temple at Pak Kradae 
 
                                                
157	Ibid.  
158 	Conrad Schirokauer and Robert P. Hymes, “Introduction,” in Robert P. Hymes and Conrad 
Schirokauer, eds., Ordering the World: Approaches to State and Society in Sung Dynasty China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993), p. 4. Cited in Ibid.  
159 Ibid., 6-7.  
160	Ibid., 7.  
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The above figure shows a phrase asking for the patron saint in the temple. The 
donator is Wu Duolun (吳多論), the owner of Hexing company, who was from Hainan. 
In most of the bells and wooden plates the ancestral home of the donator was always 
transcribed, which can be understood to mean that the donator cared a great deal about 
his ancestral home. In the case of a signature in a temple in Singapore, the donator also 
wrote his status or official ranking when he donated a wooden plate, as follows: “天福宮 
「光緒二十年甲年嘉平中濣，賜進士出身四品銜刑部直隸司主政閩縣曾福謙敬獻」
.”  The donator, one Ceng Fuqian, worked in the Ministry of Justice in Fujian, and this 
shows his respect to his motherland and his form of government.161  
 
The big migrant communities created their own space and established a pluralist 
society in the local space in which they had their own temples to serve them whereas in 
the less sizeable communities a small number of migrants had to stay together with local 
people and thus created hybrid temples to serve both migrants and local people. Many 
temples also reflected the assimilation of the Chinese into local communities owing to the 
fact that many builders of the temples were born of a Chinese father and Siamese mother.  
     
 
Figure 1.8: Mysterious Chinese wooden plates in Maeyaichao temple at Tha Chang, Surat Thani 
 
In Tha Chang, a small district in Surat Thani, there are two mysterious Chinese 
wooden plates in the Maeyaichao shrine. The statue of Maeyaichao deity is more Thai 
                                                
161 Xun, “東南亞媽祖銘刻萃編,” 4. 
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than Chinese and, as such, whether the shrine is considered to be Thai or Chinese remains 
a question.162 Chinese geomancy was possibly used to determine the orientation of the 
temple because the location has good feng shui. In Singapore and Malaysia, feng shui, 
which is imperative for a temple, means that its front façade should face open to the land 
and have a good view of the sea. It is called, “座山望海”, meaning “sitting on the hills 
and looking at the water or sea”.163 Based on an interview with two of the descendants of 
the shrine founder, the shrine was built by Champa, a lukchin, meaning Chinese children 
who were born of Siamese mother and Chinese father, with the Chinese family surname 
of Li. Champa found a white stone floating in the sea and later it was revered as a 
goddess. When the people in the community, both Thai and Chinese, were sick, they 
prayed for her to cure their illness.164 
 
 
Figure 1.9: The statue of Mazu deity and her military guards in a Hainanese temple, Bandon 
 
Champa was said to have acted as a person who found Chinese migrants to build 
the railway. His profession was crocodile hunting and, before the twentieth century, the 
river in front of the shrine was full of crocodiles. In the past it was also used by people in 
the community to take bathe, so her power was said to prevent believers from being 
attacked by crocodiles. Many crocodile skulls have been found around the statue that are 
                                                
162	This will be discussed intensively in Chapter two.  
163 Evelyn Lip, Chinese Temples and Deities (Singapore: Times Books International, 1981), 58, 99.  
164 On Srirak. Interview, 10 September 2015. On is a guardian of Maeyaichao Temple at Tha Chang. She 
was a daughter-in-law of Champa.  
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said to be her followers. This reflects a hierarchy of deities in spirit world, known as ‘the 
imperial metaphor’ in Chinese popular religion.165 The hierarchy in the spirit world is a 
metaphor for social organisation of family and government. This explains why gods are 
portrayed in the robes of officials and the military guards who attend them, as seen in 
Figure 1.9, an example from a Chinese temple in Bandon. 
 
Inspecting carefully the two wooden plates in Maeyaichao shrine, the oldest one 
reads as follows: “ 惠及海防「光緒已卯年孟春月吉旦，沐 恩信民， 弟子 李登漢
敬奉」” (“Grace reaches maritime activity”; it was cast on the auspicious day of the fifth 
year of the reign of Guangxu Emperor (1879). Blessing to believers. It was donated by Li 
Denghan, the follower). 166 The reason why there is no transcription of his ancestral home 
might possibly be because of the fact that he was lukchin, born in Siam.  
 
Today, the shrine is claimed to be Thai and its myth and story are different from 
this version. Moreover, the committee members are all Thai. In the past it was the place 
where Chinese migrants and their descendants used to come to pray every Chinese New 
Year. There has also been a procession of the deity every year to Thai villages and the 
Chinese market since the early twentieth century. The Chinese migrants were said to 
number no more than 20-30 people in the twentieth century, and included Hainanese, 
Hakka, and Teochew.167  
 
Claudine Salmon researched on the transnational networks of Chinese bells in 
South East Asia, and during her fieldwork she counted a total of 166 bells from the 
nineteenth to the first half of the twentieth century, among which are 73 in Indonesia, 67 
in Malaysia, and 26 in Thailand, excluding Surat Thani. She states that the scarcity of 
“Chinese” bells might have come from the fact that the Sino-Thais were not hesitant in 
purchasing bronze bells cast locally, so some of them are hybrids. The acquisition of 
                                                
165 Stephan Feuchtwang, Popular Religion in China, the Imperial Metaphor (Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001), 
vi-viii.  
166 李登漢 is supposed to be the Chinese name of Champa.  
167	Go Kaew, a successful Hakka merchant from Tha Chang district. Interview, 28 June 2015. ‘Go’ is a 
Hainanese word meaning ‘brother’, which is widely used by the Chinese and their descendants in eastern 
coast provinces in the South, although he was born of a Siamese mother and Hakka father.  
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locally-made bells might have something to do with the long process of assimilation of 
the Chinese into the local society.168  
 
However, her data, collected from Thailand, seems to be incomplete as she failed 
to survey many Chinese temples in many major Chinese communities, including those in 
Surat Thani. According to the observations in Surat Thani only, there were ten bells 
imported from China while only one was cast locally. Of this number, nine bells were 
imported during the nineteenth century while only one was imported from China and 
another one was purchased locally during the first half of the twentieth century. Thus, the 
Chinese of Surat Thani during the nineteenth century were not buying the bells cast 
locally yet. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there was a significant demand for bells, 
especially those new arrivals, as they had to build and develop new temples to be centres 
of the Chinese communities throughout South East Asia. Moreover, it also reveals the 
transnational networks of Chinese bells between Surat Thani and China.169 
 
 
           Figure 1.10: A “hybrid” bell found in the Hainanese temple at Bandon 
 
                                                
168 Claudine Salmon, “Transnational Networks as Reflected in Epigraphy: The Case of Chinese Buddhist 
Bells in Southeast Asia,” in Chinese Migration, Research and Documentation, eds. Tan Chee-Beng, Colin 
Storey, and Julia Zimmerman (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2007): 23-83.  
169 For a chronological list of Chinese bells in Surat Thani from 1848 through to the first half of the 
twentieth century, see Appendix 1. 	
	 74	
A solely Chinese bell imported from China in the first half of the twentieth 
century might signify that the Chinese had already firmly established themselves in Surat 
Thani. Therefore, they began to buy a locally cast bell. A local bell, seen in Figure 1.10, 
exhibits a highly ‘hybrid’ style in that the handle is adorned with a naga, which is rather 
Siamese, but the waist bears an inscription date based on the Chinese calendar. In 
addition, it should be noted that all of the bells imported from China belonged to the 
Hainanese temples, so the number of the bells also represented the power and status of 
the Hainanese in the area prior to the twentieth century.  
 
The brand name of the foundry on the bells could also be traced to the 
transnational networks of the migrants. Of all the bells in the temples, only one, from 
Qingtonggangbentou Temple, bears the brand name of Foshan foundry in Guangdong, an 
area naturally rich in iron ore and so many foundries were established there. However, 
the inscriptions on some bells are rather blurred so it is not possible to ascertain whether a 
foundry name is transcribed.  
 
Concerning commercial activities, in the South Seas seagoing merchants, who for 
the most part were native to Fujian, acted as go-betweens. A number of them had to make 
a stop-over at Foshan to buy ironware to take with them to the South Seas and at the same 
time they could place orders for bells. In the 1680s many of the established merchants at 
Canton in Guangzhou were said to be from Fujian province and many Hokkiens moved 
there and ran their junk trade from Guangdong.170 Guilds or ethnic associations in Surat 
Thani might also have acted as intermediaries in the shipping of the bells found in 
Hainanese temples. The people of North Fujian and the Hainanese, who also participated 
in shipping activities in South East Asia, had a huiguan (會館), or ethnic association, in 
Foshan.171 Therefore, it is possible that most of the bells were either bought from Foshan 
or Hainan.  
 
                                                
170	Ibid., 76.  
171 Ibid.  
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In the late nineteenth century, Siam underwent a series of radical reforms, as 
mentioned above. The growing importance of rice exports affected Chinese migration 
such that the Chinese migrated from the tin districts on the west side of the peninsula to 
other ports. The construction of the peninsular railway in the early twentieth century had 
an impact on migration patterns. Similar to Hat Yai in Songkhla, many sites of the 
railway stations in Surat Thani became significant locales that attracted a large number of 
Chinese from many different ethnic groups. In the first half of the twentieth century, all 
five major ethnic groups were present in the province, especially in the downtown area of 
Bandon, the main district.  
 
Table 1.2: Chronological list of Chinese temples and native-place associations  
in Surat Thani during the first half of the twentieth century 
 
Years Name Patron saint Ethnic 
group 
Location Evidence 
1906 Bentougong Temple of 
Surat Thani (素叻本頭公
廟) 













Hokkien Bandon Wooden plate 









1945 Kwongsiew Association  
(廣肇高公所) 
- Cantonese Bandon Wooden plate 
1947 Teochew Temple or 
Today’s Bentougumiao 
(本頭古廟) 
Bentougong Teochew Bandon Government 
document173 
                                                
172	See Yokkian School in section VI. 	
173 See Chapter 5. 	
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1949 Bentouma Temple 
(本頭媽廟) 
Bentouma Hainanese Pakkio, Tha 
Chana 
An inscription on 
a jellyfish pond 
 
From the Table 1.2, it can be seen that there were seven temples and associations 
established in the first half of the twentieth century. Three of these belonged to the 
Hainanese, while the Teochew had two temples. The Hokkien had one temple to serve 
them. The Cantonese established an association. However, the Hakka had settled down in 
Surat Thani during this period, although they officially established their temple and 
native-place association after 1950.174 The buildings of ethnic associations and meeting 
halls were built in the temple precincts in the late 20th century, as seen in the following 
illustrations. 
 
                          
Figure 1.11: Hokkien temple after the renovation in 1953       Figure 1.12: Hokkien temple in 2015 
 
From 1848 through to 1950, there were eighteen Chinese temples and 
associations. Of this number, thirteen belonged to the Hainanese, and Surat Thani was 
hence the most important stronghold of the Hainanese diaspora. While the Hakka settled 
in Surat Thani in the early twentieth century, they officially established their native-place 
associations and temples after the 1950s. Shenke Hakka founded the Hakka Association 
of Surat Thani (素叻府客家會館) in 1963, and Banshanke Hakka built Dabogong 
Temple (大伯公廟) in 1981. However, the position of the Hainanese was challenged by 
the Teochew during the twentieth century. Despite the fact that the largest number of 
Chinese were Hainanese, the leading Chinese luminaries that had an impact on the 
                                                
174 See Chapter 5, where the history of these native-place associations is discussed in depth.	
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Chinese community were Shou Caikun and Liao Chiangsoon, two Teochews of Bandon, 
who had royal connections and were granted exceptional privileges.175 
 
Teochews were known, during the reign of King Taksin or Zheng Xin (鄭信), a 
son of a Chinese migrant from Shantou, Guangdong, (1767-1782) as “royal Chinese”, 
and granted exceptional privileges. This caused a huge increase in migration of 
Teochews, especially to the trading centre established across the river from Taksin’s 
palace in Thonburi, the new capital after Ayutthaya. The migration rate of the Chinese 
sharply increased during his reign and was maintained at a high level by all of the early 
Chakri kings.176 
 
No ethnic group, however, could control Chinese society in Siam, which 
eventually led to conflict among the groups. Chinese ethnic groups, as observed in 1837 
by a Westerner, were “strongly opposed to each other, as much so, indeed, as if they 
belonged to rival nations.”177 Each single group had its own guilds, benevolent societies, 
mutual-aid and regional associations. In other words, there were leaders of particular 
ethnic groups but no Chinese leaders.  
 
The belief in the hierarchy of deities in the spirit world among the migrants in a 
community was also a source of ethnic conflict in the early twentieth century. The 
replacement of Mazu as patron saint in the Hokkien temple at Bandon to 
Lifuwangyegong, who was a prince before being deitified, was possibly because the 
                                                
175 For the contributions of these two leading Chinese families in the Chinese community of Surat Thani 
see Chapter 5. For the contributions of the Shou family, and Section VI, Chapter 3, and Chapter 5 for the 
Liao family.  
176 The reigns of the first five Chakri kings were as follows: Rama I (1782-1809), Rama II (1809-1824), 
Rama III (1824-1851), Rama IV (1851-1868), Rama V (1868-1910). See G. William Skinner, Leadership 
and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand (New York: Cornell University Press, 1958), 4-5. 
177 George Winsor Earl, The Eastern Seas, or Voyages and Discoveries in the Indian Archipelago in 1832-
33-34 (London: W. H. Allen, 1837), 170.  
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committee wanted to claim superiority of the god they believed in over other clans, who 
had a lower status based on the hierarchy in the spirit world.178  
 
However, it is also possible that the deity was changed due to the diseases and 
illnesses that affected believers in the Chinese community. Another story goes that Mazu, 
the former patron saint of the Hokkien temple, was replaced by Lifuwangyegong deity 
because their members did not recover from illness when they prayed to the Sea Goddess. 
Khosiew or Xu Jiawen (許嘉文), a committee member in the early twentieth century, 
who opened a Chinese drugstore and often travelled to Fujian, brought the new deity 
statue from Quemoy.179 This reveals the transnational Hokkien networks of Surat Thani 
with Fujian.  
 
In Singapore there was considerable conflict between the rival groups of Hokkien 
and Hakka. Although Fujian province was identified as their homeland, the Hokkien’s 
Fujian claim was more forthright.180 The tension was exacerbated after the Hakka people 
began to migrate by sea in the eighteenth century, their route passing through the 
homelands of Hokkien and the Cantonese Pearl River Delta. In a migrant community, 
power was developed from wealth, and in Singapore the Hokkien controlled the Hokkien 
association (新加坡福建會館) and Fujian seats in the Singapore Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce (新嘉坡中華總商會). The migration of Hakka led to a challenge to Hokkien 
monopoly of the representation of Fujian interests.181 
 
In Surat Thani, during the first half of the twentieth century, the story of the 
Banshanke Hakka demonstrates the concept of the “ethnic division of labour”. This 
ethnic group tended to have less power and wealth compared with other dialect groups in 
                                                
178	Cai Guohui (菜國輝) or Boonchart Thamcharoensak, a committee member of the Hokkien temple, 
claimed during an interview that the status of Hokkien temple was superior to others because the patron 
saint was a royal prince.  
179 Cai Guohui. Interview, 7 September 2015. Due to Khosiew’s stone tablet in Hokkien cemetery, he 
migrated from Quemoy (金門縣), Fujian.  
180 Huei-Ying Kuo, “Native-Place Ties in Transnational Networks: Overseas Chinese Nationalism and 
Fujian’s Development, 1928-1941,” in Yongtao Du and Jeff Kyong-McClain, eds., Chinese History in 
Geographical Perspective (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013), 142.  
181 Ibid., 143.  
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the city, and most of them rented government land to work as vegetable gardeners. They 
settled together in an area which today is used as a military camp and was quite far from 
the business centre of Bandon. Dabogong temple was established as their native-place 
association in the rental area after the majority of Banshanke Hakka settlers settled 
there.182                    
 
In mainland China, there was a tradition of reliance on migration in the qiaoxiang, 
meaning the regions from which the Chinese came. Families at home expected them to 
send money, and the remittances contributed significantly to the wealth of the qiaoxiang. 
There were networks of commercial enterprises with headquarters in the British colony of 
Hong Kong, and these networks were comprised of recruiters to find labourers, banks and 
money shops to manage remittances, shipping companies to deal with travel, and 
suppliers to export local products.183   
 
There were services operated for migrants and their families, including health 
checks before migration, the repatriation of distressed migrants, and returning dead 
bodies.184 They sent money through money shops in migrant communities and sometimes 
they sent goods or jewellery and gold, which could be sold in China. In the late 1920s 
and early 1930s there were about three or four million Chinese migrants living around the 
world sending money back to China every year.185 The telegraph, which reached China in 
the late nineteenth century, was important for transoceanic migration as it was used in 
recruitment, booking passages and remittances.186  
 
                                                
182 Sese  Kwankawin. Interview, 19 September 2015. His family was the biggest Hakka family in the 
Hakka community and his father, Lee Chinhon (呂清漢), migrated from China to Songkhla and finally 
settled in Bandon. He had eleven children. However, most of them studied in Thai schools owing to the fact 
that the Chinese school in Bandon was quite expensive. Today, his children have established the Lee 
Chinhon ancestral hall (河東公祠). More than 200 family members gather here every year to celebrate 
Chinese New Year. 
183 Lary, Chinese Migrations, 93.  
184 Ibid.  
185 Ibid., 109.   
186 Ibid., 118. 
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With the continued growth in migration and permanent settlement abroad, 
Chinese social networks became established in foreign countries. Apart from native-place 
associations, there were also clan and surname associations. Therefore, they rarely 
associated with the host societies, preferring to operate within their own communities and 
sending money and contacting home by letters via Chinatown merchants.187  
 
In brief, Chinese migrants built their networks through the establishment of 
native-place associations. Temples were built not only for religious purposes, but also for 
the building of ethnic associations. There was also conflict among the migrants in that 
wealth could be developed into enhanced power for their clansmen in the migrant 
communities. In a community where there were many migrants, they exerted their ethnic 
identity through religious objects such as bells, wooden plates and even deities. However, 
these materials also reveal the transnational networks between the country of origin and 
the host country. The change of deities by migrants also shows the conflict of migrants 
who came from a different homeland and the development of migrant communities. In 
contrast, in smaller communities migrants had to live with local people, and were thus 
forced by circumstances to create a social field where they could share and exert their 
identity together with the local people. Many hybrid temples also reveal that a son of a 
Chinese migrant and Siamese mother established a new space to serve his dual identities. 
The most important thing is that the impact of migrant beliefs even had an impact on the 
economy. The next section will explore the immigration of Chinese women into Surat 
Thani and other parts of Siam.  
 
 
IV.       The Immigration of Chinese Women  
 
Prior to the migration of Chinese women in the late nineteenth century, Chinese migrants 
assimilated into Siamese society through the intermarriage with local women. Moreover, 
they participated in the activity of the Siamese temple and acculturated themselves to the 
Siamese form of Buddhism. They also sent their children to Siamese schools. In this 
                                                
187 Ibid., 99. 
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manner, the Chinese became a part of the local society. Nevertheless, the emigration of 
Chinese women, together with the development of the Chinese native-place associations 
and the enlarged numbers of Chinese, led to an end of the assimilation of the Chinese into 
Siamese society. This section aims to investigate the immigration of Chinese women into 




     Figure 1.13: A mural painting depicts Chinese men, their Siamese wives and their children 
during the early nineteenth century at Matchimawat temple, Songkhla. 
 
Prior to 1893, women almost never emigrated from China. During the period of 
immigration from 1882-1892, females did not account for more than two or three per cent 
of Chinese arrivals.188 Therefore, many Chinese men married local women although a 
large number of those men already had wives in China, as can be seen in the mural 
painting in Figure 1.13.  
 
In addition, the Chinese also participated in events in the Siamese temples and 
associated with Siamese people. On the Buddhist Sabbath, they went to the Siamese 
temple to participate in the celebrations and some of them even hired a Chinese opera to 
perform there along with Likay, a Siamese popular folk theatre. This portrays the 
                                                
188	Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 126.  
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assimilation of the Chinese into local society, leading them to become a part of the 
Siamese society. An example of the performance of the Chinese opera in a Siamese 
temple can be seen in Figure 1.14.  
 
 
Figure 1.14: A mural painting at Matchimawat temple, Songkhla, during the reign of King Mongkut  
(1804-1868), showing the performance of Chinese opera and a Chinese audience at a Buddhist 
ordination ceremony in a Siamese temple. 
 
Chinese migrants were also said to have readily acculturated themselves to the 
Siamese form of Buddhism, the oldest public Chinese cemetery having been built in 
Bangkok in 1884.189  In nineteenth-century Siam, most Chinese cremated their dead and 
their corpses were buried in the precincts of Siamese temples. However, some Chinese 
rented the landed property from the Siamese temples to stay in or do business.190 Many 
Siamese temples even allowed the Chinese to establish their own Chinese temples in their 
areas.  
 
The way the Chinese created their own space in local temples to bury their 
relatives was made through donations to local temples. Here the network between 
migrants and local temples was established. This is notable in that it shows the gradual 
process of the creation of space in the country of settlement since their donation of two 
                                                
189	Ibid., 127.  
190	The collection of NAT, MOE 7.6 provides many documents about the property of Thai temples for rent. 
There are also temple lots that indicate the names of tenants, positions of the structures and surroundings. 
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bells to a Siamese temple in the sixteenth century. In the case of the Hainanese 
community at Pak Kradae in Surat Thani, the Chinese chairman of the Hainanese temple 
had to donate the landed property of the temple to build a new Thai temple in order to 
bury their clansmen in the community.191 This proves that the only way to have their own 
cemetery for their clansmen in the Siamese temple precincts was to donate their landed 
property to the Siamese temple.  
 
      
         Figure 1.15: Pak Kradae cemetery                    Figure 1.16: A mural painting in Pak Kradae  
                                                                                       Hainanese temple 
                                                               
In this space of the local temple they also exerted their identity through the 
building and decoration of the graveyards. When the Pak Kradae Hainanese temple was 
renovated in the late 20th century, a committee board decided to paint the story of the first 
wave of Chinese migration who had travelled by junk based on the stories of their 
ancestors, as seen in Figure 1.16. The paintings of Chinese junks (see Figure 1.15) were 
also decorated in the graveyard.192 
 
Another example of the exertion of their identity in the cemeteries in the precinct 
of local temples is the graveyards of the “Peranakan”. In the early Qing dynasty, trade-
related emigration increasingly expanded, encouraging people to move within and 
abroad. This developed into a global proliferation of Chinese commercial activities, 
particularly within South East Asia. Chinese merchants also traded with growing 
plantations in this region and, in so doing, some decided to settle with their entire 
                                                
191 Nikoon Chuleetham (Li Pat Poon). Interview, 9 September 2015. Li is the guardian and spirit medium 
of the Hainanese Temple of Pak Kradae, Kanchanadit district.  
192 Ibid.  
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families in the Straits Settlements (Malacca, Penang, and Singapore) and Indonesia. 
Some had both families abroad and in their homelands. Most of the emigrants were from 




           Figure 1.17: A grave in a Chinese cemetery in Phuket. 
 
However, in Siam, Phuket is home to the Peranakan. From the sixteenth to the 
twentieth centuries, tin mining was the main source of income, and Hokkiens were the 
dominant dialect group among immigrants to the Strait Settlements.194 In 1902, Kaw 
Simbee (許森美), a son of Kaw Suchiang (許泗章), who was a Chinese migrant to 
Penang about 1810 before moving to Ranong on the western coast of South Siam, was 
appointed the new governor of Phuket. He encouraged Chinese immigration (primarily 
Hokkiens via Penang), and provided them with funds to work in the tin mining 
industry.195 According to Figure 1.17, showing a female costume in the grave, reveals 
that it belongs to Peranakan.  
 
In a Siamese temple in Pak Nam Tha Thong, a coastal Hainanese village, the 
Chinese utilised space within the temple for their graveyard. Although the majority of 
                                                
193 Lary, Chinese Migrations, 79-81.	
194 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 211.  
195 Ibid., 151. See also “นักเดนิทาง…เพื$อเขา้ใจในแผน่ดนิ”: ภเูกต็ (Travel Guide for Understanding In 
Phuket), (Bangkok: Sarakadee, 2000), 47.  
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them cremated their dead bodies, the graveyard processed both Siamese and Chinese 
characteristics, as can be seen in Figure 1.18.  
 
 
Figure 1.18: A Chinese graveyard, which portrays their assimilation into Siamese society. The graveyard 
processed Siamese characteristics while there was a Chinese stone tablet in front. 
 
In the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, there were signs 
that the Chinese had begun to separate themselves from Siamese society due to the 
enlargement of the Chinese population. In 1884, the first public Chinese cemetery was 
built in Bangkok. By 1900, all five major ethnic groups in Bangkok had their own 
cemeteries. In the early twentieth century, the space within the Chinese public cemeteries 
was not sufficient to provide for everyone. A Chinese descendant whose relative or 
ancestor was not the member of an ethnic association would have found it difficult to 
bury their corpses. It is also possible that to be a member of an association or to bury 
their relatives would possibly mean they would have to pay a large sum of money. 
Therefore, some Chinese thought of a business plan to rent a cemetery at a Siamese 
temple to charge those Chinese who wanted to bury their relatives.  
 
In 1905, for example, Lam and Toe, a Chinese and a Siamese, wrote a letter to the 
government for permission to rent a cemetery at Sangveswitsayaram temple in Bangkok. 
Their business plan was to charge those who wanted to be cremated or to bury their 
relatives. There had been many earlier requests from within the Chinese community, but 
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all were declined. The officer, inasmuch as there had never been any temple that allowed 
its property to be rented for this purpose before, rejected this proposal too.196  
 
In the case of Surat Thani, in many small Chinese communities, they buried their 
ancestors or relatives in the precincts of the Siamese temple, where their cemetery was 
separated from the Siamese graveyard. There were Chinese public cemeteries owned by 
the five major dialect groups only in the downtown area of Bandon. However, not all 
Chinese were buried there, for some chose to bury their ancestors on their own private 
landed property due to the fact that people who wanted to bury their relatives in the 
cemeteries of the native-place associations had to pay a certain amount of money.  
 
The period of the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century was the 
turning point of the history of Chinese migration to Surat Thani and other parts of Siam. 
Chinese women started to migrate abroad, which made the assimilation of the Chinese 
into the Siamese society gradually decrease. Chinese children born of these Chinese 
mothers might have to speak Chinese at home and no longer have to learn the Thai 
language. Some might gradually stop sending their Chinese children to Siamese schools. 
In addition, there was the introduction of the Law of Nationality (Siam) in 1913, the first 
nationality law, which had an effect on Chinese migrants, making them more cohesive 
and homogeneous. The law stated that every person born on Siamese territory had to be 
considered as Siamese and a Siamese woman who married an alien had to lose her 
Siamese nationality, which made intermarriage harder.197 The Chinese communities had 
become seen as spaces of alien difference in the eyes of Siamese people. 
 
In Hainan, the motherland of the majority of Surat Thani’s Chinese, Hainanese 
women were strictly forbidden from migrating outside the island owing to an ancient 
Hainanese superstition that doing so would bring bad luck. Even in the early twentieth 
century, this practice still existed. In 1915, there was a dispute among Hainanese men at a 
port in Bangkok after they discovered that a Hainanese man had also travelled with his 
                                                
196	NAT, MOE 7.6/6 เรื$องนายโต นายหลําเชา่ที$ป่าชา้วดัสงัเวชวศิยาราม (Toe and Lam asking permission 
to rent a cemetery of Sangveswitsayaram temple), Luang Phirom to MOE, letter dated 19/01/1905.  
197 TNA, FO 628/31. Document dated 1913, 1.  
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wife, who had hidden herself in a junk leaving Haikou, the capital city of Hainan, for 
Siam.198 In the meantime, some Siamese women who travelled with their Chinese 
husbands to China completely dressed as Chinese women and were criticised for making 
their local-born children become more Chinese than Siamese.199  
 
          
             Figure 1.19: A gravestone in Ayutthaya                      Figure 1.20: Another gravestone 
 
A gravestone in Ayutthaya, a former capital of Siam, in Figure 1.19, reveals that a 
Siamese woman who married a Chinese migrant adopted the word Xian (暹), or Siam as 
her surname, something which can also be seen in the large number of gravestones 
bearing this surname for local women. However, some women adopted the word Tai (泰), 
or Thai, as their surname when they married Chinese men, as shown in Figure 1.20.200 
Normally the name of the first wife would be written on the right side of the gravestone. 
Almost all Chinese migrants had left their wives in China, but some brought them to 
Siam or had more than one wife. In Figure 1.20, the Chinese wife is written as the second 
wife. The most important thing that the second stone tablet portrays is that the Chinese 
                                                
198	Siam Observer Newspaper, dated 7/12/1915. See NAT, MOI 20.18/47 ตรสุปีใหม ่(Chinese New Year). 
Document dated 23/11/1915 to 8/05/1917, 6. 	
199 Mr. Rampueng’s opinion in Siam Observer Newspaper, dated 8/12/1915. See Ibid., 7.  	
200 This idea and figures 1.16 and 1.17 were derived from Somchai Kwangtongpanich, an expert on Thai-
Chinese history that the author met in person during the field research in Thailand in 2015. 	
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women had migrated from China and settled into the local society together with Siamese 
women.  
 
Another impact of the immigration of Chinese women was that their Chinese 
children gradually separated themselves from the Siamese society although some of them 
studied in Siamese schools due to the fact that Chinese schools were not established 
throughout the country yet. In some Siamese schools where the majority of the students 
were Chinese, they had begun to be seen as problematic in the eyes of the Siamese 
authorities. The Chinese children did not completely assimilate themselves into local 
society and still celebrated their Chinese New Year and traditions. In the collection of 
NAT, MOE 4.2, for example, there are a number of letters written by Siamese 
headteachers asking for permission to cancel classes during term time. Most public 
Siamese schools were temple schools located in the precincts of the temple. There are 
some letters stating that the reasons why the headteachers cancelled the classes were, 
among others, the performance of Chinese opera in the Siamese temple when it came to 
religious ceremonies and festivals.  
 
In 1913, there was a report that a school had to be closed for two days owing to a 
Chinese opera hired by a Chinese company performing in front of the school 
playground.201 The opera was hired to play for only one day on the Buddhist Sabbath but 
the Chinese community collected money for a second day performance.202 Some Chinese 
within the community utilised a school pavilion as a morgue for a day until the body was 
cremated or buried.203 During Chinese New Year, in schools such as Pratoomkongka 
School, which had a Chinese majority, it had been the custom to close for three days. 
However, the headmaster had to ask permission every year beforehand from the inspector 
of the Ministry of Education.204  
                                                
201 NAT, MOE 4.2/4 เรื$องการปิดเปิดโรงเรยีน 29 เม.ย.-29 ม.ีค. 2456 (Asking permission to cancel the class 
in 1913), Nai Sri to Khun Phirunphittayaphan, letter dated 11/03/1913, 145.  
202 Ibid.  
203 NAT, MOE 4.2/5 เรื$องการปิดเปิดโรงเรยีน ศก 2457 (Asking permission to cancel the class in 1914), 
Ratchaburut to Khun Worawetphisit, letter dated 24/08/1914, 46.  
204	NAT, MOE 4.2/3 เรื$องการปิดเปิดโรงเรยีน ศก 131 (Asking permission to cancel the class in 1913), A. 
Sulton to Luang Anubhart, letter dated 28/01/1913, 16.  
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In 1914 a government officer marked that this custom should be eliminated and 
the school should be run as normal even though there were just five or six 
students.205After 1916 there was a last report on the closure of the school due to 
interference from the Chinese opera, which suggests that the majority of Chinese children 
might possibly have chosen to study in Chinese schools once public Chinese education 
was introduced in Siam.206 These documents reveal the difficulties facing Chinese 
children and parents to maintain their Chinese identity through the celebration of Chinese 
New Year and enjoying their own entertainment, such as Chinese opera, while studying 
in Siamese schools.   
 
To summarise, prior to the immigration of Chinese women, Chinese migrants 
assimilated themselves into local society through intermarriage with local women. They 
established the networks with local temples by having their own cemeteries through 
donations and exerted their identity into the local space through the performance of their 
own entertainment. They became a part of local society. However, during the late 
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, there was a greater influx of Chinese into 
local society, and as their communities got stronger, native-place associations were 
established to serve them. The development of local place associations as well as the 
emigration of Chinese women in the late nineteenth century led to an end of the 
assimilation of the Chinese into local society. The enlarged numbers of Chinese as well 
as their children in local society led local authorities to begin to see them as a problem 
because they did not completely assimilate themselves into local society. Furthermore, 
the first nationality law of Siam, in 1913, together with the immigration of Chinese 
women, acted as a catalyst for the end of the assimilation. The following section looks at 
the introduction of Chinese schools. Mass public Chinese education in the early twentieth 
century had made the Chinese communities separate from Siamese society. The migrants 
and children rarely spoke Thai or associated with local society and had, to all intents and 
                                                
205 NAT, MOE 4.2/5 เรื$องการปิดเปิดโรงเรยีน ศก 2457 (Asking permission to cancel the class in 1914), 
Anusit Wiboon, letter dated 27/02/1914, 144.  
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purposes, become aliens in the eyes of Siamese people. The situation led to the Thai-
ification policy launched by the authorities in a bid to force the Chinese to become Thai.  
 
 
V.        The Introduction of Chinese Schools and the Preservation of Chinese   
            Ethnic Identity  
 
As the networks of Chinese migrants had been firmly embedded in Siam through the 
establishment of Chinese native-place associations and the migration of Chinese women 
in the twentieth century, the Chinese communities continued to flourish and enlarge. 
These factors brought an end to Chinese assimilation into Siamese society. Chinese mass 
public education was later introduced into migrant communities to serve the needs of 
Chinese parents to preserve their Chinese ethnic identity for the second generation of 
Chinese. Chinese schools prior to the first three decades of the twentieth century focused 
on their native-place based education, using their own language to teach.  
 
The establishment of Chinese schools in the first decade of the twentieth century 
had much to do with economy. The Chinese communities were not only enlarged but also 
the complexity of business dictated as such. There was a need for workers with 
knowledge of Chinese for efficient bookkeeping and filing in large firms, for banking, for 
contact with Chinese firms in Singapore and Hong Kong among others.207 However, 
Xinmin school was the first community-supported Chinese school for all the five major 
ethnic groups. However, it failed to meet the needs of other dialect groups as it used 
Teochew as the language of instruction. As a result, the Hakka founded “the Chin-te (Jin 
Tek) school in 1913, the Cantonese Association the Ming-te school in 1914, and the 
Hokkien Association the Pei-yuan school in 1916. Only in 1921 was the first Hainanese 
school, Yu-min, established.”208 The order nearly parallels the order of the power and 
resources of dialect groups.209   
 
                                                
207 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 169.  
208	Ibid.  
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In the meantime, Keemong School, the first Chinese school in Surat Thani, was 
introduced and financially supported by Liao Chiangsoon (廖昌順), also known as Liao 
Baoshan (廖葆珊), Khun Prasertsawamiphak, and Phraya Pradinun-Bhumirat, a southern 
tycoon who migrated from Chenghai district near Shantou.210At the turn of the 20th 
century, Liao obtained the largest share of the bird’s nest industry in Siam and was based 
in Bandon. He later built a sprawling market with a modern cinema, rice mill, saw mill, 
and an ice-making factory, and was one of the very few Chinese to be appointed to the 
title phraya by King Vajiravudh.211  
 
There is no definitive evidence as to when Keemong School was founded exactly, 
as it had not been registered with the government. However, on 3 October 1918, the 
managers of the school were commanded to register within two months. Therefore, Liao 
Hantheng (廖漢建), a member of Liao’s family, and Chia Chongkui (謝棕奎), a Hakka, 
who were managers of the school at the time, officially registered the school on 10 
December 1918. Koe Khunbok, a Chinese, served as a headmaster while Chua 
Khengnguan (蔡慶元), a Teochew, was a Chinese teacher. The school utilised a Chinese 
vegetarian cafeteria that was located in the centre of Bandon’s Chinatown as the school’s 
building.212 This was due to the fact that the Ministry of Education wanted to regulate 
Chinese education.  
 
The Private Schools Act was introduced in 1918, the first Siamese legislation to 
regulate Chinese education. It forced every foreign school to register with the Ministry of 
Education and the principals of these schools to be educated to the standards set by the 
Ministry for the second year of secondary school. Moreover, all foreign teachers were 
required to study Thai and pass examinations in the Thai language six months and one 
                                                
210 Kanok Nganphairot, “โรงเรยีนจนีในบา้นดอน,” (Chinese Schools in Bandon) in ๗๕ ปีสรุาษฎรธ์าน ี
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year after they had begun teaching. The Thai language must be taught in the school at 
least three hours each week.213    
 
On the basis of this regulation, Keemong School experienced difficulties. The 
headmaster was changed every six months. Koe Khunbok was replaced by Chua 
Khengnguan. In late 1919, the school received Sunho, a local-born Chinese with a 
Siamese nationality, as its headmaster while Chua returned to teaching. By the end of 
1920, the school had hired another Chinese teacher, Kho Chochai (許楚材), but he was 
also Teochew.214 Therefore, it could be assumed that this school might have used 
Teochew as the language of instruction and there is no evidence that other ethnic groups 
were welcomed at this school.  
 
 
Figure 1.21: A photocopy of a school certificate of Chua Khengnguan 
                                                
213	Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 228.  
214 NAT, MOE 54.8/1 มณฑลสรุาษฎรส์ง่รายงานประจําปีพ.ศ. 2462 ของโรงเรยีนคมีงและโรงเรยีนคมีงขอรับ 
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In the early twentieth century, those who migrated were not only limited to the 
working class, but the educated people also migrated into Siam due to the requirement of 
Chinese teachers. This made the Chinese community fill with migrants from many social 
classes. In the case of Keemong School, Chua got his school certificate from Chaozhou 
Government Middle School (潮州官立中學堂) in Guangdong (see Figure 1.21). In the 
meantime, six teachers of Hakka’s Jin Tek School all produced their high school 
certificates from China to prove that they were qualified to be Chinese teachers.215It is 
worth noting that every teacher from each Chinese school all shared the same hometown 
due to the benefit of the networks established from the native-place association. Leaders 
of the Chinese community also had the responsibility to find Chinese teachers.  
 
The following year, the passing of the Compulsory Education Act of 1921 was 
initiated by the government. This law demanded all children aged 7 (in some cases 8, 9 or 
10) to 14 to attend primary school for at least four years.216 Moreover, all children of 
compulsory school age in every kind of school must study Thai language for at least 800 
hours per year, or approximately three hours per day.  
 
In the early twentieth century, most Chinese schools in Siam were located near 
Chinese temples. Some were in the temples and together they formed temple schools. In 
Bangkok, a Chinese native asked for permission in 1919 to open Guan Yu temple 
primary school, in which students would be instructed inside the temple. However, the 
school was only finally allowed to open a kindergarten as the space and building did not 
meet the requirements of the Ministry of Education.217  
 
Due to the large numbers of Chinese temples that were formerly established in 
almost every Chinese community, mass public Chinese education was easily spread. In 
                                                
215 NAT, MOE 541/31 เรื$องอนุญาตใหด้ํารงโรงเรยีนจิ6นเตก้อยูต่อ่ไป (The permission for Jin Tek school to 
exist). Document dated 2/09/1918-19/05/1920, 1-42.  
216 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 228.  
217 NAT, MOE 541/212 เรื$องอนุญาตใหต้ั 0งโรงเรยีนศาลเจา้กวนอ ู(The permission for Guan Yu temple 
school to be established). Document dated 08-31/10/1919, 1-6.  
	 94	
Surat Thani, the Chinese also utilised their temples to offer Chinese education. In Ko 
Samui, the Hainanese community at Nathon used their Hainanese temple to establish 
Tiang Thon O’iao School. However, there is no evidence as to when the school was 
exactly founded but it was possibly some time in the 1920s because Yu-min School, the 
first Hainanese school, in Bangkok, was only established in 1921. Before 1926, there 
were four managers operating this school, namely Ngao Toneyeng (吳選仍), Lim 
Hongyao (林鴻曜), Po Kokhui (潘鵠輝) and Pu Hongseng (符洪成).218 They were all 
Hainanese. 
 
Similar to the Chinatowns in the US and Canada, which were created to be 
“spaces of difference” developed from the exclusionary legislation in 1882 and the 
unfriendly social environment, Chinatowns in Siam had gradually become “spaces of 
difference.” Strong transnational networks were firmly established. There were many 
Chinese temples and native-place associations that served as the centres of their networks. 
In addition, there was also the migration of Chinese women and the founding of many 
Chinese schools throughout Siam. Therefore, their settlements had become so large that 
they felt that they no longer derived any benefit from learning the local language.  
 
Despite the enlarged Chinese communities, the Chinese, however, were oriented 
towards their original locality; they still felt that they were Hainanese, Teochew and 
others. In other words, the Chinese successfully created their own space in the early 
twentieth century but there were spaces developed separately within the larger space. 
Similar to Keemong School, which might use Teochew as the language of instruction, the 
three Hainanese schools in Ko Samui and Phunphin might instruct their students in 
Hainanese.  
 
Many Chinese teachers refused to assimilate themselves into local society. A 
large number of them did not even try to study the Thai language and had to resign from 
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their posts after they did not pass the language exam. Some tried to extend the test date so 
many times that the officer regarded it as a trick. This could be found in the case of the 
teachers from both Keemong School and Jin Tek School. Therefore, the Siamese 
authorities found that they should find a way to limit the growth of Chinese education. 
Moreover, the Chinese residing overseas, in the late 1920s, were captivated by the ideas 
of race and nation promoted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, ideas which were also transmitted to the 
Chinese community in Surat Thani and other parts of South East Asia.219 
 
Therefore, the Siamese authorities found that they should find a way to limit the 
growth of Chinese education. In 1927, a model was proposed to merge Siamese schools 
with Chinese schools by the Ministry of Education. The model was to be used in small 
Chinese communities as an experiment before applying it to the larger communities. In 
May, Bao Muikiab (傅美甲), a Hainanese, asked for permission to open “Tang Tum” 
private school in Ko Pha-ngan, Surat Thani. The Ministry of Education plotted a secret 
plan to merge a Siamese school with a new Chinese school on the island. The new 
government school was originally planned to be used as a model to merge Siamese 
schools with Tiang Thon O’Hiao School, which was owned by a Hainanese native on Ko 
Samui, some time in the future because it would be easier for the Ministry to control the 
school and for the government to control local-born Chinese.220  
 
Luang Borwonsarnwichachao was sent by the Ministry to inspect the school and 
the Chinese communities on Ko Samui. His significant role was to persuade the Chinese 
in the community to agree with the model of merging schools. When he arrived on Ko 
Pha-gan he called a meeting to discuss the new model. In the meeting, both Chinese and 
Siamese headmen, together with people from both the Chinese and Siamese communities, 
participated. The Chinese finally agreed with the plan and the new school was named 
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“Prachaban Tambon Madueawan 1 (Kok Mian 國民)”, where both Chinese and Thai 
languages would be taught equally.221  
 
However, the government would only pay for Siamese teachers, not Chinese ones, 
and moreover, in the report he suggested that Siamese children should study how to do 
commerce in the new school because the economy of Ko Pha-ngan was completely 
dominated by the Chinese. They even set the price of coconuts because there was no 
business-meeting environment like theirs and he added that the best locations were 
owned by the Chinese.222 However, what he termed ‘business meeting place’ would 
actually be the temple, which was used as both a meeting place and for business 
connections in almost every Chinese community.  
 
In addition, the inspector wanted the school to have more buildings to receive 
both Siamese and Chinese students. Therefore, the Chinese volunteered to raise the 
necessary funds, and there was a fundraising campaign to use the Chinese New year to 
gather money donated by people.223 This reveals the cooperation of the Chinese in the 
local community and the success of the native-place associations, which were firmly 
established to serve people in the community for not only religious purposes, but also for 
business connections and the education of the second generation Chinese.   
 
In brief, once networks had been firmly established in the country of settlement 
due to the influx of Chinese men and later, in the twentieth century, with women, the 
Chinese communities had enlarged and Chinatowns were seen in the eyes of local 
authorities as “spaces of difference”. In the Chinatowns, in the first three decades of the 
century, and before the establishment of the Nationalist government in 1928 in Nanjing, 
there were conflicts between the different groups. Even the schools were separated from 
each other based on the use of the language of instruction: there were Hokkien, 
Cantonese, Teochew, Hainanese, and Hakka schools, but there were no “Chinese national” 
schools. In the early decades of the century, when the Chinese communities had evolved, 
                                                




the local government began to launch the Thai-ification programmes through the 
regulation and restriction of Chinese education. However, the inspection of Chinese 
schools was not carried out in a strict and unyielding manner compared with what was to 
come in the 1930s. The Chinese ethnic community had changed to become a Chinese 
national community after the movement to use Guoyu, or Mandarin, in Chinese schools 
in the late 1920s. This served as the first mark of the transformation of Chinese identities, 
which will be discussed in depth in the next chapter.  
  
 
VI.      Conclusion 
 
The migrant communities in Surat Thani and also in greater Siam had fluid and 
complicated characteristics that were susceptible to change over time. For the sake of 
trade and economy the Chinese had been in Siam for a long time. However, they only 
began to establish themselves into Siamese society around the sixteenth century, based on 
evidence found, such as the bells and the graveyards during that period. Early networks 
were built through the donation of bells in the sixteenth century. In this way, they exerted 
Chinese identity and this was the beginning of the assimilation of the Chinese people into 
the local society. Therefore, the Chinese became a part of the Siamese community as they 
interacted within the space of the local people.  
 
However, the industrial revolution, together with colonialism, caused the massive 
migration of the Chinese into Siam. The early migrants in the modern period assimilated 
themselves into the local identity owing to the fact that their women never migrated in 
this period, and so the men intermarried with local women. The influx of these Chinese 
led to the enlargement of their communities and the firm establishment of native-place 
associations at the centre of networks. Their space, which had become larger in the local 
space of the host country, had complicated characteristics in that within their space there 
were many other smaller spaces established there.     
 
Prior to the twentieth century Chinese migrants had families in both China and in 
Siam. In the early twentieth century the migration of Chinese women had brought an end 
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to the assimilation of the Chinese into Siamese society. The names of the Chinese women 
were written on graves along with those Siamese and local-born Chinese women. They 
were seen in the eyes of the Siamese as aliens and the Chinatowns were “spaces of 
difference”. In this period, Chinese schools were established based on the needs of 
Chinese education due to the complexity of transnational networks. However, there were 
no “Chinese national” schools, but separate Hokkien, Cantonese, Teochew, Hananese, 
and Hakka establishments. There was also the migration of educated people, which made 
Chinese schools become more distinct as they refused to learn the Thai language and 
forced Chinese and local-born Chinese to stop associating with Siamese society.  
 
Space and place are indispensable components of diaspora owing to people’s 
existence and interaction within the said space and place. Spatial interaction is 
characterised by the movement of people, capital, goods, ideas and information across 
networked space between homeland and settled land or others where a diasporic person 
has settled.224 To conclude from this case study, the Chinese diaspora is about the 
creation and interaction of “space”. Within a space there are many smaller spaces created 
and interacted in by migrants. However, the space created by migrants can be dynamic 
and fluid. This reveals the complicated characteristics of the “space” in migrant 
communities.  
 
In the late 1920s, the introduction of Guoyu as the language of instruction in 
Chinese schools marked as the first sign of the transformation of Chinese identities from 
ethnic to national ones. The Chinese communities had become a single unit, their space 
was growing larger and becoming distinct and this led to severe restrictions and many 
policies to end Chinese-only education and make Chinese children become Siamese. The 
transformation of Chinese identities from ethnic to national ones will be discussed in the 
next chapter.  
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Chapter Two 
The Chinese Response   




I.         Introduction 
 
After being impacted by the industrial revolution and colonialism, there was an influx of 
Chinese into Surat Thani in the mid-nineteenth century through the early twentieth 
century. These early migrants established their native-place associations through the 
construction of Chinese temples to serve as centres of networks. In the late nineteenth 
century, Chinese women started to migrate in significant numbers, making the Chinese 
intermarriage and assimilation into the Siamese society decrease gradually. In the early 
twentieth century, mass public Chinese education was introduced to Siam. In Surat 
Thani, many Chinese schools were established in Chinatowns to serve the needs of 
Chinese parents that desired to preserve their Chinese ethnic identity for the second 
generation of Chinese. Most Chinese schools were in or located near the Chinese 
temples. However, there were no Chinese national schools but rather Hainanese and 
Teochew schools. As the Chinese community enlarged and homogenised, it began to be 
seen in the eyes of the Siamese government as a “space of difference,” and a Thai-
ification programme was therefore launched through the regulation and restriction of 
Chinese education. Nevertheless, the inspection of Chinese schools was not carried out in 
a strict and unyielding manner.  
 
On mainland China, Chinese intellectuals, in the early twentieth century, put a 
great deal of effort in to reshaping China into a modern nation-state which could confront 
foreign threats. People, commodities, finance and ideas could be mobilised within and 
outside China by diverse layers of social networks as a consequence of globalisation.225 
The ideas of race and nation promoted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), a Chinese 
physician and revolutionary and the Father of the Republic of China who went on to 
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become the first leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party, or the Guomindang (GMD, 國民
黨), were also transmitted to overseas Chinese communities including Surat Thani. These 
ideas captivated many Chinese sojourners.226  
 
After the Nationalists successfully reunited the country in 1928, China quickly 
gained international recognition. The nation seemed to be gradually modernising.227 The 
Chinese national identity was focused round the concept of the Republican citizen 
recognizable by modern customs and symbols such as having short hair and wearing a 
felt hat, bowing, and taking part in National Day ceremonies based on the solar calendar. 
New customs of the Republic, nevertheless, were constructed from previous ethnic 
identities. The new Republican government did not intend to abolish the festivals of the 
lunar calendar because the modern state required both guojia (國家), or a country, and 
minzu (民族), or race. The idea of a single unified traditional China was a product of the 
new political culture of the twentieth century.228 
 
In addition, the idea of the Chinese national identity and the concept of overseas 
Chinese, or huaqiao (華僑), a call for unity of all Chinese emphasising what was national 
in China, were brought to Chinatowns in Surat Thani and elsewhere. The expansion of 
the Chinese printing industry in major treaty ports and the introduction of modern 
Chinese schools in every place were important factors for rapid change such that the idea 
of the national was soon implanted into the consciousness of local-born Chinese students. 
In colonies and elsewhere, the Chinese, having been conquered and governed by 
foreigners, hoped to reclaim their independence and self-respect.229  
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The concept of Chinese national identity, however, provoked the local authorities 
in Siam as the Chinese refused to assimilate into local society. They rarely spoke Thai or 
associated with the locals. The Siamese authorities thus launched the Thai-ification 
policy to force the Chinese to become Thai. In 1918, the Siamese government introduced 
the first legislation to regulate Chinese education, or the Private School Act of 1918. The 
law required that in every foreign school the principal must have completed at least two 
years of Siamese schooling, that every foreign teacher must study Thai and pass 
government examinations in the language within one year, and that the Thai language 
must be taught. In 1921, the first Compulsory Education Act was passed. It demanded all 
children aged 7 to 14 to attend primary schools run by the government or private schools 
that were granted permits from the government for at least four years. Moreover, all 
children of compulsory school age in every kind of school must study Thai language at 
least 800 hours per year, approximately 3 hours per day.230 
 
In 1927, the Private School Act of 1918 was amended in order to devise a more 
adequate control of Chinese schools after the Education officers had found many 
loopholes. King Prajadhipok (1893-1941) was so worried about the political movement 
of the Chinese, especially from the Chinese communists, that books about communism 
were seized at Bangkok port in 1926. Furthermore, the Siamese authorities also inspected 
Chinese textbooks in 1928 after the King visited southern provinces, including Surat 
Thani, and the Chinese schools were found perpetuating the Chinese language and 
Chinese nationalism. These were considered a threat to the absolute monarchy. At the 
same time, criticisms of the absolute monarchy and the idea of revolution were also 
widespread in local newspapers in 1928 so as to foment radical ideas in the country.231 In 
1932, foreign language was limited to seven and a half hours per week in schools and 
applied to all areas except Bangkok.  
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After the Siamese Revolution of 1932, new government introduced serious 
regulations demanding that all children receive a Thai education in order to improve the 
sense of citizenship across the nation. So the provisions of the Compulsory Education Act 
were promulgated in Bangkok and all areas in March 1933, in which the inspection of the 
Chinese schools was extremely strict and unyielding. In 1936, the Thai government 
amended the Private School Act so that Chinese language was permitted in Chinese 
primary schools for only 2 hours per week. It was, nevertheless, reported in 1938 by a 
British officer that the Chinese communities still remained distinct national communities 
in every town in Siam.232  
 
This chapter seeks to investigate the rise of Chinese nationalism and the 
transformation of the Chinese identities from ethnic to national. While the assimilation of 
the Chinese into local society seems to have come naturally when they chose to settle in 
Siam prior to the late 1920s, the Siamese government did engage in forced assimilation. 
Thus, it is interesting to examine how the Chinese identities shifted from ethnic to 
national identities and how the Chinese in Surat Thani responded to the Thai-ification 
programme from 1928 to 1937. This chapter has four main sections. The first section is to 
investigate the rise of Chinese nationalism. Then, the Chinese communist movement and 
the reaction and response of the Chinese to the Thai-ification programme from 1928 to 
1932 will be explored. The third section discusses the ideas planned by the Siamese 
authorities to launch the Private School Act of 1932 during 1930 to 1934, on which the 
Private School Act of 1936 was largely based. The last section investigates the Chinese 
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II.      The Rise of Chinese Nationalism 
 
After the establishment of the Chinese Nationalist government in 1928, modern Chinese 
education was introduced to Surat Thani for propaganda purposes through the contact and 
transnational networks between their native-place associations established in Surat Thani 
and those in their motherland districts in South China.233 The revolutionary cause of Sun 
Yat-sen was celebrated throughout Chinatowns in Surat Thani and elsewhere in South 
East Asia. This alarmed the Siamese authorities and later led to a crackdown on many 
Chinese schools. This section aims to investigate the rise of Chinese nationalism that was 
implanted into Chinese children in many Chinese schools in Surat Thani and elsewhere 
and the transformation of the Chinese identities from ethnic to national. In addition, it 
examines the early reaction of the Siamese authorities towards the rise of Chinese 
national identity.  
 
To comprehend Chinese nationalism, it is important to address the concepts of 
tradition and modernity. There has been no common consensus on the meanings of these 
two concepts. Some maintain that the first is anything old while the latter is anything 
new.234 However, Suryardinata observes that many academics have utilised the term 
“modernity” to refer to “a process of change, especially economic, social and cultural 
change, from simplicity to complexity, from the agricultural to the industrial, from rural 
to the urban, from the local to the national.”235 These transformations occur under the 
impact of the rapid industrialisation and globalisation.236 He concludes that ethnic 
Chinese in a migrant community are naturally oriented towards their Chinese locality. 
Having been migrated for a while and encountered with “Chinese nation-state,” the 
modern concept, they had been forced to transform from the ethnic Chinese into national 
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Chinese.237 Wang also proposes that “Chinese national” highlights the political good of 
larger community and its interests are prioritised.238 
 
In the latter half of the 1920s, the Chinese in Surat Thani and elsewhere in Siam 
venerated Sun Yat-sen as the Nationalist patron saint. His portrait was worshipped 
ardently throughout the Chinese community, which alarmed the Siamese authorities. In 
order to put it in context, it is necessary to look briefly at the history of the early Chinese 
Republic that the new political culture had developed in China between the inauguration 
of Dr. Sun as President of the Republic of China on January 1912 and the reburial 
ceremony of his remains in 1929 at Nanjing.239 The modern customs and symbols such as 
bowing and taking part in National Day ceremonies based on the solar calendar came to 
identify people who defined themselves as citizens of the Chinese Republic.240  
 
Following the death of Sun Yat-sen on 12 March 1925, he became a Chinese 
national hero and the ‘Father of the Country’ as obituaries and appreciations followed. 
Sun was repeatedly stated to be the founder of the Republic of China and often compared 
to George Washington, one of the founders of the USA. Moreover, he became a national 
symbol, and huge demonstrations followed his funeral procession shouting slogans: 
‘Love live Sun Yat-sen’s thought!’ ‘Love live the people’s revolution!’ ‘Down with 
imperialism!’ ‘Down with the warlords!’ Such slogans captured the major political issues 
of the times. In the Central Park of Beijing, where Sun lay in state, a recording of his 
speaking was broadcast through loudspeakers. Leaflets with the Shining Sun flag, the 
portrait of Sun, his dying testament or extracts from his doctrines were handed to 
visitors.241 
 
The Sanminzhuyi (三民主義), or the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen, together 
with the modern Chinese customs and symbols, were also transmitted to many 
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Chinatowns in Surat Thani and elsewhere in Siam. Chinese schools were founded to 
perpetuate Chinese nationalism. In 1927, an education inspector found that illegal 
Chinese language teaching was taking place in Zhaoying Temple at Maenam, a 
Hainanese community in Ko Samui. Additionally, books relating to Chinese politics were 
also discovered.242 Meanwhile, it was found that there were ceremonies of National Day 
of the Chinese Republic on 10 October 1927 in Sanmin, a Chinese kindergarten in 
Bangkok. The Shining Sun flags were decorated in front of Sanmin School. Many scrolls 
were hung on the wall at the entrance of the school, expressing the revolutionary doctrine 
of Sun.243 
 
The loyalty of the Chinese to the royal institution in Siam began to be questioned 
by the Siamese authorities because one of the principles of Dr. Sun, democracy (anti-
monarchy), obviously undermined the notion of an absolute monarchy, as was the 
practice in Siam at the time. The ‘Three Principles of the People’ elaborated by Sun Yat-
Sen, encouraged by Mikhail Boradin, a Comintern advisor, comprised an ideology for the 
Nationalist Party, consisting of nationalism (anti-imperialism), democracy (anti-
monarchy), and ‘people’s livelihood’ (similar to socialism now).244 Moreover, in January 
1928, the Siamese authorities found that every Chinese paid respect to the portrait of Sun 
Yat-sen on a stage at a student performance in a Chinese school in Bangkok. In contrast, 
and more shockingly, they did not stand during the royal anthem for King Prajadhipok 
after the end of the performance.245  
 
The doctrine was a potential threat to the monarchy in the eyes of the authorities; 
therefore, they paid extra attention to Chinese loyalty. There was an idea to force Chinese 
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students in Surat Thai and elsewhere in Siam to sing the royal anthem in order to show 
their loyalty to the country and its institutions. Prince Dhani Niwat, the Minister of 
Education, called a meeting of managers and headmasters from Chinese schools to 
instruct them to make singing the royal anthem and showing respect for the king and 
queen a top priority in every occasion.246  
 
This instruction was possibly due to the fact that Chinese students were more 
loyal to China than to the Siamese government or possibly even stood against the 
government system of Siam. When Prajadhipok visited Jintek School in Bangkok on 24 
March 1927, the Chinese students sang Qingyunge (卿雲歌), or “Song to the Auspicious 
Cloud,” which was once sung by Emperor Shun (帝舜, 2233 BC-2184 BC). The Chinese 
teachers, additionally, did not dare to reply when the king asked them to translate. 
However, it took more than a year to be finally translated, and in April 1928 a Chinese 
translator claimed that Chinese teachers wanted Chinese students in Siam to sing this 
song in order to encourage them to study hard.247 In reality, the classical version of the 
song was preferred by many Chinese to become the national anthem of the Beiyang 
government after the end of the monarchy.  
 
During his lifetime, Sun Yat-sen had been a controversial politician. However, he 
became a Chinese national hero and the Father of the Chinese Republic after his death. 
But he was a symbol open to various interpretations.248 People could use his image or 
different reasons. Many Chinese managers of Chinese schools in Siam used his portrait as 
a tool to gather money to support their Chinese schools. For example, on 11 April 1928, 
Chinese books, together with the pictures of Dr. Sun, were distributed and sold to many 
Chinese shops by Sunwen School (孫文學校) in Bangkok’s Chinatown. However, when 
an officer inspected the school on 16 April, the Chinese manager and teachers were seen 
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helping to decorate the picture of the King.249 The Chinese possibly pretended to show 
their loyalty to the King to the education inspector in order to escape the crackdown as it 
had just used the Chinese books and the portraits of Sun to gather money. It is also 
possible that the school obeyed the instruction from Prince Dhani Niwat, who had told 
the managers and headmasters of Chinese schools to make showing respect to the king 
and queen a top priority. 
 
It could be said that the Chinese Nationalists also wanted to mobilise the overseas 
Chinese for the benefit of Chinese national politics. The description of the pictures, found 
at Sunwen School in 1928, was Sun’s instruction in 1925 to build the Republic for all 
Chinese people to fight against warlordism, imperialism and end unequal treaties.250 In 
China, the recruitment of the union and party by both the Chinese Communists and the 
Chinese Nationalists succeeded after Chinese demonstrators, protesting against capitalist 
factory owners, unequal treaties and the privileges of foreigners in treaty ports, were 
killed in Shanghai and Guangzhou on 30 May 1925. This incident has been called 
Wusacanan (五卅慘案), or the May 30th Massacre. In these circumstances, it was 
suitable to mobilise patriots across the country to fight against those enemies as 
instructed by Dr. Sun.251 
 
Chinese schools had now developed into spaces for all Chinese ethnic groups. 
Based on a 1928 letter of Sunwen School sent to the owner of a shop in Chinatown in 
Bangkok, the managers of the school aimed to accept Chinese children from every dialect 
group and also welcomed all Chinese nationals to be sponsors and members of the school 
committee and association. They had to donate a certain amount of money every month 
to get voting rights or become a chairperson. 252  There was also an election in 
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Tianghuahakhao School in Satun, mostly by a committee of managers and merchants. 253 
The managers of Zhongshan School in Chumphon were also comprised of people from 
different dialect groups - Hakka, Hainanese, Cantonese and Hokkien. Furthermore, there 
were many Chinese teachers from diverse dialect groups working together in schools in 
this period. 254  As a Chinese national language based on Northern Mandarin was 
introduced as the language of instruction following the consolidation of the Nationalist 
Government in Nanjing in 1928, Chinese teachers from different dialect groups might 
have communicated in Mandarin. This symbolises the transformation from ethnically 
based Chinese communities to Chinese viewing themselves through the prism of the 
concept of a modern nation-state. 
 
The Siamese Government did not financially support Chinese schools. The self-
reliance of Chinese schools in Siam showed the attitude that the Siamese authorities did 
not want Chinese education as they were afraid that this would further reinforce a lack of 
assimilation into local society and further strengthen Chinese involvement with Chinese 
national politics. This was also the case with the colonial government. In British Malaya, 
for example, the British authorities rarely helped migrant children, both Chinese and 
Indian, to meet their educational needs. The power of the state was exercised mainly to 
prevent students and teachers from being involved with radical political movements. 
Financial assistance provided to English and Malay schools greatly exceeded that given 
to Chinese schools. The donations from Chinese merchants, often collected to bridge the 
gap between fees and running costs, were paid for land, buildings and equipment. Local 
leaders were socially and morally obliged to keep the schools going. Chinese teachers 
were also blessed with both status and respect for their role in meeting social and cultural 
requirements.255  
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As many governments in South East Asia did not financially support Chinese 
education, Chinese schools had to rely on money donated from the Chinese in 
Chinatowns. Sometimes, the donation came from the Chinese residing in many different 
countries, revealing the transnationalism of networks of Chinese in South East Asia. The 
Chinese had been establishing native-place associations as centres of the transnational 
networks since the second half of the nineteenth century as vehicles of mutual assistance 
and co-operation. Worried by the transnational nature of Chinese communities, the 
government of British Malaya banned the donations from outside the country to Chinese 
schools. Donations were henceforth monitored by a director general of education or his 
regional assistant.256 This method of preventing the development of Chinese education 
was a model for the education policy of the Siamese government, stemming from the fact 
that the Chinese residing in different places always assisted each other. In 1917, for 
example, when the Chinese from the Central Market of Songkhla, one of the southern 
provinces of Siam, wanted to establish a Chinese school, Chinese merchants residing in 
Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat, a neighbouring area of Surat Thani, and in Singapore 
and Penang, two states of British Malaya at the time, donated money to support the 
school.257  
 
Another aspect of the popularity of Dr. Sun is that, following his death in 1925, 
many Chinese schools were named after him throughout the country during the second 
half of the 1920s. Nevertheless, in order to disguise their lauding of him, the Chinese 
attempted to deceive the authorities. For example, in Chumphon, Surat Thani’s 
neighbouring province, the managers of Zhongshan School (中山) translated the name 
“middle mountain” as “public school where everyone can study,” when they asked for 
permission to establish the school on 23 April 1928.258 On February 1926, the Chinese 
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community in Langsuan, Chumphon, asked to establish ‘Yat-sen Night School,’ which 
was opened in May 1927, to teach the regular Thai curriculum, English and Chinese to 
people aged 15 to 45 years old. 259  Its name came to the attention of Phraya 
Thudsayunrungsarit, the commissioner of Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat, who thought 
that its teaching might focus on Sun Yat-sen’s doctrine, which would be counter to the 
policy and the law on Private Schools.260 Moreover, it educated both young people and 
mature students at night school, raising suspicions that it might have a hidden agenda. It 
was also difficult to inspect the school at night.261 The Chinese school was told by an 
officer to be temporarily closed and permission for its re-opening was delayed in order to 
disrupt its running. This had an effect on the popularity of the school in the community 
because the school relied on money donated by merchants and students.262 Finally, it was 
allowed to run on 27 October 1927, but the number of students was limited to ten because 
it did not meet the sanitary requirements following an inspection by a doctor.263 The 
minister had instructed that the permission be withdrawn following a legal stipulation that 
allows for this in the event of school premises failing hygiene and sanitation checks.264 
 
Following the death of Sun Yat-sen, paying honour to him became a mark of 
Chinese nationalism. Respect for him had grown. On 1 June 1929, Chinese worldwide 
observed the reburial ceremony of Dr. Sun. On this mournful day, the Chinese residing in 
many Chinatowns of Surat Thani went to pay respect to the Father of the Republic in 
their Chinese temples and native-place associations, where wreaths and offerings were 
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placed before Sun’s portrait as he became the Nationalist patron saint, and acquiring 
religious-like status.265  
 
   
      Figure 2.1: A portrait of Sun at Banpot Temple, Xiajie     Figure 2.2: A portrait of Sun in a  
       Association in Donsak, a district in Surat Thani, was       house at a Hainanese community in 
       replaced by Mao’s portrait in 1976                                     Banpot, Donsak  
 
In ceremonies, the Chinese venerated him as a deity. In Xiajie association, at a 
Hainanese temple at Donsak, a district in Surat Thani, a portrait of Sun was hung on the 
temple wall (see Figure 2.1). In Ko Rat Temple, located in another Hainanese community 
in Donsak, also hung a portrait of Sun. At the same time, some held memorial ceremonies 
as a tribute to Sun at private houses, as his portrait was also hung in many houses in Surat 
Thani’s Chinatowns (see Figure 2.2). Before Sun’s re-internment on June 1 1929, the 
Chinese community asked for permission from the Police Department to propagate the 
Three Principles of Sun and hold a ceremony, but the police refused to grant permission 
and issued an order that the Chinese could hold memorial ceremonies only in private 
houses.266 
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In spite of the fact that the ceremonies were strictly prohibited in Chinese 
associations and Chinese schools, the order was widely violated. In the Chinese 
Association (中華會館) in Bangkok, for example, a mock reburial ceremony of Sun was 
organised in accordance with the actual procession in Nanjing. A portrait of Sun was set 
up on a table and the Chinese brought wreaths and flowers or written passages praising 
him as tributes.267  
 
At the Chinese Association in Bangkok, the police suppressed the ceremonies and 
closed the entrance gate. They furthermore commanded that the portrait of Sun, hung on 
the wall, be taken down.268 This provoked the indignation of the Chinese across the 
country, who had heard of this incident.269 An anonymous Chinese wrote to The Bangkok 
Daily Mail on 8 June 1929, warning that, “No silly actions such as this will happen in the 
future or the amity between Siamese and Chinese may be lost forever.”270 A secret 
society to boycott Siamese products was established in a Chinese school in Surat Thani as 
a result of the incident. The Chinese in Bangkok set a nationwide precedent that Chinese 
teachers wanted Chinese students born of either Chinese or Siamese mothers to stop 
associating with Siamese society. In December 1929, a Siamese headmaster reported that 
a Chinese teacher of Tiang Thon O’iao School, in Ko Samui, established Sae Ji Hui, a 
name of a secret society that students had to pay to join. Every member received a 
booklet about the rules and regulations, which were strictly enforced. The society 
commanded Chinese students to see only Chinese opera and buy goods from Chinese 
markets. Additionally, they were prohibited from watching Likay, a form of Siamese 
popular folk theatre.271  
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Figure 2.3: The plan of a traditional building of Donghua School in 1929 
 
 
Figure 2.4: The plan of a modern building of Donghua School in 1930 
 
Another modern aspect of the Chinese community was the change from 
traditional buildings to modern. Although these large European-style buildings of 
Chinese schools represented a mere surface of modernity and could be found anywhere 
throughout the big cities in China and South East Asia, it is worth nothing this change. 
The change occurred because the modern Chinese education was more popular than 
before as Chinese schools and their buildings in Siam became larger and stronger.272 
Most of them were superior even to Siamese schools. Looking at the development of 
Chinese schools, the Siamese accused the Chinese of causing commodity prices to rise by 
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doubling the price of the materials used to build such schools.273 The building of 
Donghua School (中華學校), in a traditional Chinese townhouse in 1929 (Figure 2.3), 
was constructed into a larger building in European style in 1930 (Figure 2.4) after only 
one year in operation.274 This shows the popularity of modern Chinese education, which 
was attracting Chinese parents and children, together with the growing affluence of the 
Chinese. 
  
Leaflets and books of the Sunbun (孫文) doctrine were found decorating a picture 
frame in 1929. For example, a local education officer found a leaflet in Jengmeng School 
and a book in Kakmin School in Ayutthaya. In the leaflet, the words “sovereignty 
belongs to people” were written, catching the attention of the authorities.275 However, it 
was not illegal because the 1918 education law had not been amended to address such 
things and there was no obvious evidence that the doctrine was taught in Chinese 
schools.276 A political pamphlet was published in Tang Tek An Printing Press in 
Bangkok’s Chinatown. This confirms the idea that the authorities were afraid that these 
pamphlets threatened the royal institution.  
 
In brief, the ethnic Chinese had transformed to national Chinese when they 
encountered the modern concept of the “nation-state”, influenced by the current aspects 
of globalisation and the implantation of a Chinese national consciousness into local-born 
and Chinese children through the introduction of Chinese education into Chinese schools 
in Surat Thani and elsewhere in Siam. At the same time, Sun Yat-sen became one of the 
central symbols of the nation after his death. The Chinese throughout Siam honoured 
him, and this was yet another mark of Chinese nationalism. The Siamese authorities, 
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nevertheless, monitored closely the Chinese, whose celebrations of the principles of Sun 
were deemed harmful to Siam’s internal stability. This later led to the Thai-ification 
programme and the Private School Act of 1927 was introduced to control Chinese 
schools more efficiently.  
 
 
III.      The Reaction of the Siamese Authorities and the Response of the Chinese  
            to the Thai-ification programme from 1928 to 1932  
 
This section examines the movement of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) found in 
Chinese schools and the Private School Act of 1927, which was amended to deal with the 
rise of Chinese nationalism as well as Communist propaganda in Chinese schools in 
Surat Thani from 1927 to 1932. After 1927, the law was more seriously enforced than 
earlier and affected Chinese schools in Surat Thani to a great extent. Before looking into 
the 1927 Private School Act, it is necessary to consider the Private School Act of 1918.  
 
The Private School Act of 1918 was the first legislation to regulate foreign 
schools that had an effect on Chinese education. Under the law, it required that the 
principals of foreign schools must have completed at least two years of Siamese 
schooling, that all foreign teachers must study Thai and pass government examinations in 
the Thai language within a year, and that Thai language must be taught in the schools at 
least three hours each week. The Compulsory Education Act was issued in 1921, 
requiring every child aged between 7 and 14 to attend primary schools operated by the 
Siamese government or private schools that received permits from the government for at 
least four years. It also required all children of compulsory school age in every school to 
study Thai language for at least 800 hours per year, around 3 hours per day.  
 
The Private School Act of 1918, however, was not aimed at controlling Chinese 
schools but missionary schools owned by Westerners.277 Prince Dhani Nivat, the Minister 
of Education from 1927 to 1932, wrote that Chinese schools had not become a problem 
by the time the law of 1918 was imposed, since the Chinese did not perpetuate Chinese 
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nationalism and did not refuse to assimilate into the Siamese society.278 The Chinese 
schools, moreover, were founded to preserve the culture of ethnic and dialect groups 
from the beginning, and were not enthused by Chinese nationalism.279  
 
In 1926, the Siamese authorities seized books imported from China to Siam at a 
port in Bangkok. King Prajadhipok was concerned about the political movement of the 
CCP as communism was considered as a threat to the absolute monarchy. The King 
himself read all of the books and the documents that were seized, and he was profoundly 
concerned particularly about those books that espoused communism.280   
 
The Private School Act of 1927, therefore, was launched to control Chinese 
schools better after the Siamese government had found that the Chinese were utilising 
Chinese schools as vehicles to implant Chinese nationalism and/or communism into 
Chinese students. The law was similar to that of 1918, but it was added that a school must 
be closed forthwith if it was found to be teaching or preparing to teach any doctrine 
inciting hatred towards the Siamese king or the Siamese government, which caused class 
antagonisms, and which encouraged people to violate the law. Phuangphit proposes that 
the law of 1927 was amended to control Chinese schools in particular and was so strict 
that a Chinese school must be immediately closed if it broke the regulation.281 
 
The law of 1927 affected many Chinese schools in Surat Thani, particularly the 
Hainanese ones, which were later closed after the Siamese authorities found the political 
activities of the CCP in such schools. In addition to the rise of Chinese nationalism, 
another dimension of the Chinese community was the political movement associated with 
the CCP in Surat Thani and elsewhere in South East Asia. In order to understand the 
transnational networks of the CCP in South East Asia and how they affected Chinese 
schools, particularly in Ko Samui, one of the most important strongholds of the 
                                                
278 Phuangphit, พระวรวงศเ์ธอ, 18. 	
279 Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, 144. 	
280  Eiji Murashima, การเมอืงจนีสยาม การเคลื(อนไหวทางการเมอืงของชาวจนีโพน้ทะเลในประเทศไทย 
ค.ศ. 1924-1941 (Sino-Siamese Politics: Political Movement of the Overseas Chinese in Thailand from 
1924-1941), (Bangkok: Goodwill Press (Thailand) Co., LTD., 1996), 79.  
281 Phuangphit, พระวรวงศเ์ธอ, 16-17. 	
	 117	
Hainanese diaspora and the CCP, it is necessary to consider briefly the history of the CCP 
in Siam.  
 
The first Chinese communist who engaged with the political movement in Siam 
was Tan Zhensan (譚振三), who founded a Chinese newspaper named Kew Sing (僑聲) 
in 1922. His printing press was also used for printing documents about the Bolsheviks 
and he opened a library to spread communist ideas.282 As a result of his ideas and 
activities, he was deported on 19 May 1926. Zheng Shengyi (鄭省一) and Wang Buxian 
(王步先), who were members of the CCP and joined the Nationalist Party, took over Kew 
Sing and changed its name to Li Sae (勵青). When the CCP separated from the 
Nationalist Party in 1927, the two of them were expelled from the committee of the 
Nationalist Party in Siam. Therefore, Li Sae was used in the struggle against the 
Nationalists, who used Chino-Siamese Daily News (華暹新報) as its mouthpiece.283  
 
It should be noted that the majority of the CCP members were Hainanese, the 
largest dialect group in Surat Thani. Additionally, they contacted with other CCP 
organisations in British Malaya.284 Shortly after the establishment of the CCP branch in 
Siam in 1927, a group of Hainanese in Bangkok founded Ia Bu Lao Tong Lian Ha Huai 
Kan Chiang, meaning “the association of labour who worked with foreigners in Siam”. 
This secret association aimed to control labour and follow the principles of 
communism.285 In British Malaya, the purging of the CCP in 1927 by Chiang Kai-shek, 
or Jiang Jieshi (蔣介石, 1887-1975), a Chinese military leader, head of the Chinese 
Nationalist government (1928-1949) and the government in exile on Taiwan (1950-1975),  
resulted in a split in the radicals, leading to the establishment of splinter organisations 
such as the Modern Revolutionary Committee of the GMD of China, the Southseas 
Provisional Commission of the Communist Party of China, the Communist Youth Party 
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and the Nanyang Labour Union. These organisations consisted mostly of the Hainanese, 
who devoted their energy to spreading communism amongst Malayan Chinese.286  
 
The CCP was also involved in Chinese schools in Surat Thani and elsewhere in 
Siam. Many Chinese teachers were accused of being Bolsheviks and induced Siamese to 
join. In 1927, Lim Zhakchuan, a Teochiu who worked in Sammin School at Hat Yai, was 
accused of being a Bolshevik in Zheng Shengyi’s gang and expatriated on 6 June.287 
Murashima observes the difference in the political movements between the GMD and the 
CCP, noting that the GMD aimed to mobilise only the Chinese in Siam while the later 
wanted to include Siamese people as members.288 This led to the severe crackdown on 
Chinese schools because many Chinese teachers were CCP members.  
 
The severe crackdown on Chinese schools in Surat Thani and elsewhere in Siam 
can be traced back to the visit of King Prajadhipok to Ko Samui and other southern 
provinces in 1928. He found that many Chinese schools were flagrantly violating the law 
and ignoring the orders of the education inspectors. His tour was immediately followed 
by the new Minister of Education devising a new law to control these schools 
adequately.289 Following His Majesty’s tour in 1928, the Siamese authorities strictly 
enforced the Private School Act of 1927 as a tool to crackdown on Chinese schools. By 
the end of 1928, the education officer of Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat, of which Surat 
Thani was a part, commanded that Chinese teachers in this area, even in kindergarten, 
must have a good command of the Thai language and strictly follow the law on Private 
Schools. For the kindergartens, there was normally no educational requirement for 
teachers prior to 1928.290 This led to an interesting phenomenon. Some Chinese had to 
close their schools for a period of time to find qualified teachers. Chinese teacher wages 
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had risen due to their popularity and the shortage of them until these brought into the 
closure of many Chinese schools following 1928.    
 
In Ko Samui, Lim Xixiam, a Chinese teacher at Tiang Thon O’iao School, 
resigned his position on 30 April 1929 after complaining that there were too many 
students to teach and having a request for a payrise rejected by the manager. Therefore, 
Ngao Dengxim, the manager, had to find new two teachers, Ngao Sengsuan and Oui 
Thonggian, to do the Thai language examination. Sengsuan successfully passed the exam 
on 1 August while Thonggian did not. However, he was later accused of being a 
communist and sent to Bangkok on January 1930.291 In Chumphon, a neighbouring 
province of Surat Thani, Yat-sen School (Night School) in Chumphon had to close its 
door in April 1928 after all students resigned because the manager could not find any 
qualified Chinese teachers. 292  Meanwhile, Dongsunkokmin School in Nakhon Si 
Thammarat, another neighbouring province, also suffered the same fate.293   
 
In the case of Keemong School, in Bandon’s Chinatown, Shou Caikun, or Luang 
Prajak, a Teochew tycoon, the manager of the school asked for permission to accept Lim 
Mengzheng, a Teochew, to be a teacher on 2 September 1929. Although he failed the 
Thai language test, he did well compared with other Chinese teachers in the area.294 In 
contrast, Phraya Surat Thani, the governor of Surat Thani, wrote to Phraya Si Thammarat 
on 19 September that this case should be considered leniently, because he had paid a lot 
of attention to Thai language study. He thus should be allowed to study Thai language 
additionally if he would be allowed to teach.295 On 22 September, Phraya Si Thammarat, 
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the governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat, strongly opposed the idea and insisted that the 
regulations must be unyielding for private Chinese schools. 
  
Here we start to see the effect of Thai-ification programme. The Chinese began to 
struggle to maintain their Chinese schools. Some of them, for example, signed their 
names in Thai with the royal title received from the Siamese king to show their royal 
connections. Shou Caikun, the manager of Keemong School, signed his name in Thai 
with his royal title (see Figure 2.5).296 Another manager of Keemong School, Khun 
Chinkanaphiban (Jiam Xiukiam) (see Figure 2.6), who received royal title on 8 
November 1930, also did the same.297 This also happened in the case of Khun Piyarataree, 
a manager of Fakiaogongli in Nakhon Si Thammarat, and Khun Chinthurakan, or 
Tianiew Limkoonpong, and Khunpoonphanit of Tianghuahakhao, in Satun, a province in 
southern Siam, while others signed in Chinese.298 In addition, the chairman of the board 
of Huanan School in Pattani, another southern province, signed his royal title in Thai to 
communicate with the Ministry while other Chinese who had no royal title signed in 
Chinese.299  
 
             
      Figure 2.5: The signature of Luang Prajak      Figure 2.6: The signature of Khun  Chinkanaphiban 
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Moreover, many Chinese schools sent their teachers to study Thai language in 
Bangkok in order to prepare for the language examinations, particularly in the case of 
Tueanghua School in Satun, a South Siam province. The manager of this school sent a 
teacher to Bangkok until his accent was similar to that of Bangkok, for which he was 
praised by the local officer.300  
 
In addition, the Siamese government made communicating with them more 
difficult and cumbersome. Therefore, many Chinese schools appointed only one manager 
to communicate with the Siamese authorities. Firstly, the Chinese schools might simply 
want to contact with the local authorities easier and faster. Secondly, they possibly 
wanted to appoint a person who had power or royal connections to deal with the local 
authorities. Lastly, they might want to hide certain Chinese from the Siamese government 
because it was possible that some of them were members of the CCP or participated in 
Chinese national politics while they financially supported the Chinese schools. In Ko 
Samui, a stronghold of the Hainanese diaspora and the CCP, Pu Hongseng (符洪成) was 
given authorization by three former managers, namely Ngao Toneyeng (吳選仍), Lim 
Hongyao (林鴻曜), and Po Kokhui (潘鵠輝), to act on behalf of the matter of Tiang 
Thon O’iao School on February 1926.301 In 1928, the task was handed over to Ngao 
Dengsim (吳盛深) after the school elected a new group of managers.302 Zhongshan 
School in Chumphon, and Fakiaogongli School, Nakhon Si Thammarat, also asked for 
the same permission.303 In general, there were mostly four managers in Chinese schools. 
Some, nevertheless, had eight managers such as Dongsunkokmin School in Nakhon Si 
Thammarat etc.  
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By the end of 1929, the political movement of the CCP in Siam was very active. 
Leaflets about Communist propaganda, not only in Chinese but also in Thai and English, 
were published by “The South Sea Communist Party, the Special Committee in Siam” 
(南洋共產黨暹羅特別委員會). The CCP members, for example, were bold enough to 
spread leaflets by car on Bangkok streets on 11 December 1929. Two interesting 
demands appeared on the leaflets: a call for people to topple a tyrant, aristocracy and 
landlords in Siam; and a demand that a democratic republic in Siam be established.304 On 
12 December 1929, those Chinese who spread these leaflets were arrested at a meeting at 
Jintek School in Bangkok. The group members consisted of 18 Hainanese, two Cantonese, 
two Teochew and two representatives from the head office in Singapore.305 This is 
significant as it underlined the fact that most of CCP members in South East Asia were 
Hainanese and that the CCP members of these transnational political organisations were 
connected together.  
 
Surat Thani was one of the most important CCP networks in South East Asia. The 
Chinese in Ko Samui and other Chinatowns in the coastal area of Surat Thani controlled 
the coconut industry of Siam and had connections with the Hainanese who traded with 
them in Bangkok. Peicai School in Ko Samui established after the end of the Second 
World War, was also financially supported by the Bangkok Chinese who traded in 
coconut products.306 By the end of 1929, the movement of the CCP in Ko Samui was also 
apparent. On 31 January 1930, Ngao Sengsuan, a Hainanese working as a teacher at 
Tiang Thon O’iao School, was accused of being a Communist and was arrested in Ko 
Samui.307 Ngao, who had passed the language test on 1 August 1929 with a high score 
(72.50%), was officially allowed with the Ministry in December of that year. Another 
teacher, Oui Thongkian, who was a Hainanese and took the examination on the same day, 
failed the test. Being a communist and failing the test led to the catastrophe of Chinese 
                                                
304 Murashima, การเมอืงจนีสยาม, 80. 	
305 Ibid. 	
306	See Chapter 5. 	
307 NAT, MOE 54.5/24, Ngao Dengxim, the manager of Tiang Thon O’iao School, to Prince Dhani Nivat, 
the Minister of Education, in a letter dated 10 February 1930, 350.  
	 123	
education in Ko Samui. Tiang Thon O’iao School started to encounter financial problems 
and therefore had to ask permission to temporarily close for two months from May to 
June in 1930 in order to gather donations from the Chinese community and to find 
qualified Chinese teachers.308 The school, utilising the building of the Hainanese temple 
of Nathon, finally closed its doors on 1 July owing to a shortage of funds and money.309       
 
Meanwhile, on 15 April 1930, the police arrested seven Hainanese in Ko Samui 
and accused them of spreading communism. The police wrote that they “criticised the 
system of Siamese government, committed lese-majeste, encouraged people to rebel, 
fought against imperialism, founded a democratic movement and mounted a propaganda 
campaign against the Emperors’ supporters.”310 Two of them were brought to court and 
the others were deported to China.  
 
In 1930, His Majesty also expressed his concern about the CCP’s attempts to 
spread communism and the fact that many radicals remained at large. His statement 
spurred heightened police activity and the subsequent capture and arrest of many CCP 
members, including Ngo Tichi (伍治之), a Teochew who used to be a teacher, now a 
CCP leader in Siam.311 Deportation was used as a tool by the Siamese government to deal 
with the CCP movement, and many anarchists or Communists/Bolsheviks were 
deported.312 Throughout 1929 to 1930, many Chinese were arrested and accused of being 
communists. For example, in 1929 in Bangkok a newspaper accused Jisai School of 
being communist and an alleged Chinese visitor who was a friend of the school keeper 
was arrested. However, the Siamese school headmaster also sent textbooks used in the 
school to the inspector, one of which was a textbook about the Three Principles of Sun 
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Yatsen.313 Iangchai School in Bangkok had to close its doors because its teachers were 
accused of being Communists. On February 1929, Dang Lak, a Chinese teacher, was 
arrested for being a Communist and inciting others to join in a leaflet in three 
languages.314 In 1930, four Chinese teachers of Mikang School were captured for being 
Communists after the police found books about communism during an inspection. They 
were finally deported on 5 September. This led to the closure of the school by the 
manager, Im Taekoon (姚子謙).315  
 
Many Chinese claimed that they aimed to teach Chinese students commercial 
skills when they asked permission to open Chinese schools. For example, in 1931 Lim 
Mengdong and Dan Kheelim, two Hainanese from Phunphin, Surat Thani, founded Yok 
Hian School, whose room shared the same building with their Hainanese temple. It aimed 
to equip Chinese students with commercial skills. 316  This attracted some Siamese 
children to study in Chinese schools because they wanted to study the Chinese language, 
as it was the lingua franca of commerce in the region. However, although this may have 
been true to an extent, Chinese schools generally perpetuated Chinese nationalism and 
taught politics. The King thus ordered that there would be Chinese language classes in 
some Siamese schools in order to prevent these Siamese children from Chinese teachers 
who might teach them political doctrines that were deemed a threat to his throne. His 
view paved the way for a Chinese language curriculum in many Siamese commercial 
colleges which were founded by the civilian government after the Siamese revolution of 
1932.317 
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In conclusion, the CCP in Surat Thai and elsewhere in Siam tried to mobilise not 
only Chinese nationals but also Siamese people, while the GMD targeted only their 
fellow countrymen. The Siamese government, therefore, amended the Private School Act 
in 1927 to control both Chinese nationalism and the CCP. This affected Chinese schools 
in Surat Thani, leading to the closure of Tiang Thon O’iao School in Ko Samui. At the 
same time, many Chinese teachers and others were captured and deported from Siam. 
The next section discusses the Chinese response to the Thai-fication policies after the 
Siamese revolution of 1932.  
 
 
IV.       The Chinese Response to the Thai-ification Policies after the Siamese  
            Revolution of 1932  
 
The kings of the Chakri Dynasty ruled Siam as absolute monarchs. During one of the 
most intense periods of European imperialism, Siam survived colonialism. 
Chulalongkorn (1853-1910), the venerated king on the throne during this critical period, 
launched a programme of reforms to modernise his country. The two less capable kings, 
Vajiravudh (1880-1925) and Prajadhipok, who succeeded him, were unsuccessful in 
maintaining the positive momentum, however. In 1932, Western-educated and 
dissatisfied civilians and military officials, namely the Promoters of the People’s Party, 
mounted a coup detat that put an end to the absolute monarchy and changed the system of 
government to a constitutional monarchy. Prajadhipok visited England for medical 
treatment in 1934 and abdicated the throne the following year. The Promoters replaced 
him with Ananda Mahidol (1925-1946), who did not return to Siam but was studying in 
Switzerland.318 After the Siamese revolution of 1932, the new government ordered that 
all children should receive a national education to prepare them to be beneficial citizens 
of the country. The new Compulsory Education Act was introduced in 1932 stating that 
every Chinese primary school was commanded to teach Chinese language no more than 
seven and a half hours per week. The law was applied in Surat Thani and every province 
except Bangkok and Phuket. The following year, the provisions of this act were 
promulgated in all areas and the Private School Act of 1927 was applied seriously, which 
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affected Chinese schools in Surat Thani to a great extent. The civilian government also 
launched the Private School Act of 1936, which had a considerable effect on Chinese 
education in Siam. This section investigates the Chinese response to the Thai-ification 
programme from 1932 to 1937.  
 
Before addressing the launch of the Private School Act of 1936, it is necessary to 
examine the draft of the Private School Act of 1932 that the law of 1936 was based, and 
which had affected Chinese schools in Surat Thani and elsewhere. This draft not only 
revealed the Siamese point of view towards Chinese education, but also the ways the 
Chinese devised to preserve their Chinese schools. The Private School Act of 1932, 
drafted from 1930 to 1934, paved the way for the Private School Act of 1936 that was 
launched by the civilian government. However, even though there was a draft, but the 
law did not come into effect until 1936.  
 
Despite the introduction and the strict usage of the Private School Act of 1927, 
the Chinese still exploited loopholes of the law to escape the Thai-ification programme. 
Some of them even violated and ignored the law and orders of the inspectors. Political 
Chinese movements were still found in many Chinese schools. The response of the 
Siamese government to this defiance took the form of a plan to launch the Private School 
Act of 1932, but it was not introduced due to the Siamese Revolution of 1932, which 
marked the end of absolute monarchy and changed the government system to a 
constitutional monarchy. The Siamese government began to draft the law of 1932 in 1930 
and the civilian government even continued to discuss until 1934. The year 1930 was 
seen by the Office of His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary as time to crackdown on 
such schools because the Chinese nationalism and the movement of the CCP in Siam 
were very active (see Section III).319 
  
The laws of 1918 and 1927 required that in every foreign school the principal 
must have completed at least two years of Siamese schooling. Therefore, the Chinese had 
to hire mostly Siamese headmasters to work for their Chinese schools. The Siamese 
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authorities, however, discovered that these Siamese headmasters were paid by the 
Chinese to work for many different Chinese schools at the same time because they did 
not have to stay or teach at school according to the regulations. The law was thus adapted 
to add that headmasters must work in only one school because the Siamese government 
wished to use them to inspire Chinese students to speak Thai. The law also commanded 
that headmasters must have a sufficient knowledge of the colloquial language and be able 
to speak it fairly well even at kindergartens in order to inspire those preschoolers to 
cherish the Thai language and make the subject popular.320 
 
Almost all Chinese in Siam had more than one name and, moreover, changed 
their names many times to avoid the inspections.321 It was therefore difficult for the 
Siamese authorities to inspect the schools. The law of 1932 was thus amended to state 
that every letter requesting permission to open a school must attach photographs of 
managers, headmasters and teachers to prevent violations. For example, Dua Tao, a 
Chinese teacher at Handong School, left the position because he could not pass the Thai 
language examination. However, he changed his name to Daixiu in order to apply for a 
post of Chinese teacher at Xiamhua School, Petchaburi. The government thought that he 
had never registered as a Chinese teacher before and then allowed him to temporarily 
teach until he passed the language test.322 The idea of having the Chinese attach their 
pictures was modeled on the French Cochinchina, which required those asking for a 
license to establish Chinese schools to attach their pictures with the documents.323 
 
As the Siamese authorities found many Chinese textbooks about Chinese politics 
that were dangerous in the eyes of the Siamese government, it was proposed in 1928 to 
inspect those textbooks. Legally, those who brought books into the country had to send 
them to the National Library to be inspected. However, there was no mark or symbol that 
they were approved for use in schools.324 As a result, the Chinese could freely bring and 
use any book in their schools. The authorities also found them difficult to inspect because 
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most of them did not know Chinese.325 They also did not trust the translators because 
most of them were ethnic Chinese.326  
 
World history textbooks of the Nanjing period (1927-1937) emphasized 
imperialism and anti-colonialism, influenced by Sun Yatsen’s anti-imperialist 
nationalism and the growing global trend of anti-colonialism which had emerged after 
World War I. Sun’s words for “weak and small peoples” (弱小民族) was used to show 
the shared experience of imperialist domination and anti-colonial resistance by non-
European communities. That leaders of the Nationalist Party and affiliated intellectuals 
adopted this narrative of nation formation on the Euro-American pattern as a model for 
world history was analysed by Robert J. Culp.327 The flip side of the “weak and small 
people” made Siamese authorities believe that they were being looked down on for being 
exploited as it was written that Chinese students were taught Siam was controlled by the 
“Imperialist” for “exploitation”.328 
 
The authorities, therefore, cooperated with other colonial governments in South 
East Asia to regulate Chinese schools better. A list of banned Chinese textbooks was 
exchanged amongst them. In the case of Batavia, there were a variety of books used in 
Chinese schools that ran into hundreds. However, the Dutch East Indian Government 
(D.E.I.) regulated that such schools should be kept free from all political influence as far 
as the pupils were concerned although the establishment and expansion of such schools 
were not restricted. In the eyes of the colonial governments, the GMD were using the 
textbooks in which the revolutionary doctrine of Dr. Sun was being promulgated to 
spread these political doctrines outside China. To prevent politics from entering Chinese 
schools, Chinese education was placed under control in 1923.329 
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In 1931, it was planned to regulate the plates of the Chinese schools to be 
“prominently inscribed in Siamese” in order to make the Thai alphabet larger than 
Chinese characters.330 In 1934, it was reported that the Chinese schools were used as a 
place for business meetings and meetings of the members of the GMD and the CCP, 
which obviously had nothing to do with education. Therefore, it was later proposed that 
the schools should be used only for the meetings of managers, teachers and students. It 
prohibited any visitors from staying at schools.331 This was due to the fact that Chinese 
communists or adherents of other political doctrines were often captured with their 
inflammatory literature in Chinese school buildings.   
 
By looking at the draft of the Private School Act of 1932, we can see that the 
Chinese from 1930 to 1934 used many ways to preserve Chinese education. Although the 
Siamese government planned to launch the law in 1932, it was not enforced, as there 
came an end of the absolute monarchy in Siam. The law was eventually applied in 1936 
when the civilian government decided to launch another Private School Act to control the 
Chinese schools more efficiently.  
 
Another event in many Chinatowns after the Siamese revolution of 1932 was that 
the Chinese established many English language schools. Notably, some night schools 
were established in the local schools and donated part of their profits to the local schools. 
For example, Boe Yang English Night School in Songkhla, a southern province located 
in the same Monthon as Surat Thani, was established by Senglim Jeeraphan, a son of 
Chinese, in the building of Phrachaban Boe Yang 1 School.332However, most of them 
were local-born Chinese and had graduated from Siamese schools.  
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There was also a movement to teach English in Chinese schools. For instance, 
Huanan School asked for permission to teach English in 1933.333 This year also saw the 
high popularity of English education until Songkhla English Night School, which was 
established on the premises of Fakiao School, was forced to terminate operations because 
the managers of Fakiao wanted to open their own English night school in order to gain 
more money to support their own daytime school.334  
 
Suryadinata proposes that the division amongst the older generation Chinese in 
Malaysia and Singapore was between the Chinese-educated and English-educated. The 
economic activities of the Peranakan and Sinkeh, or Xinke (新客), meaning new comers, 
were different. The former participated mostly in the shipping and banking sectors, which 
required knowledge of the English language, while the latter worked more in agriculture 
and trading. Moreover, the Peranakan elites were politically UK-oriented, while the 
Sinkeh considered themselves part of the larger Chinese nation. In 1950s, Diana Ooi used 
the term “Baba” to refer to “English-educated Chinese,” as if every Baba was English-
educated.335 In South Siam, there were no reports of English language study in Surat 
Thani. This was partly because most of the Chinese were farmers and traders. Based on 
the archival documents, English language study was popular in Monthon Phuket, where 
the Chinese engaged in tin mining and had a close relationship with the Peranakan in 
Penang, who also participated in tin mining, and Songkhla, where the Chinese had 
established contacts with Singapore.  
 
In the colonial era, the Peranakan were also known as the “Straits Chinese”. To be 
Straits Chinese meant “a socially higher and even superior status than that of other 
Chinese.”336 In South Siam, many Chinese started to sign their name in English in 
                                                
333	NAT, MOE 54.5/84.	
334	NAT, MOE 52.5/82 เรื$อง ผูจ้ัดการร.ร.ราษฎรส์งขลาองักฤษศกึษาขอรับคําชี5แจงวา่ผูจ้ัดการ ร.ร.ฟาเคยีว 
จะขบัไลไ่มย่อมใหใ้ชส้ถานที6ของร.ร.ทำการสอน (The manager of Songkhla English School asked for the 
instruction after the managers of Fa Kiao School no longer wanted to allow his school to utilise the school 
premises), 2-6.   
335 Leo Suryadinata, “Peranakan Chinese Identities in Singapore and Malaysia: A Re-examination,” in 




communications with the authorities. For example, Oui Boon Kiat signed his name in 
English to acknowledge to the Ministry of Education that he was the new manager of 
Tianghuohakhao School in Satun.337 The manager of Poyek School in Trang, a province 
once in Monthon Phuket, also signed his name in English in communication with the 
authorities (see Figure 2.7).338  
 
     
Figure 2.7: The signature of the manager of Poyek School 
 
After 1932, many Chinese schools began to hire local-born Chinese who studied 
in Chinese primary schools in Siam and graduated from Chinese high schools in China, 
Penang and Singapore. This was due to the fact that they did not have to take a Thai 
language examination. For examine, Kao Xiaoyok, a local-born Hainanese, was hired by 
Pakbun School in Nakhon Si Thammarat after his graduation from Singapore because he 
did not have to take the Thai language examination, as did the mainland-born Chinese.339 
Similarly, Fakiao School in Songkhla preferred to hire a local-born Chinese with a 
certificate from China.340 In Phuket, Poihua School also hired Hokzhai Chaowana, a 
local-born Chinese, who graduated from Penang in 1933.341 Many Chinese teachers even 
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graduated from university, as did Hiu Hiudai, a Hakka who graduated from Jinan 
University in Nanjing and worked at Poyek School in Trang, another southern 
province.342  
 
As many local-born Chinese went to China for a Chinese education, there was a 
movement to establish Thai student associations in China in 1933 by Meng Leelaphan, a 
local-born Chinese. The association, which had its head office in Hong Kong, was not 
recognised by the Siamese government until late 1932.343 The Siamese government 
eventually recognised its existence because it might have wanted to maintain connections 
with Thai students, even though they were Chinese by blood, in case they worked as 
government officers in the future. It could mean that not all Chinese were loyal to Chiang 
Kai-shek. Perhaps they wanted to play games. Nevertheless, it shows that people could be 
on both sides, possibly because they wanted to remain on good terms with the two 
governments.  
 
To mobilise Chinese children and people in Siam, plays were used as a tool to 
construct Chinese national consciousness. Student performances were also used to collect 
money to support Chinese schools. Pengbin School in Nakhon Si Thammarat, for 
example, closed its school for 20 days to have Chinese students perform in Songkhla in 
order to collect money for a new building.344 The “public commemoration of war” or 
“ritual” could shape the perception of citizens on their own culture and define who they 
were or “others” were. Historically speaking, in Taiwan Japan used textbooks as a tool to 
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mobilise people to support Japan’s war effort. Stories of battles and soldiers were 
featured even in Shotoka ongaku (初等科音樂), or Elementary Music.345  
 
Therefore, the Chinese in Siam would also use plays to implant a sense of 
Chinese nationalism in their students. In 1933, Daitong School in Bangkok held a student 
fair and performed a celebration to raise money. Some of the plays from the list were 
related to the situation in China and Chinese nationalism such as	Soul of the Nation (國
魂).346 Five plays out of eleven were related to gender equality. For example, “the love of 
father” (爸爸的愛) was used to object to “inappropriate traditions” such as arranged 
marriages in order to free women and “civilise” China. Some plays also showed pictures 
of women who were dedicated to nation and war. “Lonely woman” (孤女) joined the 
volunteer regiment to fight after she lost her mother in war. “A wound” (傷後) was about 
two male and female students who fell in love and volunteered to be a soldier and a nurse 
in order to rid the country of its enemies. “A philanthropist” (慈善家) told a story about a 
young woman who raised money donated from people for flood victims in China. “No 
time yet” (未到時候) shows the ability of teachers and students to use English.347 
However, this situation also reveals that the Thai-ification programme was successful as 
the permission of the Siamese government had to be asked to stage these plays.  
 
The promotion of Siamese education was an important plank in the platform of 
the new Siamese government after the Siamese revolution of 1932. Within ten years, the 
Siamese government wanted to have a population 50 per cent literate, and Chinese 
schools were seen as an impediment to attaining this goal.348 To check the progress, the 
Siamese authorities inspected Chinese schools in Bangkok and found that many of them 
could not even read the Thai language although they had been studying for years. 
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Therefore, the provisions of the Compulsory Education Act were promulgated and came 
into force in every province in March 1933, and were accompanied by rigorous and 
unyielding inspections of Chinese schools.  
 
In 1932, the government commanded that every Chinese primary school must 
teach the government curriculum for 25 hours per week, limiting foreign language to 
seven and a half hours per week. The law was applied to all areas except Bangkok, while 
Phuket was given special status by its governor, Aditaya Dibabha, and Chinese language 
was allowed to be taught for 11 hours per week in recognition of the large contribution of 
the Chinese to commerce in this area.349 In 1933, many Chinese schools reportedly 
violated the law by establishing schools without permission, hiring outsiders to teach and 
refusing to stick to the timetable. As a result, Phraya Amornsakprasit, Phuket’s new 
governor, issued an instruction to every governor in Monthon Phuket to strictly enforce 
the law and the special status was withdrawn.350  
 
According to the report of an education official in Surat Thani (1932), Keemong 
School was the single Chinese school left in the province. It was reported that there were 
three Teochew male teachers, two Thai teachers, and 40 Thai male students, 13 Thai 
female students, 37 Chinese male students and 16 Chinese female students.351 The year of 
the closure of this school is unknown but it is highly possible that it was closed between 
1933 and 1936, after the Compulsory Education Act of 1933 was enforced and the 
inspection of Chinese schools became stricter.  
 
During 1932 to 1933, we began to see the effects of the new Compulsory 
Education Act introduced by the civilian government and the serious application of the 
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Private School Act of 1927 in Surat Thani’s Chinatown. Keemong, the first Chinese 
school in Surat Thani, was established and financially supported by Liao Chiangsoon, 
one of the most well-known Chinese in Siam, from the beginning, but in the 1930s the 
task was handed over to Shou Caikun, another notable Teochew in Bandon’s Chinatown. 
The last contact with local education officers that could be found occurred in 1933. It was 
written that Jiam Xiukiam, or Khun Chinkhanaphiban, was the only remaining manager 
of the school after Shou died in 1932. On 22 February 1932, Jinkia Patjakkhapat, a son of 
Shou, was invited to be the second manager to help further run the business of the school. 
Jinkia was a local-born Teochew in Bandon, and was revered by many Chinese in 
Chinatown.352  
 
In 1934, the Siamese newspapers started to publish articles attacking the Chinese 
for challenging the Compulsory Education Act. One person, for example, on June 1934, 
wrote an article in Siam Newspaper about Chinese parents and their children. In the 
article, Chinese parents were accused of being conservative and stated that female 
Chinese children in particular were told by their parents to help their family to do 
commerce instead of going to school. These Chinese children chose to study in Chinese 
schools owing to the fact that they could choose when to go and leave their schools.353 
Therefore, on 18 January 1934, Phra Sarasasprapan, the minister of Education, called a 
meeting of the Chinese school managers and handed over documents stating that all 
licenses given to Chinese schools had to be withdrawn because many Chinese schools did 
not obey the regulations. It was ordered that all primary schools where the Chinese 
language was taught had to close their doors by 1 April 1935.354 The Chinese language 
was seen as a threat because the education authorities wanted to “protect the country from 
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being swallowed…”.355 The Chinese were compared to European Jews by the Minister of 
Education and Sun’s principles were seen as nothing other than German nationalism in 
Germany and Poland.356 
 
Moreover, the Siamese government wanted to prepare the local born Chinese to 
be ready for the election since the election law of 1932 was amended in 1933 stating that 
Thai nationals had the right to vote, but if their father was a foreigner they must study in 
the national curriculum until ninth grade. Therefore, the Chinese were indirectly forced to 
study in Siamese schools if they wanted to enjoy this right.357  
 
In the response to this critical situation, many Chinese schools from Siam were 
relocated to British Malaya and D.E.I.358 In South Siam, after the closure of all Chinese 
schools in Songkhla, a rumour spread in 1934 that the government would stop Chinese 
children from going abroad in 1935. Without government permission, those who insisted 
on going had to pay 100-200 Baht. Chinese parents, therefore, sent a large number of 
their children to study abroad after they heard the rumour. Some even considered 
establishing Chinese schools in Padang Besar, Perlis, a city of British Malaya, situated on 
the border of Songkhla.359 The panic of the Chinese in Songkhla and other parts of South 
Siam, including Surat Thani, was reported in Krungdeb Varasab on 5 March 1934, which 
stated that “Southern Chinese rushed their children to go abroad.” It claimed that Chinese 
merchants sent about 500 children, both male and female, abroad. Penang was the most 
favoured destination.360 
 
The Police Department, under the control of the Ministry of Interior and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, saw the actions of the Ministry of Education as too severe 
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and potentially contributing to conflict in the future. Therefore, a committee was 
established to discuss this matter.361 After the meeting of the cabinet on 29 March 1934, 
private schools were still allowed to match up their curriculum based on the Act of 
Compulsory Primary Education B.E. 2464 (1921), in which the Thai language was set to 
23 hours/week and subjects taught in Thai language were fixed.362 Other subjects, in 
addition to the 23 hours/week, had to be reported to the Ministry of Education.363 Many 
Thai newspapers, such as Lak Mueang on 2 April 1934 and Krungdeb Varasab on 3 
April, reported that this was due to the warning by Guangdong Rice Traders Association 
to boycott rice from Siam from being imported into Guangdong province after they had 
heard that the Siamese government would order the end of Chinese primary schools in 
Siam.364  
 
On 21 February 1935, the Minister of Education only granted permits for private 
schools to teach foreign languages for approximately four or five hours per week. In 
contrast, all grants given to private schools that taught the Chinese language were 
withdrawn.365 In July, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok sent several 
telegraphic instructions to the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Chinese schools 
acting as representatives of Chinese nationals in Saigon in order to agitate for a boycott 
of Siam and to serve as an intermediary to the Chinese government.366 To pressure the 
local authorities, the Chinese possibly spread the rumour that China should boycott rice 
imported from Siam. In the opinion of the Chinese Ambassador to Japan, he thought the 
Chinese in Siam were the originators of the rumour.367  
 
In 1936, the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, asked the Thai government to 
amend the Private School Act. It was stated that the Embassy had received an official 
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letter from the Foreign Office, Nanjing, stating that Chinese Residents in Siam were 
disadvantaged by the law due to the many strict restrictions placed on Chinese schools.368 
For the Siamese point of view, this secret document disclosed that the law had to be strict 
and unyielding because of the fear that the Chinese would teach only their own language, 
communism and anti-foreigner sentiments, which would lead to unrest.369 Therefore, the 
Siamese government launched the Private School Act of 1936, which stated that the 
Chinese language could only be taught in Chinese primary schools for two hours per 
week. It was nevertheless reported in 1938 by a British officer that the Chinese 
communities still retained distinct national communities in every town in Siam.370 
 
In sum, by looking at the draft of the Private School Act of 1932, the Chinese 
found numerous ways to preserve Chinese education, such as forming different identities 
to mislead or negotiate with the authorities. These tactics were seen by the government as 
evidence that the Chinese did not desire to assimilate with Siamese society. In order to 
plug loopholes, the Siamese government planned to launch the Private School Act of 
1932. However, the Siamese Revolution of 1932 meant that the act was postponed until 
the Private School Act of 1936 was passed which was based on the draft of the law of 
1932. After the Siamese revolution of 1932, the managers of Chinese schools hired local-
born Chinese teachers, many of whom had graduated from China, Penang and Singapore, 
to deal with the strict enforcement of the Private School Act of 1927. However, in 1933 
the provisions of the Compulsory Education Act were promulgated in every province and 
the education law was carried out in a strict and unyielding manner. On the basis of this 
law, Keemong School, the first Chinese school in Surat Thani, was closed. In 1934, 
managers of Chinese schools were informed that all primary schools where Chinese 
language was taught had to close in 1935. There was a movement to establish Chinese 
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schools on the border with Malaysia and there was a flood of Chinese children out of the 
country to study abroad. Instead of writing petitions to the Siamese government, the 
Chinese asked the Chinese government to put pressure on the Siamese government.  
 
 
V.    Conclusion 
 
After encountering the modern concept of the “nation-state” and the implantation of a 
Chinese national consciousness into Chinese children via the introduction of Chinese 
education under the influence of globalisation, multiple ethnic Chinese consciousnesses 
were gradually transformed into a united national Chinese consciousness. Another mark 
of Chinese nationalism was the fact that the Chinese in Surat Thai and elsewhere in Siam 
honoured Sun Yat-sen and paid respect to his portrait. In addition, there was also a 
movement of the CCP, particularly in Chinese schools. The Siamese government saw 
these developments as dangerous to its internal stability and thus rigorously enforced the 
Private School Act of 1927 in order to control Chinese nationalism and the activities of 
the CCP in Siam. Stipulations such as harder language tests and higher standards were 
enforced to fail Chinese teachers. Many Chinese schools were closed on the basis of this 
tactic. Some managers signed their names in Thai with a royal title, hoping to 
demonstrate loyalty to monarchy in a bid to preserve their schools. On the basis of the 
law of 1927, Chinese schools in Surat Thani were closed, such as Tiang Thon O’iao 
School in Ko Samui, as the Siamese authorities discovered that the ideas of CCP were 
being promoted in this school.  
 
Despite the strict enforcement of the Private School Act of 1927, the Chinese still 
found loopholes in order to escape the crackdown, and some of them even violated and 
ignored the law and the orders of the inspectors. The Siamese government hence planned 
to launch the Private School Act of 1932 to control the Chinese schools better, but it did 
not carry this through because of the Siamese revolution of 1932. The promotion of 
education was an essential plank in the platform of the new civilian government. It 
wanted to have a population 50 per cent literate within ten years, and Chinese schools 
were seen as an obstacle to this policy. This led to the provisions of the Compulsory Act, 
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which was promulgated in 1933 throughout the country. In 1935, the Chinese were 
informed that all Chinese schools would be closed. Consequently, Chinese parents sent 
their children for a Chinese education abroad. There was also a plan to establish Chinese 
schools along the border between Siam and Malaysia. Later, the Chinese asked their 




























The Chinese Reaction to the Japanese Invasion  





I.         Introduction 
 
Following the establishment of the Chinese Nationalist government in Nanjing in 1928, 
modern Chinese education was introduced to the Chinese community in Surat Thani’s 
schools, with the Chinese national language – based on Mandarin – used as the language 
of instruction. The Chinese had been captivated by the ideas of race and nation promoted 
by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. In Surat Thani and elsewhere in Siam they celebrated Sun’s 
revolutionary cause and fervently worshipped his portrait. Veneration of Sun became a 
mark of Chinese nationalism. Ethnic Chinese consciousness, accordingly, gradually 
evolved into a united national Chinese consciousness. Moreover, Chinese schools were 
used as a tool to implant not only Chinese nationalism but also communism into the 
students. Aware that the dissemination of one of the principles of Sun – democracy (anti-
monarchy) – as well as the communist ideas disseminated in the schools and wider 
community manifestly undermined the notion of an absolute monarchy, the Siamese 
government thus launched the Private School Act of 1927 in order to control Chinese 
schools adequately. In South East Asia, Surat Thani was one of the most essential CCP 
networks where the CCP’s political activities were undertaken in Chinese schools. Many 
Chinese teachers in Ko Samui were arrested and deported from Siam, leading to the 
closure of Tiang Thon O’iao School in 1930. Following the Siamese Revolution of 1932, 
the new civilian government wanted all children to receive a Thai education to improve 
the sense of citizenship. Chinese schools were seen as an impediment to this policy, and 
the Thai government launched the new Compulsory Education Act in 1932, ordering all 
Chinese primary schools to teach Chinese language for no more than seven and a half 
hours per week. The Private School Act of 1927, which was launched to deal with the 
rise of Chinese nationalism as well as Communist propaganda in Chinese schools, 
seriously affected the operation of Chinese schools in Surat Thani. In 1933, Keemong 
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School was the single Chinese school left. In 1936, the Siamese government further 
tightened restrictions by amending the Private School Act to allow the Chinese language 
to be taught for only two hours per week. This affected most Chinese schools in Siam. 
However, in 1938 the Chinese communities still remained distinct national communities 
in every town of Siam.  
 
The conflict between China and Japan had been brewing for decades. The Middle 
Kingdom and its smaller island neighbour were said to be ‘as close as lips and teeth’.371 
In the summer of 1937, Japanese troops were heavily stationed in the area around 
Lugouqiao (盧溝橋), otherwise known as the Marco Polo Bridge, in the West.372 This 
bridge, where the historic fortress town of Wanping (宛平) was located, southwest of 
Beijing, turned out to be the pivot of a bitter dispute that would develop into the Second 
Sino-Japanese War (SSJW hereafter, 1937-1945), an all-out war between the two 
nations.373 In the sweltering summer weather, the Chinese 29th Army was deployed 
nearby the soldiers of the Japanese North China Garrison Army. Japanese troops were 
allowed to garrison in the area under the agreements concluded after the Boxer 
Movement (1899-1901), which gave foreign powers the right to position troops to protect 
their nation’s citizens against another uprising.374 On the night of 7 July, the Japanese 
regimental commander Mutaguchi Renya telephoned Ji Xingwen (吉星文), the Chinese 
garrison commander of the town, to inform him that one of his soldiers had gone missing 
and to request entry to Wanping to search for him. Afraid that Chinese sovereignty would 
be contravened, he rejected the request, but allowed the search to meet them halfway. 
The search was fruitless, and at 5 am the following morning the Japanese troops started 
firing on the town and seized this significant crossing.375 Historically known as the 
‘Marco Polo Bridge Incident’, this incident was the marker for the commencement of the 
war. Chiang Kai-shek was determined that it was time to fight, writing, “This is our very 
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last remedy against the Japanese dwarfs,” despite the fact that a number of similar clashes 
prior to this had usually evaporated after China made some concessions.376 In the eyes of 
Chiang, the war was possibly seen as “a spiritual, sacred trust, a continuation of the 1911 
revolution symbolised by Sun Yat-sen,” making him refuse to bow to the enemy.377  
 
A specific modernisation project of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Government in 
Nanjing was disrupted by the outbreak of the SSJW in 1937. The aim of the project was 
to transform Nanjing into a city that would become a model of Chinese modernisation 
and similar to other global cities such as London, New York, and Paris. Chiang also 
attempted to solve many social problems, such as beggary, poverty, and prostitution, 
which had existed in Chinese society for a long time. Efforts to regularise and modernise 
Chinese society during the Nanjing decade proved to be unsuccessful and his dreams of 
building a modernised society failed to materialise as planned.378 
 
During the first episode of the war, Chinese troops courageously fought against 
the Japanese but inefficiently, and they continued to pull back. The advancing enemy 
forces seized Beijing and the major port city of Tianjin within a month. Shanghai 
suffered the same fate by November. The Chinese capital of Nanjing was rapidly 
captured in December, where the Nanjing Massacre was carried out by the Imperial 
Japanese Army after they took control of the ill-fated city.379  
 
 After the beginning of the skirmish, the Guomindang government realised that 
the patriotism of the large international diaspora and the resources of migrants could be 
utilised to contribute to the war effort.380 In the late 1920s, the ethnic Chinese had 
gradually transformed into national Chinese after the rise of Chinese nationalism 
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throughout all Chinatowns around the world. The expansion of the Chinese printing 
industry in major treaty ports and the introduction of mass public Chinese education had 
been essential factors in this rapid transformation. There was the implantation of Chinese 
national consciousness into Chinese children. Even local-born Chinese tended to be 
obsessed with Chinese national politics. The majority of the Chinese residing overseas, 
therefore, was likely to identify politically and culturally with their motherland, and was 
not reluctant to get involved in the war.  
 
This chapter examines the Chinese reaction to the SSJW from its outbreak in 
1937 to December 1941 in Chinese communities in Surat Thani. The role of Liao 
Jingsong (廖振松), a patriotic entrepreneur based in Surat Thani who supported the anti-
Japanese movement by being a major donor in fundraising campaigns to help China’s 
war effort, will be discussed.381 When the Japanese troops had landed on 8 December in 
Bandon, the capital district of Surat Thani and “Chinatown,” as described by its 
provincial governor, the unpredicted reaction of the Chinese was that many had armed 
themselves to fight against Japan. Kobkun Saetang, a second-generation Chinese, became 
a heroine. Therefore, this chapter also investigates how the Chinese in the city came to 
fight one of the bloodiest wars in history. In addition, there was a global response among 
Chinese living overseas, who established transnational networks, particularly in South 
East Asia, to contribute to the motherland’s war effort. As there was support from the 
Chinese outside China, the war, therefore, was not geographically limited to China but 
also the countries where Chinese resided, so it was in effect shaped into a global 
conflict.382 The story of these Chinese such as Liao and Kobkun Saetang shows that there 
were the Chinese residing outside mainland China who also considered themselves at war 
from 1937. The violence committed by the Japanese in China had been globally spread to 
the extent that feelings of deep resentment towards the Japanese reached Surat Thani, a 
small Chinese community, where the authorities had always observed and suppressed 
Chinese nationalist movements. There will be three sections in this chapter. The first 
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section will address the Chinese response to the Sino-Japanese conflicts prior to the 
SSJW in Siam. The next section covers the leading Chinese of Surat Thani and their 
contribution to China’s war effort. The last section will investigate the Chinese response 
to the Japanese invasion of Surat Thani on 8 December 1941.  
 
 
II.       As Close as Lips and Teeth: Sino-Japanese Relations 
 
The conflict between China and Japan and the anti-Japanese feeling amongst the Chinese 
in the overseas Chinese communities started before 1937. In order to comprehend the 
dispute, it is thus necessary to return to the late nineteenth century and sketch a brief 
history of the discord. This section investigates the Chinese response to the conflicts prior 
to the SSJW in the Chinese communities in Siam in order to pave the way for a better 
understanding of the participation of leading Chinese from Surat Thani in the resistance 
movements and the resistance to Japanese troops in Surat Thani once they landed in the 
city in 1941.   
 
 After the modernisation which occurred during the reign of Emperor Meiji, who 
ascended the throne in 1867, Japan cast its eyes towards Korea, another of China’s 
suzerain powers. The First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), therefore, was fought 
between the two nations for control of the Korean Peninsula, ending with China’s defeat. 
The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on 17 April 1895 following the cession to Japan 
in perpetuity of the Pescadores and Formosa, or Taiwan, which remained a Japanese 
colony until 1945. This treaty inflamed anti-Japanese sentiment amongst the overseas 
Chinese and this feeling continued to exist through events such as the Twenty-One 
Demands presented by Japan to Yuan Shikai (袁世凱) for special rights in northeast 
China in 1915, the May Fourth Movement after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, and the 
annexation of Manchuria in 1931. Chinese perceptions of injustices against their nation 
on the global stage thus flamed Chinese nationalism among Chinese living overseas. In a 
world being shaped by industrialisation and imperialism, China was now becoming ‘the 
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victim of a new international system’ where once it had been a self-confident 
civilisation.383  
 
Following the events of the Twenty-One Demands in 1915, the Chinese in Siam 
determined to boycott Japanese products. On 25 August 1915, rumours of the boycott 
spread in Bangkok and it was confirmed after an officer was told by Japanese merchants 
during his city patrol that they were greatly affected by the boycott. Anonymous letters 
were sent to Chinese owners of rice mills threatening them that those with Japanese 
merchandise on a ship would have salt water thrown at them once the ship arrived in 
China. Those Chinese who traded with Japanese goods also received similar letters. 
Interestingly, the Ghost Festival, or Zhongyuanjie (中元節), which is on the fifteenth day 
of the seventh month in the lunar calendar, was used as the first day of the boycott.384 
This kind of political activity seems to be found throughout Siam as it was also reported 
that in Monthon Phayap, the provinces in Northern Siam, there was a meeting of Chinese 
merchants concluding that all Japanese products must be sold within two months from 
the beginning of September.385 These Chinese merchants delayed their move because 
some of them were participating in the boycott at their own pace, even though they 
wanted to be patriotic. Moreover, those who violated the regulations would be fined 
twice the price of merchandise, with half of the charge given to the informer and another 
to the Chinese temple.386  
 
In British Malaya, Chinese boycotts were regarded by the colonial authorities as 
more like riots rather than political protests.387 While the Siamese authorities, who were 
afraid that the Chinese might view them as being under Japan’s influence because the 
Japanese consulate had also asked for their help, acted as neutral observers during the 
event, but said they would arrest and exile those who resorted to the violence. Tik Sua 
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and Peng Yuchi, two Chinese who sold Japanese-made products, were knifed by three 
Chinese members of Kongsihoklak Secret Society in Bangkok’s Chinatown. 
Kongsihoklak extremists, including Zhua, Seng Tian and Sun Hao, who were later 
deported from Siam, also hired Chinese children to puncture seagoing junks carrying 
Japanese merchandise.388 This deportation act was used as a vehicle to suppress those 
foreign patriots and the act would be used to suppress those local-born foreigners in the 
future too.389 It seems that this tool was effective because it was reported by an informer 
that the Chinese would stop using violence towards those who traded in Japanese 
products because they were afraid of being deported. However, they announced that they 
would resort to violence in China instead.390  
 
After the Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1919, Japan gained Qingdao, 
Shandong province, given up by Germany. The Chinese presumed that Qingdao would be 
returned to China as compensation for the efforts of thousands of Chinese coolies 
recruited by the Allies to work on the Western Front during the First World War. The 
response in Beijing to this news was rapid and aggressive. A student demonstration began 
within hours.391 The event also sparked the attention of the Siamese authorities as the 
Chinese in Shanghai and Canton reportedly started to boycott Japanese merchandise 
again and the movement quickly spread to Hong Kong and Shantou. The local authorities 
closely observed the situation in Bangkok and it was found that the Chinese were 
planning to boycott Japanese products there too.392 The Siamese government also paid 
attention to the Chinese movement by having officers read and translate important news 
articles in Chinese newspapers to the Siamese authorities. This is evidence that the 
Chinese residing in Siam were interested in the Japanese agitation in China and there was 
a surge of Chinese nationalism in the Chinese community.  
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The Chinese Chamber of Commerce (CCC hereafter) in Bangkok was thus 
warned by the Police authorities that this political activity should be disencouraged.393 
The imperial government in Beijing promoted the establishment of the CCC in coastal 
China and the South Seas in order to mobilise financial support from wealthy overseas 
Chinese and improve relations with Chinese merchant communities.394 In Singapore, the 
CCC was established in 1906. In Siam, while the Bangkok Chamber of Commerce had 
been founded by European businessmen in 1898, the Chinese also needed their own 
chamber of commerce to represent and protect their mutual benefit, and Bangkok’s CCC 
was thus founded in 1908. The organisation was soon representing the whole Chinese 
community and its officials became the recognised leaders of the Chinese community. 395 
The boycott movement in Shanghai and other parts of China had been daily reported in 
the local Chinese newspapers, notably the Chinese Daily News (中華民報) and the 
Chino-Siamese Daily News (華暹新報 ), new bilingual newspapers. The Chinese 
residents in Siam were also roused to take revenge on the “traitors” and on China’s 
“eastern neighbour”. 396  Moreover, a telegram, revealing the signatures of fourteen 
Chinese students in Bangkok, forwarded to the students of Peking University to approve 
the campaign, was published in an article entitled “The Righteous Indignation of 
Resident Students” in the Chino-Siamese Daily News on 31 May 1919. Informed that a 
boycott was being incubated amongst many Cantonese merchants in Siam and fearful that 
the movement might burst out in the near future, the Japanese Minister consequently 
requested that the Siamese authorities prevent the Chinese outrage and boycott.397  
 
A letter by Mr. Pua Hakxiu, presumably a Chinese residing in Southeast Asia, 
was published in the Chinese Daily News, on 10 June 1919. The letter was addressed to 
newspaper organisations, the CCC, coolies, educators, and all Chinese residing in 
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colonies in South East Asia, including Siam. He roused the Chinese residing overseas to 
establish a Chinese national salvation association and telegraphed his message to the 
Chinese in every province to do the same. Additionally, he asked the Chinese to seriously 
boycott the Japanese merchandise and to resort to violence towards those who were still 
trading in Japanese products.398   
 
The Siamese authorities took further steps. Chinese newspapers in Siam were 
warned not to publish any news of agitation against Japan, the posting of placards or the 
distribution of flysheets was prevented and violation was punished.399 The colonial 
authorities in British Malaya proclaimed martial law because the anti-Japanese sitation in 
Singapore was so extreme. In Penang, a state of British Malaya, a boycott of Japanese 
products commenced on 22 June 1919, and all stores trading Japanese merchandise were 
closed and there were no rickshaws in road.400 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Wong Kian, or K. Wong, and his family in Ban Na San401  
 
Surat Thani had a close connection with Penang. While tin, one of the most 
important natural resources in Phuket, attracted most Hokkiens from Penang, the tin 
                                                
398	NAT, ม-ร.6 น.25/49, Letter of Mr. Pua Hakxiu translated from Zhonghuaminbao Newspaper, dated 
10/06/1919, 134-138.  
399 NAT, ม-ร.6 น.25/49, Devawongse to Mr. Genshiro Nishi, letter dated 11/06/1919, 80-81.  
400	NAT, ม-ร.6 น.25/49, Devawongse, letter dated 22/06/1919, 106. 	
401 Kiang Koetnasan, 77 ปีบา้นนาสาร พทุธศกัราช ๒๔๘๒-พทุธศกัราช ๒๕๕๗ (77 years of Ban Na San 
from 1939 to 2016) (Surat Thani: Udomlap, 2017), 34. 
	 150	
mining industry in Ban Na San district in Surat Thani was dominated by Hakka tin 
miners from Penang. In the early twentieth century, Hor Sunglong, a Penang Hakka, 
pioneered the tin mining industry and a contract to build the railway in Ban Na San. His 
success led to the migration of Hakka tin miners from Penang to this district, such as by 
Guihian, Hor’s sister, K. Wong (see Figure 3.1). Tan Wanlai, who was a Hakka tin miner 
from Perak, a state of British Malaya and a neighbouring state of Penang, also migrated 
to Ban Na San.402     
 
The news of the boycott of Japanese products in Penang would have reached the 
Chinese residing in Surat Thani who had family ties with Penang. Meanwhile, the serious 
riot in Penang was directly telegraphed from the Siamese consulate in Penang to Phuket 
to observe the political movement of the Chinese. Phuket was a province in South Siam 
where tin mining was a major source of income and the Chinese residing in Phuket had 
family ties with the Chinese in Penang who also participated in tin mining. Directly after 
the Penang riot, the local authorities in Phuket found that the Chinese were posting 
placards to ask the Chinese to boycott Japanese products.403 The Chinese also refused to 
work for the Japanese.404  
 
Warships, therefore, were commanded by Bangkok authorities to prevent the 
situation in Phuket from deteriorating.405 The authorities of every province, including 
Surat Thani, were also told to closely observe the movement of the Chinese. However, it 
seems that the Chinese extremists operated underground despite being warned by the 
Siamese authorities not to foment agitation against the Japanese. A threatening letter, 
presummably written in Chinese on 25 May (Chinese Calendar) by a secret society called, 
“Thirty Two Correspondents Society,” was directed to Chinese merchants but discovered 
by the Siamese authorities.406 This secret society told the Chinese in Siam to rouse 
                                                
402 Koetnasan, 77 ปีบา้นนาสาร พทุธศกัราช ๒๔๘๒-พทุธศกัราช ๒๕๕๗, 27-28.  
403 NAT, ม-ร.6 น.25/49, Chao Phraya Surasri, the Minister of the Ministry of Interior, to HRH Prince 
Pravitra Vadhanodom, His Majesty’s Private Secretary, letter dated 26/06/1919, 112-113.  
404 Ibid., Copy of the Telegraph from Phuket by Phraya Surasri, dated 26/06/1919, 114.	
405  Ibid., Chao Phraya Surasri, the Minister of the Ministry of Interior, to HRH Prince Pravitra 
Vadhanodom, His Majesty’s Private Secretary, letter dated 26/06/1919, 113. 	
406 We did not have a lot of information about the “Thirty Two Correspondents Society”. 	
	 151	
themselves to save their country and warned Chinese merchants trading in Japanese 
products that they would be assasinated at the hands of a skilled swordsman.407  
 
The Penang riot seemed to spark the attention of the local authorities in every 
province in South Siam, including Surat Thani, with particular attention paid to Monthon 
Songkhla, which shared a border with British Malaya. There was knowledge of the 
donations made by the Chinese in Nakhon Si Thammarat, a neighbouring province of 
Surat Thani, to support the movement in Penang and strike on the first day of July 1919. 
The police were told to take precautionary measures against any contingency of the 
movement, particularly in the tin districts in Nakhon Si Thammarat, where there were 
meeting places of Chinese miners, and the downtown of Songkhla, where the majority of 
Chinese resided. The regiments in Nakhon Si Thammarat and Phatthalung were also told 
to observe this event and a warship was also requested to patrol Songkhla.408 At that time, 
Surat Thani was also under the control of the Viceroy of the South. Therefore, the 
Chinese political movements in the province had to be closely observed. In addition, the 
political activities of the Chinese in Surat Thani had long been under observation and 
control as the Chinese had considerable influence. Moreover, the majority of the 
population in the downtown of Bandon, the capital district of the province, was Chinese. 
409   
  
The measures taken to prevent a deterioration in the situation seem to be effective. 
Seow Hoodseng (蕭佛成, 1863-1939), a powerful overseas Chinese and leader of the 
GMD in Siam, told a prominent Japanese merchant that the Chinese political movement 
against the Japanese in Siam would not be as severe as in Singapore and Penang because 
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they were afraid of the local authorities, who were sending police and soldiers to observe 
the situation daily.410  
 
Seow Hoodseng was a Hokkien born in Bangkok and a leader of the Chinese 
revolutionaries in Siam. His background suited him for his activist role. After the fall of 
the Ming dynasty in the mid-seventeenth century, his ancestors fought with the anti-
Manchu resistance.411 Seow’s ancestors, together with some of the exiles, eventually fled 
to Taiwan, headed by Zheng Chenggong (鄭成功), or Koxinga (1624-1662), a Chinese 
Ming royalist who resisted the Manchu conquest of China. After the grandson of Koxinga 
was sent to Beijing, Taiwan was finally integrated into China in 1683.412 Seow’s family 
thus fled to Malacca, a British Malaya state ruled by the Dutch from 1641 to 1789 and 
again from 1818 to 1825, from where Seow’s father migrated to Bangkok almost two 
centuries later. Seow was a successful attorney and merchant. In 1905, influenced by the 
revolutionary movement of Dr. Sun, Seow contacted the China Daily (中國日報), a pro-
revolutionary Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong, for help to start a mouthpiece for the 
movement in Bangkok. He established the Maenam Daily (美南日報), a Chinese 
newspaper.413 Sun established the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance (同盟會) in Bangkok 
during his second visit in 1906, when he was appointed chairman. Wong Hangchao (王杏
洲), a Cantonese and one of the six founders of the Thian Fah Foundation Hospital (天華
慈善醫院) in Bangkok, was one of the first leaders of the Chinese Revolutionary 
Alliance.414 In 1906, Seow founded the Chino-Siamese Daily News as a mouthpiece for 
his political movement. In 1908, he also established the Chinese Association (中華會館) 
as a front organisation for the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance.415  
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Despite heavy monitoring by the authorities, the boycott started to expand 
throughout Bangkok at the end of July 1919. Instead of using threatening letters as usual, 
verbal threats were made. Chinese merchants, around 400-500 persons, also took turns to 
meet and listen to the boycott regulations at Linfong restaurant in Bangkok’s Chinatown, 
headed by Co Tianyian, the owner of Minkok pharmacy. After the investigation, he 
admitted that he was also the leader of the Resistance of the Overseas Chinese against the 
Japanese (華僑抗日聯合會). This association was a secret society and a branch of 
Canton in Siam, aiming to unite the Chinese coolies. He was subsequently deported.416 In 
addition, Chinese students in Siam also took part in the boycott. The Siamese authorities 
were afraid that the Chinese students would follow the example of the students in Beijing. 
To prevent this, the authorities commanded inspectors to patrol every Chinese school in 
order to prevent the burgeoning political movement.417 The political movement of 
Chinese students in Beijing and other provinces in China influenced the Chinese students 
in Siam to establish the Chinese Student Association in Siam with the express aim of 
implanting patriotism.418  
 
Another wave of the boycott against Japanese products started with the Jinan 
Incident, the Japanese agitation in Jinan, the capital of Shandong province, which 
occured in early May 1928. A major cause of this incident was that the Japanese military 
was worried about the safety of more than two thousand Japanese people residing in 
Jinan should Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition follow its plan to pass through the 
city in the Spring of 1928. However, an unpredictable clash between two parties broke 
out on the morning of 3 May, even though there were many negotiations between Chiang 
and the Japanese cabinet to avoid conflict. The skirmish grew into a larger battle that left 
many thousand dead. Chiang thus made a decision to withdraw from Jinan.419  
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In May 1928, Chinese merchants in Siam reportedly persuaded one another to 
stop purchasing Japanese products.420 A Japanese charge d’affaires reported to the police 
in Bangkok that two Chinese were killed and others physically attacked because they 
traded in Japanese merchandise. These incidents were, however, difficult to investigate as 
the Chinese tried to hide their political movement as much as possible.421 On 21 May, 
Seow Hoodseng also disseminated a Chinese leaflet of the ‘Chinese national salvation 
organisation to get rid of the Japanese in Siam’ to the police, the content of which 
sparked anti-Japanese sentiment amongst the Chinese and induced them to boycott such 
products and stop working for the Japanese. The police, nevertheless, believed that it 
might belong to Seow himself, or the Guomindang Party in Bangkok, because he was the 
leader of the boycott of which Tan Lengsue (陳寧思) and Nai Kurtai (賴渠岱) were the 
chief executors and leading the boycott.422 On 9 June, the Chinese Daily News was 
temporarily closed by the authorities due to articles fanning anti-Japanese sentiment and 
supporting the Chinese to resort to violence against their enemies.423 Six Chinese were 
arrested for threatening and attacking those who traded in Japanese merchandise were 
also deported from the country.424   
 
King Prajadhipok, reigning from 1925-1935, was worried about the economic 
situation he had inherited from his predecessor. The budget had been in deficit for many 
years. In the meantime, the Chinese controlled most of the country’s economy. On 7 May 
1926, he wrote a letter to Prince Chula Chakrabongse, his nephew, who was studying in 
England, informing him that it was time the Siamese people should improve commerce 
and industry. He also expressed the opinion that Siamese people should find other jobs 
except government officers.425 In 1928, Prajadhipok thus recommended that Siamese 
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people should be hired to replace the Chinese coolies because if the Chinese stopped 
working for the Japanese it would harm trade in Siam.426 This was also due to a request 
for help from the Japanese charge d’affaires, who claimed that Japan was buying a lot of 
rice. Therefore, the Siamese authorities recommended a shipping agent to the Japanese 
which was to be commanded by the Siamese authorities to hire only Siamese workers on 
the day Japanese ships arrived.427  
 
Following the annexation of Manchuria in 1931, all Chinese newspapers in Siam 
criticised the Japanese intensely. Despite the strong anti-Japanese sentiment amongst the 
Chinese residing in Siam, they could not provide much economic assistance to China 
compared with the aid in 1928 due to the Great Depression of the 1930s. When Tan 
Siewmeng (陳守明), the newly elected chairman of the CCC in 1932, organised a 
fundraising campaign for the relief of war refugees in Shanghai, only the small sum of 
21,000 baht was collected. Furthermore, he restrained the CCC from boycotting Japanese 
merchandise. Due to the Great Depression, the Chinese were not in a position to boycott 
Japanese products until 1933. During 1931-1933, Japanese trade with Siam thus 
increased significantly.428 This confirms the idea that some merchants were forced to 
think of the economic reality and take part in the boycott at their own pace, as noted 
earlier. If the economy was depressed, they could not afford to be that patriotic.  
 
Following the outbreak of the SSJW, the Japanese seized most of the port cities in 
South China in 1937-1938, which led to Japan importing rice from China. After the 
Japanese realised that China was importing rice from Siam, they started to purchase rice 
directly from there too. However, the Chinese merchants who controlled the rice industry 
in Thailand refused to sell to them. In order to solve this problem, in 1938, Mah Lapkun 
(馬立群), a Cantonese man known as Ma Bulakul, the former chairman of the CCC 
(1929-1932) and the president of the Kwongsiew Association (廣肇會館), was selected 
by the Siamese government to be the manager of the Thai Rice Company, which was 
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owned by the government. The government rented one of his rice mills to produce rice 
for export.429 The business went well and the government aimed to utilise the company as 
a tool to seize the rice market in Siam from the Chinese and control this industry.430  
 
In conclusion, the surge of Chinese nationalism and the anti-Japanese sentiment 
among the diaspora in South East Asia had been brewing for decades even prior to the 
start of the SSJW in 1937. This upsurge in nationalism was mirrored elsewhere, even in 
the small Chinese communities. The Chinese responded to the Japanese agitation in 
China by boycotting Japanese merchandise, which was possibly the most damaging anti-
Japanese activity as it caused severe damage to Japanese interests. Some of them resorted 
to violence to make the boycott more efficient. This alarmed the Siamese government, 
who thought it would harm national trade; therefore, the boycott was closely observed by 
the government and those who took to violence were deported to China. The anti-
Japanese sentiment later inspired Liao Jingsong, a Chinese rooted in Surat Thani and one 
of the most powerful Chinese in Siam, to identify culturally and politically with China to 
contribute to the Chinese war effort.  
 
 
III.      Chinese Diaspora at War: Leading Chinese of Surat Thani and their  
            Contribution to China’s War Effort 
 
The relief fund movements or the anti-Japanese activities across the South Seas were 
normally led and supported by Chinese luminaries in the diaspora. This section examines 
the networks and connections between the leading Chinese in Surat Thani and elsewhere 
in Siam in order to find out how the powerful Chinese from the province had become 
involved in Chinese national politics and the anti-Japanese movements in the country.  
 
As anti-Japanese sentiment had been in the making for some time, Chinese 
migrants around the world who identified politically with China predictably participated 
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in displays of patriotism and support for China’s war effort against Japan. Even far from 
their motherland there was an increase of Chinese nationalism, for example in the pan-
European diaspora, a patriotic network centred on Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, 
and the Netherlands, and in North America, where the Pan-European Federation was 
established in 1937 to help China fight against Japan.431  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Liao Chiangsoon and Xiucheng (秀清 ) (left), and (right) one of his wives in 1923 at the 
Royal Photographic Studio, Saranrom Gardens432 
 
Into the 1930s, in the Chinese community in Siam the Chinese, who were mostly 
Teochew, had emerged as ‘notable people’433. One of them was Liao Jingsong, a product 
of Surat Thani Chinese and widely known in the Chinese community. Liao was a 
patriotic entrepreneur and one of the leading Chinese in the province and a major donor 
to fundraising campaigns to support China’s war efforts against Japan. He was a son of 
Liao Chiangsoon (see Figure 3.2), a southern tycoon, a patriotic entrepreneur and one of 
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the leading Chinese in Surat Thani, having migrated from Chenghai district near Shantou 
for Bangkok in 1867 when he was 15.434 With the assistance of relatives who had 
migrated before, Liao inherited a domestic shipping business from his uncle, which gave 
him the opportunity to travel to southern Siam regularly.435 This was where Liao’s 
perseverance and honesty caught the eye of Phraya Nakhon Si Thammarat, who 
patronised him and later appointed him to be a tax farmer in Surat Thani, where he 
established himself in Bandon. At the turn of the 20th century, he held the largest share of 
the birds’ nest industry in Siam. He later built a sprawling market with a modern cinema, 
rice mill, saw mill, and an ice-making factory in Surat Thani.436 Bandon, a small market 
town at the time, had become the capital of the bird’s nest industry. 
 
In 1919, Liao was appointed to be Phraya Pradinan-Bhumirat by King 
Vadjiravudh. He was preferred by the king, who knew him at court as the palace’s 
supplier of the best-quality birds’ nests and a generous supporter of many charitable 
campaigns. Liao was also one of a very few Chinese to be appointed to the title phraya 
during his reign.437 After Vadjiravudh ascended the throne, many leading Chinese from 
different provinces were ennobled as Khun or Luang. The titles were awarded for 
services to the provincial governor, for large contributions to the royal cause or for 
entertaining the king on his tours.438 With his royal connections and the phraya title (see 
Figure 3.3), Liao was held in high regard in the Chinese community. His privilege of 
being favoured by King Vadjiravudh led him to become involved in politics and connect 
with other Chinese community luminaries in Siam.439 Liao and other leading Chinese in 
Siam, particularly those who established the Thian Fah Foundation Hospital, congregated 
                                                
434 Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 273-274. For other names of Liao Chiangsoon, 
please see Chapter One, Section VI. 	
435 Ibid., 273. 	
436  อนุสรณง์านฌาปนกจิคณุพอ่เล็ก เสรฐภกัด ี ณ วดัธาตทุอง วนัที> 2 ธนัวาคม พ.ศ. 2545 (Cremation 
volume of Lek Sethbhakdi 廖欣圃 at Wat That Thong on 2 December 2002), 7.  
437 Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 273. 	
438 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 153. The titles of the bureaucratic nobility were not often 
bestowed on the Chinese. In descending order of rank, these were Chao Phraya, Phraya, Phra, Luang and 
Khun. Chao Phraya was held by only a very select few; Phraya by governors, department heads, senior 
judges, and so on; Phra by division chiefs; Luang by selection chiefs or lesser judges; and Khun by those in 
minor posts.  
439 Wu, 60 ปีโพน้ทะเล, 261. 	
	 159	
in 1907 to set up the CCC in the following year. The Thian Fah Foundation Hospital 
survived after the war and is still operation today. Another two leading Chinese who 
joined the group were Tan Kaihor (陳開河), a powerful member of the Thian Fah 
Foundation Hospital, and Tan Lipbuay (Wanglee) (陳立梅), the head of Wanglee family 
and eldest son of Tan Tsuhuang (陳慈黌), who founded Wanglee, a successful rice 
export company in Siam.440   
 
 
Figure 3.3: King Vadjiravudh gave the Sethbhakdi surname to Liao Chiangsoon in 1919441 
 
The Thian Fah Foundation Hospital, founded in 1903 and completed in 1905, was 
another important organisation at the turn of the twentieth century that was cooperated by 
all five major dialect groups. The six founders were Lau Chongmin (劉聰敏), a Hokkien 
and the official leader of the Chinese in Siam, Ng Miaongian (Lamsam) (伍淼源), a 
Hakka, Lao Gibing (劉繼賓), a Teochew, Wong Hangchao (王杏洲), a Cantonese, Tia 
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Giangsam (張見三 ), a Teochew, and Koh Huijia (高暉石 ), a Teochew. 442  The 
establishment of the Thian Fah Foundation Hospital, located in Bangkok’s Chinatown, by 
these six founders portrayed the unity that transcended regional and dialect groups 
amongst the Chinese in Siam. The hospital provided 250 beds and a fund of 160,000 baht, 
largely solicited from the Chinese community in Siam. In addition, King Chulalongkorn 
donated 8,000 baht when he attended the ceremonial opening on 19 September 1905.443 
During the SSJW, the Thian Fah Foundation Hospital also trained nurses to be sent to 
China for service with the army, but this activity was brought to a halt in 1940 after its 
chairman was deported to China by the Thai government.444 The founders of the hospital 
chose Liao Chiangsoon, on account of his royal connections, to inform King Vadjiravudh 
about the initiative to launch the CCC, of which the king expressed his appreciation.445 
The CCC was formed in 1908 and registered with the Manchu government.446  
 
During the first twenty years of the establishment of the CCC, its work was 
mostly limited to business.447 It is possible that the Siamese authorities particularly 
observed its movement as the police warned the CCC that its political activity should be 
disencouraged during the May Fourth Movement in 1919 (see Section II). However, in 
1924, when Chaozhou in Guangdong province was battered by a devastating typhoon, 
Liao Chiangsoon was elected the ninth chairman of the CCC and he notified Vadjiravudh 
of the disaster in his motherland and was given 5,000 to assist his countrymen.448 When 
this news spread throughout the country, Chinese from all walks of life contributed nearly 
a hundred thousand baht to the typhoon relief campaign. The CCC stepped beyond 
business circles and went into public service to lead the Chinese in Siam to express their 
patriotism under Chairman Liao. He also raised funds to move the CCC into a better area 
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and was the first person to donate ten thousand baht for this campaign. However, he 
passed away in 1925449, and his second son, Liao Jingsong (1892-1980), became head of 
the family.  
 
Owing to Liao Chiangsoon’s move from business circles, a committee of 
prominent Chinese was formed in Siam for the collection of subscriptions from the 
Chinese, who wanted to help people suffering from Japanese agitation in Shandong due 
to the Jinan Incident in 1928. A preliminary general meeting was held in the CCC at 
which Lau Chongmin and Lao Gibing, Liao’s friends, were reportedly amongst the 
leaders of the board of management to collect the funds.450 
 
Liao Jingsong was second-generation Chinese born in Nakhon Si Thammarat, a 
neighbouring province of Surat Thani, on 7 January 1892. His mother was Siamese from 
Nakhon Si Thammarat. When he was three, his mother died in a boat accident. Liao 
Chiangsoon therefore sent Jingsong to China for education under the care of Madam 
Chua, his Chinese stepmother. He was assigned to take care of his father’s business 
during the pioneering era of Bandon when he was just 15. Liao Chiangsoon not only left 
his business to his son, but also his connections and networks with Chinese luminaries in 
Siam, which also led Liao Jingsong becoming involved in politics. After the death of 
Liao Chiangsoon, he later expanded the business to four provinces in South Siam, 
including Bandon in Surat Thani, Chumphon, a neighbouring province of Surat Thani, 
Nakhon Si Thammarat and Hat Yai in Songkhla, where he established power stations to 
provide electricity to the towns. Due to his development performances, King Prajadhipok 
appointed him Khun Sethbhakdi. He also expanded the business into banking, insurance, 
rice milling and shipping in Bangkok and expanded to Hong Kong.451 He also assigned 
Gor Thongsiew to be the manager of Liaoyongheng (廖榮興), his family company based 
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in Bandon, to build a new cinema in Bandon in 1936.452 This cinema later became a 
meeting place between government officers and Chinese merchants in Bandon’s 
Chinatown to induce the merchants to open their business as usual after the Japanese had 
landed in Surat Thani.453 
 
The factional division within the GMD in China was also reflected abroad. In 
Siam, in the 1930s—at least until the outbreak of the SSJW in 1937— the GMD branch 
was divided between a Southwest faction, or Xinan faction (西南), and a pro-Chiang Kai-
shek faction, or the commercial attaché faction (商務專員).454 The Southwest faction was 
under Seow Hoodseng owing to his close relationship with Hu Hanmin (胡漢民), the 
leader of the Southwest faction, since his visit to Bangkok with Sun Yat-sen in 1908. 
Seow was appointed to the central committee of the Xinan government and moved to 
Canton following the 1931 division. He lived there until the death of Hu in 1936. Fearing 
that Chiang Kai-shek would arrest him after the collapse of the faction, Seow fled to 
Bangkok.455 Tan Siewmeng, the chairman of the CCC from 1932 to 1936, was the leader 
of the commercial pro-Chiang Kai-shek attaché faction. With his success in business and 
political connections with Bangkok’s high society, Tan Siewmeng was selected by the 
Nanjing government to be the commissioner of commerce to establish diplomatic 
relations with Siam and the office “unofficial legation” was set up.456 Tan Siewmeng was 
against the takeover of Liao Jingsong’s group on the CCC. When the chairman of the 
CCC was available in 1936, the Southwest faction nominated candidates to compete for 
leadership of the Chinese community. The group of Liao Jingsong, mentored by Seow 
Hoodseng, was comprised of well-known Teochew people at the time, namely Liao 
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Jingsong, Tan Gengchuang (Tanthana) (陳景川), Tae Juebing (Techapaiboon) (鄭子彬), 
U Chuliang (Uahwatanasakul) (余子亮), and Hia Guang-iam (Iamsuree) (蟻光炎).457  
 
The competition ended with the victory of the Southwest faction. In an election 
held on 1 March 1936, Hia Guang-iam was elected the new chairman of the CCC. The 
gang of five, Liao and his friends, had a strong political connection with the Southwest 
faction under Seow Hoodseng. Tan Lengsue, the father of Tan Gengchuang, was Seow’s 
close friend and his father was also the chief executor of the boycott in 1928. Tae Juebing 
was persuaded to be a member of the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance by Seow. 
Furthermore, almost everyone from Liao’s group attended the funeral of Tan Muitueng 
(陳美堂 ), hosted by Seow and Lim Baegee (林伯岐 ), while no one from Tan 
Siewmeng’s pro-Chiang Kai-shek faction appeared.458 Based on a Japanese document, it 
was also written that Hia Guang-iam and Tan Gengchuang were in the Southwest faction 
and Liao Jingsong was against Tan Siewmeng faction.459 Later, the members of Liao’s 
group were the founders of the Teochew Association and were called Teochew 
Association Faction.460  
 
Seow Hoodseng and Liao Jiangsong’s group shared the same passion to help their 
ancestral homeland fight against the Japanese. After the outbreak of the SSJW, Liao and 
his friends registered the Teochew Association on 14 February 1938 as a vehicle to 
contribute to the Chinese war effort and carry out anti-Japanese activities, including the 
boycotts. Tan Gengchuang was the first president of the association and Liao became the 
vice president while Hia Guang-iam served as the treasurer and U Chuliang was the 
secretary. To arouse strong anti-Japanese sentiment, the China Daily, the Teochew 
Association Faction’s own newspaper, was founded on 1 October. Lee Keeyong (李其
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雄), a relative of Liao, who was an intellectual and had obtained economics degree from 
Shanghai, served as the editor.461  
 
Nationalist fundraising activities were concerned with selling Chungking 
government bonds. A branch unit called the “Government Bond Selling Campaign 
Committee Branch in Siam” was established by Liao and his friends. Seow Hoodseng 
worked as its president while the Teochew Association faction served as the five vice 
presidents of the bond-selling committee.462 However, the contribution of Siam in the war 
relief funds raised across the South Seas accounted for only 5.12 per cent although the 
Chinese community in the country was one of the largest in the world (see Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1: Contributions of the Chinese in the South Seas, November 1938-December  
                       1940463 
 
Country/colony Funds raised  
(raw total, in Yuan) 
Funds raised 
(percentage) 
1. Malaya  
2. Dutch East Indies  
3. Philippines 
4. Burma  
5. Siam  













   
The small proportion of donations made in Siam was possibly due to the ceaseless 
observation and crackdown by the Siamese authorities from 1928. The Siamese 
government also suspected that insignificant funds were sent to China in 1928 when it 
came to donations due to the fact that funds were distributed amongst the leaders of the 
boycott associations.464 In other words, some of them were corrupted and pocketed the 
funds themselves. Moreover, the Siamese government enacted the Fund Raising 
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Restriction Act in 1937, which banned fundraising activities against the Japanese.465 The 
Siamese government not only prohibited the collection of war funds because it wanted to 
conciliate Japan, but the boycott was also considered to be a conspiracy which restricted 
trade and thereby hindered economic activity. The Chinese, therefore, went underground 
or resorted to subterfuge.466 Apart from fundraising activities, Liao and his friends also 
sent rice to China when their countrymen in Chaozhou and Shantou suffered from famine 
as a result of the war. The Teochew faction established a rice trading company to sell at 
subsidised prices to their motherland. After Shantou had fallen to the Japanese in June 
1939, this activity was halted.467 Saving his nation in the form of donated rice was a tactic 
designed to avoid the government bans.  
 
Meanwhile, in British Malaya the Singapore China Relief Fund Association was 
established within a month after the commencement of the SSJW by a group of leading 
Chinese merchants in the CCC in Singapore. At the same time, the Hokkien Clan 
Association formed a committee to find ways to raise funds and assist their motherland. 
In September 1937, the Penang China Relief Fund Association was set up by clan 
associations in Penang while a relief fund institution was established at the same time by 
the leaders of the Chinese associations and principles of Chinese schools in Selangor, a 
state of British Malaya.468 Such meetings to establish relief fund institutions against the 
Japanese could not be held in Siam due to the fact that, as noted, the Siamese government 
had introduced the Fund Raising Restriction Act in 1937, banning fundraising activities 
against the Japanese, partly to conciliate Japan and partly to prevent the economy from 
being harmed.  
 
After Xiamen, the home city of many Hokkiens in British Malaya, had fallen to 
the Japanese in May 1938, communications between merchants and labourers in the 
South Seas were severed, heightening awareness of the war and attracting even the least 
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nationalistic overseas Chinese into the relief movement.469 Kong Xiangxi (孔祥熙), also 
known as H. H. Kung, the Premier of the Republic of China, encouraged Tan Kah-kee 
(陳嘉庚, 1874-1961), one of the leading Chinese leaders in the South Seas, to organise a 
pan-Southeast Asia national salvation organisation. Tan Kah-kee then sent telegrams to 
many relief fund groups in South East Asia, informing them that a conference of all 
Southeast Asia associations would be held at the Nanyang Overseas Chinese Middle 
School in Singapore on 10 October.470  
 
As Tan Kah-kee was one of the notable overseas Chinese, it is essential to briefly 
sketch his background. Tan Kah-kee was a Hokkien born in Xiamen, or Amoy, in Fujian 
province. Immigrating to Singapore in 1890 at the age of 17, he spent more than fifty 
years of his life there. Tan became a wealthy merchant from rubber trading, 
manufacturing, rice mills etc. By 1911, he was a millionaire and a multi-millionaire by 
the end of the First World War (1914-1918). With enormous wealth, he provided 
economic aid to China through many major events. He assumed leadership in the 
Shandong Relief Fund, Singapore-China Relief Fund and the Federation of China Relief 
Fund of the South Seas (南洋華僑籌賑祖國難民總會 , or 南僑總會) (FCRFSS 
hereafter). He also founded Amoy University in 1921 and many colleges and schools in 
Fujian. After his death, he was widely known in South East Asia and China as a pioneer 
industrialist, philanthropist, social reformer and supporter of movements for socio-
political change.471  
 
The major consequence of the conference of all Southeast Asia associations in 
Singapore on 10 October 1938 was the creation of the FCRFSS, which, with its 
headquarters in Singapore, coordinated all relief efforts in South East Asia. One hundred 
and sixty-five delegates from relief fund associations and merchant groups from British 
Malaya and Burma, the Dutch East Indies, French Indochina, Siam and the Philippines 
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gathered at the conference.472 Tan Kah-kee wrote that Chinese delegates from Siam 
comprised the smallest number. The Siamese government forbade the Chinese from 
raising funds for the war. Most of the delegates were from Chinese communities in South 
Siam, namely Pattani, Narathiwat, Trang and Ron Phibun in Nakhon Si Thammarat.473 
The China Daily of 26 January 1939 reported about Seow Hoodseng and mentioned the 
FCRFSS, the name of this conference. Therefore, Liao Jingsong and his friends, who had 
a close relationship with Seow, would have sent their representatives to this 
conference.474      
 
The year 1939 was possibly the worst year for the Chinese community since the 
outbreak of the war. Siam changed its name to Thailand and Chinese descendants who 
worked in the military and government services were forced to change their names and 
surnames to Thai names. In February, Hainan was occupied by the Japanese, which 
dismayed many Hainanese, the first largest dialect group in Surat Thani and the second 
largest in Bangkok. Shantou, in Guangdong province, had fallen to the Japanese in June. 
All Chinese schools were closed down and only one Chinese newspaper was allowed to 
be published. Seow Hoodseng passed away in May and Hia Guang-iam was killed in 
November. The anti-Japanese activities were severely repressed by the Thai government 
and they gradually declined after the death of Hia.475 Many Chinese were deported to 
China in 1939, with the government deporting approximately 200-400 people each 
trip/round until there was a growth in anti-Thai feelings in the Chinese community in 
Hong Kong.476 
 
Realising that the Chinese residing overseas did not contribute enough to help 
China’s war effort, Liao Jingsong traveled across the Southern provinces, including Surat 
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Thani, his hometown, to raise funds for his ancestral homeland.477 “National prosperity or 
catastrophe depends on the dutiful son” was his motto.478 After the Japanese landed in 
Thailand on 8 December 1941, Liao and his friends realised that they were in danger. 
Having planned to take refuge in Yunnan through Burma, a total of thirteen, including 
Tan Genghuang and Tan Juebing, fled Bangkok for Northern Thailand. When they 
reached the border, the Japanese had already surrounded the place, so they returned to 
Bangkok, where the Japanese soldiers finally captured them.479 Liao was sentenced to 
lifetime imprisonment and his brother, Liao Hinpoh (廖欣圃), also known as Lek 
Sethbhakdi, to a 16-year term due for anti-Japanese activities in Thailand after Liao had 
refused to cooperate with the Japanese to support the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. They were released at the end of the war while their friend, U Chuliang, 
successfully escaped to Penang before the Japanese invasion.480  
 
In prison, Liao Jingsong suffered grievously. His agonising pain was expressed in 
one of his poems, Zhongqiu (“Mid-Autumn”,中秋), composed during the Mid-Autumn 
Festival while he was still in the prison. The poem reads: 
 
Suffering under long dark nights and the pitter-patter of unstoppable rain, I am 
filled with hatred and will sing opera without makeup during the Mid-Autumn 
Festival. My meal was full but tasteless. When would I be released from prison?” 
(長夜蕭蕭雨未收，恨無清唱過中秋，盤餐雖飽未知味, 何日彈冠慰楚囚)481  
 
After the end of the war, he was selected to be one of the Overseas Chinese 
representatives in 1947 to participate in the national convention  in Nanjing, where he 
met President Chiang Kai-shek. When Deng Xiaoping visited Thailand in 1978, he was 
also on the welcoming committee. Liao Jingsong had six sons and one daughter from 
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four wives. Kamthorn and Kamyong Sethbhakdi, his eldest and second childs, stayed in 
Bandon to look after his businesses in Southern Thailand.482  
 
The war also had a profound effect on Liao Hinpoh, one of the committee 
members of the Teochew Association. As the war had intensified, Liao Hinpoh sent his 
wife and children to take a refuge in Penang. He was worried and cut off from his family 
when he learnt that Penang was also under Japanese occupation from December 1941.483 
After the end of the war, he avoided all political activities, instructing Somkiat, one of his 
children, who was about to study in Australia, to “work hard, be careful with your money 
and stay away from political activities.”484 His concerns in this regard might have derived 
from his life in prison, where he had experienced day-to-day misery and uncertainty 
about his family in occupied Penang and the shattered family businesses. What upset him 
most was his experience of seeing other political inmates tortured. His fate was described 
by his son as having “resulted from being part of a civic group of prominent Thai-
Chinese merchants.”485  
 
After the end of the war, Liao Jingsong and his brother connected with their 
friends from the Teochew Association Faction and became business partners. They co-
founded Srinakorn Bank, which was supported by Teochew customers in the earliest 
stage (see Figure 3.4).486 His marriage with Tan Jaexiam (陳靜蟾), whom he had met in 
1933, confirms the idea that there was a network of connections between the leading 
Chinese families in Surat Thani and in Bangkok. Tan Jaexiam was a niece of Tan 
Lipbuay, the patriarch of the Wanglee family, who also joined the establishment of the 
CCC with Liao Chiangsoon, as mentioned earlier.  
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Figure 3.4: Picture of the Srinakorn Bank founders, back row left to right: Liao Hinpoh, Tae 
Liangim (鄭亮蔭 ), Tae Ngowlow (鄭午樓 ), Shou Kungkiam (蘇君謙 ); front row left to right: U 
Chuliang, Phraya Thonawanikmontri, the Finance Minister of Thailand in 1948, Liao Jingsong487  
 
On 25 November 1941, thirteen days before the Japanese landed in Surat Thani, 
Pramote Chongcharoen, the Thai Consul of Penang, observed, “There are certain classes 
of Thai people who have relatives in the Malay Peninsula and are planning to evacuate 
from Thailand to stay with their relatives.”488 There is no doubt that he was referring to 
the Chinese in Surat Thani, who had networks with those Chinese in Penang. Therefore, 
he asked the government to put restrictions on the evacuation of them from the country 
while the government was also preparing to pass this kind of law.489 Moreover, Penang 
was also a place where many Chinese, particularly from the Southern Peninsula, went to 
get a Chinese education (see Chapter Two), after every local Chinese school had been 
closed down by the Phibun government from 1938 to 1940.490 One of them was Manin 
Patjakkhapat or Shou Kiangjiao, a grandchild of Shou Caikun Patjakkhapat, or Phra 
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Patjakphattikan, a leading Chinese family in Surat Thani who went to Penang to study in 
Chung Ling High School (鍾靈中學校) after the closure of every Chinese school in Surat 
Thani. He took a train with his friends from Trang and Phuket back to the Southern 
Peninsula after his school in Penang was bombed in December.491  
 
Liao Chiangsoon was preferred by King Vadjiravudh. This made him become 
involved in politics and connect with other Chinese luminaries in Siam. He was chosen as 
the representative of these Chinese to inform the King about the initiative to launch the 
CCC. In 1924, Liao became the ninth chairman of the CCC and organised the typhoon 
relief campaign to help his motherland. Following his death in 1925, Liao Jingsong 
became head of the family. However, Liao Chiangsoon not only left his business to 
Jingsong but also his connections with leading Chinese in Siam, which inspired him to 
participate in politics. He and his friends met Seow Hoodseng, the leader of the 
Southwest faction in Siam and anti-Japanese movement prior to the war, with whom he 
shared his passion to help China fight against Japan. In 1936, Hia Guang-iam became the 
new chairman of the CCC. After the outbreak of the war in 1937, Hia and his friends, 
including Liao, registered the Teochew Association in 1938 as a tool to contribute to the 
Chinese war effort. Liao was also a vice president of the bond-selling committee to 
organise the fundraising campaign. After Shantou had fallen to the Japanese military in 
1939, he travelled across the southern provinces, including Surat Thani, to raise funds for 
China. After the Japanese landed in Thailand in December 1941, he and his brother were 
imprisoned owing to their anti-Japanese activities after they refused to cooperate with the 
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IV.       The Japanese Invasion of 8 December 1941  
 
Bandon, the capital district of Surat Thani, considered Chinatown at the time, was one of 
the destinations the Japanese had decided to invade on 8 December 1941. The majority of 
the population in Bandon’s downtown was Chinese, as mentioned by Chalo Charuchinda, 
the provincial governor from 1942-1943. Unlike other provinces, the people in the city 
chose to fight back and clashes occurred in Bandon’s Chinatown. This section discloses 
how the Chinese in the town responded to the Japanese invasion when their Chinese 
community turned into a warzone.  
 
During the war, Japanese military commanders were aware of their necessity to 
act with urgency to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere by using their 
military control over the South Seas, the scheme based on the ‘Nanshinron’ or ‘Southern 
Expansion Policy’. Located in the centre of Southeast Asia, Thailand was geographically 
the most desirable place where Japan could dispatch troop reinforcements, food supplies, 
weapons and war equipment. Kiattisahakul pointed out that the most important strategy 
of the Japanese army was control over the Thai southern railways because they could be 
used to transport troops, war equipment and food supplies in their frontline battlefields in 
British Malaya and Burma.492 
 
In order to conquer British Malaya and Burma, the Japanese had to utilise ports, 
airfields and railways in Thailand. Therefore, Surat Thani was one of six destinations in 
the Southern Peninsula the Japanese troops had planned to invade on 8 December 1941. 
The others were Prachuap Khiri Khan, Chumphon, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Songkhla and 
Pattani, where the Southern Line, a Thai railway line, was also located along these 
provinces. Prachuap Khiri Khan was only 17 kilometres away from British Burma and 
Chumphon provided the way to Victoria Point, where the second largest airfield in the 
                                                
492 Puengthip Kiattisahakul, “The Japanese Army and Thailand’s Southern Railways During the Greater 
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South Seas was located. Pattani was the place where the Japanese could pass through to 
invade British Malaya.493 
 
On 8 December 1941, Constitution Day, many police, government officers, scouts 
and people in Bandon, the market town and capital district of Surat Thani, woke early to 
gather at City Hall, located at the present city pillar shrine, on the east bank of the Tapi 
River, to commemorate Siam’s 1932 passage to a constitutional monarchy.494 Many 
Chinese merchants and hawkers wished to make a lot of profit on the day and they went 
to sell their goods and food at the event while many shops in Chinatown were waiting for 
customers who would spend money in the Chinese community during and after the end of 
the event. However, while everyone, including the Chinese, was ready to enjoy an air of 
festivity, the Japanese troops in the Gulf of Thailand were heading to various points in 
the Southern Peninsula, including Surat Thani, the only one of these six provinces where 
no military unit was stationed.  
 
On that day, at 8 a.m., the commander of Amphoe Ban Na San Police Station 
received a telegraph from the commander of the Provincial Police Region 8 in Nakhon Si 
Thammarat, informing him that Japanese troops had landed at Pattani. Calculating that 
Bandon, one of the important strongholds in the Southern Peninsula, where an airfield 
was located, would also be attacked, the provincial governor and the superintendent of 
the police station in Bandon had planned to resist the Japanese. At the same time, a 
Japanese troopship was moving through the Tapi River towards Talat Lang, a market in 
the coastal city of Bandon and the centre of Bandon’s Chinatown, where Hainanese and 
Hokkien temples were located.495 People in Chinatown appeared to panic when they 
heard that the Japanese were heading to the Chinese community (see Figure 3.5).  
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Figure 3.5: On the morning of 8 December 1941, people in Bandon’s Chinatown seemed to be panic 
when they learnt that the Japanese troops were heading towards Bandon. 
 
The superintendent summoned a meeting of the police to organise the resistance 
against the invaders. The resistance groups were stationed around the City Hall and down 
the roads and lanes in Bandon. Apart from the police, government officers and members 
of the public also volunteered to receive firearms at the police station only 15 minutes 
before the encounter with the Japanese army. Those firearms reportedly included 185 
rifles and only one Bergmann machine gun.496 Learning that the Japanese were about to 
invade Bandon, Zhan Kimha, a local born Chinese and owner of Puensurat (素叻槍店), a 
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gun shop (see Figure 3.6), told Fak Mitphakdi, a clerk of Surat Thani Municipality and 
Yuean Somboonying, a veteran of the Franco-Thai War (1940-1941), to load all of his 34 




Figure 3.6: Zhan Kimha’s shop in Bandon’s Chinatown498 
 
Zhan Kimha (see Figure 3.7) was a son of Khun Natchinarak and a local-born 
Chinese in Nakhon Si Thammarat. He was also a product of Chinese education in 
Penang. He had married Tae Kimio (鄭), a local-born Chinese in Bandon, and settled in 
Surat Thani with his wife. 499  He also owned Zhansuanseng Shop, selling sewing 
machines, typewriters and tricycles. Before opening his gun shop in Bandon’s Chinatown, 
he had been a tin miner in Ban Na San.500 
                                                
497 Zhan Kimha was also known as Wiwat Chantharaporn. Based on the letter of Kimha Saezhan or Zhan 
Kimha about the Japanese invasion on 8 December 1941 cited in Thossaphon Nganphairot, 
หลายเรื(องเมอืงสรุาษฎรฯ์ (many stories of Surat Thani) (Surat Thani: Lertchai, 2000), 41. 	
498 This figure was from Chompunuch Chantharaporn.	
499 Tae Kimio was also known as Orawan Thirawat. 	
500	Nganphairot, หลายเรื(องเมอืงสรุาษฎรฯ์, 40.  
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Figure 3.7:  Zhan Kimha, his wife and son501 
 
In the meantime, shortly before the Japanese invasion, many people, both Thai 
and Chinese, particularly the elderly and children, hastily headed to Phatthanaram 
Temple, another Thai temple in Bandon’s Chinatown that was founded by Kimchun, a 
local-born Chinese who had become a monk. While Kimchun was meditating at the time, 
many people went to ask him for help on account of his prestige and the belief that he 
would be able to protect them from the Japanese. Walking from his parsonage with a 
cane, 80 year-old Kimchun calmed the people by using his walking stick to draw a circle 
around these frightened people and telling them that they would be safe from bullets. 
Then he went back to do meditation. After the clash between the people and the Japanese 
soldiers ended, many myths about his supernatural powers were created. Therefore, many 
people, including those from different religions, became disciples of Kimchun. 502 
Furthermore, during the Pacific War, Kimchun’s temple also served as the first clinic in 
Bandon’s Chinatown, due to his knowledge and interest in traditional medicine. When 
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ธรรมบชูา (100 years of Wat Tham Bucha) (Bangkok: Thammasapa, 2004), 250-251. 	
	 177	
there was a shortage of conventional drugs during the outbreak of the Pacific War, 
Kimchun transformed his temple to cure patients.503  
 
As anti-Japanese sentiment had been brewing for decades and was mirrored in the 
Chinese diaspora around the world, it was possible that well-known Chinese heroes and 
heroines such as Zhan Kimha, Kobkun Saetang, and Koi Anaui identified politically with 
China, although they were second-generation Chinese. Li Patpoon, a third-generation 
Chinese and guardian of a Hainanese Temple in Pak Kradae, recalled the period after the 
Japanese invasion when his father always scolded the Japanese in his house as ‘Boe Aoi’ 
and ‘Boe Kiao,’ Hainanese derogatory terms for the Japanese meaning ‘dwarf’.504   
 
 
Figure 3.8: The small port in Bandon where the Japanese landed on 8 December 1941 
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504	Nikoon Chuleetham (Li Patpoon). Interview, 9 September 2015. Li, a third-generation Chinese, is the 
guardian and spirit medium of the Hainanese Temple of Pak Kradae. 	
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Figure 3.9: Pamphlets of the Japanese were given to people once they landed in the Southern Peninsula 
on 8 December 1941 to induce them not resist. Words on this pamphlet read, “The Thai and Japanese 
armies, which would drive out the British for peace in Asia, were impending. Thai people! Attack (the 
British) for the nation!”505 
 
 
After the preparations to resist the Japanese troops, the superintendent and deputy 
superintendent of the police station, together with the headmaster of Suratthani School, 
patrolled the city to monitor the situation.506 They met with Japanese who had just landed 
at the small port (Figure 3.8) in front of Kobkhan Naruemit Market, owned by a Hokkien, 
and walked from the Chinatown towards the City Hall to negotiate with Thai officers.507 
The Japanese also gave pamphlets to people to induce them not resist to the Japanese 
invasion (see Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10). Ijiro Nakagawa (1887-1977), a Japanese 
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translator, informed them that the Thai government had already agreed to Japanese 
passage through the country and the Japanese army would head to Bandon’s airfield, 
where there was a community of Hakka farmers.508 The superintendent objected on the 
grounds that he had not received any order from the government. Not long after the 
meeting, the Japanese started firing at him while he and his group were walking back to 
the area of resistance about only 200 metres away, and prepared for an encounter with the 
Japanese. The two sides started fighting at around 8.45 a.m.509  
 
 
Figure 3.10: Another pamphlet reads, “The Japanese troops who want to help Thailand have just 
arrived. Let Japan and Thailand collaborate to fight against England to get the lost territories back.”510 
 
Ijiro Nakagawa was a Japanese merchant who had been settled in Surat Thani for 
many years. Before settling down in the downtown and opening a shop called Nakagawa 
Yoko (中川洋行), selling ceramics, glassware and ironware, he owned a fabric shop in 
Chaiya’s market, where he married Sali Kanthawa, a daughter of Khun Phisanbannawet, 
a chief district officer of Chaiya.511 Being a translator of the Japanese troops and walking 
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510 This figure was from NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12. 
511	Nganphairot, หลายเรื(องเมอืงสรุาษฎรฯ์, 10-11.  
	 180	
with them that day, he was accused of being a Japanese spy and soldier by many 
people. 512  According to his daughter’s account, Saranya Yankitti, a daughter of 
Nakagawa, informed that her father was not a soldier but a merchant who was asked to be 
a translator to negotiate with the Thai officers while the Japanese were walking through 
his shop in the market.513 However, he was only mentioned in the Thai document as a 
“translator”. Moreover, he was not the only Japanese in the city. S.V. Mako, another 
Japanese, had also opened a store – a photo studio – in Bandon.  
 
In Thailand, most Chinese migrants stayed together in their communities, where 
they established a Chinatown. Apart from building their own temples and native-place 
associations, some of them built markets, shops and houses in Chinatown. Most of the 
Chinese communities, therefore, had become downtowns or centres of many provinces in 
Thailand. To secure the airfield in Bandon and the major train station in Phun Phin, the 
Japanese had to negotiate with the provincial governor first. Instead of going directly to 
the City Hall or train station, they had chosen to go through Bandon’s Chinatown. As the 
fight happened in the centre of the Chinese communities, there was no doubt that the 
Japanese invasion had a greater effect on the Chinese citizens than on the local people.  
 
Bandon was important because it was the district capital of Surat Thani, where the 
City Hall and other official places were located in the city. However, the majority of the 
population in Bandon’s downtown was Chinese. As Chalo Charuchinda, the governor 
from 1942-1943, wrote, “Bandon is the centre of this province and a large number of 
aliens are settled there. I could almost say it is Chinatown and it is not an ordinary 
Chinatown. They (the Chinese) have considerable influence and we always have 
observed their movements and suppressed them.”514 
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513 Ibid., 30. 	
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Charuchinda, the provincial governor, to the Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Education, letter 
dated 8/01/1943, 19. 	
	 181	
Table 3.2 Casualties in the resistance against the Japanese invasion 
                                   on 8 December 1941 in the Southern Peninsula515  
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Compared to other provinces such as Prachuap Khiri Khan and Chumphon, the 
number of Japanese soldiers who had arrived in Bandon was greater.518 The Japanese had 
superior firearms including rifles, machine guns, and hand grenades. This explains why 
the death toll in Surat Thani was higher than in other provinces (see Table 3.2). At 3 p.m., 
the Thai side, therefore, gradually retreated. Fighting valiantly against the enemy, the 
officers received a telegraph at 4 p.m. from the Commanding Officer of the 6th Military 
ordering them to halt their resistance. Nevertheless, Police Captain Charung Sawettanan, 
the Commander of Amphoe Chaiya Police Station, who was on duty at Bandon, together 
with the Deputy Govenor, represented the Thai side to negotiate a ceasefire with the 
Japanese military commander in the Chinatown area. The encounter was completely 
ended after the provincial governor went to negotiate with the Japanese himself at 6.30 
p.m.519  
 
According to Table 3.2, the number of casualties in Surat Thani was the highest 
from all the provinces. Most of the deaths and injuries were made up of civilians. As 
mentioned above, the number of Japanese soldiers who had arrived in Bandon was higher 
than for other provinces and they had superior firearms. In addition, the high civilian toll 
                                                
515 This table was based on information from NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12, 3-91. 	
516 The number of injuries was unknown but people were reported with petty injuries. 	
517 Teachers and scouts are included in this category. 	
518 NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12, 65. 	
519 Ibid., 16-17.  
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could be attributed to the fact that the resistance against the Japanese happened in the 
densely populated downtown. As the fight happened in Chinatown and they were 
shooting on the side of the road, it can be assumed that the majority of the civilian deaths 
and injuries were Chinese.520 Even Chinese rickshaws participated in the fighting.521 
 
                           
Figures 3.11 and 3.12: Kobkun Saetang and her children522 
 
During the resistance by the police and the public, a national heroine emerged, 
namely Kobkun Saetang, from Ban Na San. She had courageously helped transport 
ammunition and food to the police while some senior government officers had fled the 
town when they heard in the morning that the Japanese were heading towards Bandon 
Bay.523 Kobkun Saetang (陳, 1921-1998), was a local-born Chinese whose family had 
settled in front of Wat Phra Yok, a temple in Chinatown (see Figure 3.11 and Figure 
3.12).524 Her father, Tang Engchiang, was a Teochew who had married Amorn Binnai, a 
Siamese woman.525 At the age of 20, she was a waitress at Khun Paen Restaurant, owned 
by her aunt and located close to City Hall. On her way from home to the restaurant, she 
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heard many people shouting that the Japanese were about to invade Bandon and the 
police asked people to volunteer to fight against the enemy. She quickly headed to the 
police station to volunteer for a gun in order to fight the Japanese. At the police station, 
she was the only woman from Chinese and Thai civilians who were waiting for the police 
to teach them how to use the gun. As the only woman, she then volunteered to transport 
ammunition and food to the police and other volunteers on the front line. While the police 
and volunteers were shooting at the Japanese soldiers, Kobkun did her best by running to 
transport the ammunition to them and many police and volunteers remembered her 
bravery.526  
 
Apart from the police, teachers and scouts were also involved in the resistance 
against the Japanese. Lamyong Wisuppakan, a Thai teacher, led his students from 
Suratthani School to participate in the Constitution Day held at the City Hall. On that day, 
he asked Koi Anaui, a scout and his student, together with other scouts, to receive 
firearms at the police station to resist the Japanese. During the fight, at around 11 a.m., 
Koi Anaui was shot dead by the Japanese, as was Wisuppakan, who had run to help 
him.527 Koi Anaui was a local-born Chinese from Surat Thani and the fourth child of 
eight by An Aui (黃才, 1886-1966), who had migrated from Chaozhou and traded in 
Maluan, Phun Phin. An Aui married a Siamese woman. Later, he was elected to be a 
village headman of Maluan and changed his name to Chu Wongsuban. Koi Anaui had 
been influenced greatly by his Chinese father as he grew up as a Chinese son surrounded 
by Chinese culture.528   
 
In the case of the other provinces, they all had military camps. Therefore, the 
Japanese troops were confronted by Thai soldiers. For example, after landing in Prachuap 
Khiri Khan, the Japanese directly seized the police station and airfield.529 The 15th 
Artillery Battalion in Nakhon Si Thammarat was also attacked after the Japanese landed 
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527 Ibid., 18-19. 	
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in the province. There was less general panic and fear as the fighting was far from 
downtown.530 In Chumphon, the 38th Infantry Battalion was stationed in the capital 
district.531 In Pattani, the Japanese encountered resistance from the 42nd Infantry Battalion, 
with support from the police, government officers and general public.532 In Songkhla, 
there were few casualties because senior officers and people had fled before the Japanese 
arrived in Mueang Songkhla and Hat Yai, the huge Chinese communities in South Siam. 
However, they clashed with Thai soldiers stationed in Songkhla on their way to secure 
the train station in Hat Yai.533  
 
In sum, Chinese civilians in Surat Thani chose to fight against the Japanese when 
they landed in Bandon’s Chinatown on 8 December 1941. Some of them became national 
heroes and heroines, particularly Kobkun Saetang, who was praised by the government 
and had her Chinese surname officially changed to a Thai surname.  
 
 
V.        Conclusion  
 
The surge of Chinese nationalism and the anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese 
communities in Surat Thani and elsewhere in the South Seas had been brewing before 
1937. The Chinese actively responded to the Japanese aggression in their motherland 
through boycotts of Japanese products, an activity which caused severe damage to the 
Japanese economy. Some resorted to violence by attacking the Chinese who traded with 
the Japanese in order to make the boycott more efficient.  
 
In addition, the Chinese luminaries of Surat Thani also participated in Chinese 
national politics and the anti-Japanese movement in Siam. Liao Chiangsoon was placed 
in a high position in the Chinese community in Siam as he had received the royal title and 
had royal connections. He became involved in politics and built networks with other 
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leading Chinese in Bangkok. With his privilege of being favoured by King Vadjiravudh, 
he was asked by his friends to tell the King about the initiative to launch the CCC. Liao 
was also elected the ninth chairman of the CCC. Under him, the CCC provided a large 
sum of money to aid a natural disaster in China. Following his death, he not only left his 
business to Liao Jingsong, his son, but also his connections with leading Chinese in Siam, 
which influenced him to get involved in politics. Liao Jingsong and his friends met Seow 
Hoodseng, the leader of anti-Japanese movements. The Teochew Association was also 
founded by Liao and his friends as a vehicle to contribute to the Chinese war effort.  
 
Once the Japanese landed in Thailand in December 1941, Liao and his friends 
were arrested as they refused to collaborate with the Japanese army. In the meantime, 
Chinese people in Surat Thani chose to arm themselves to fight against the Japanese. 
Some of them became national heroes and heroines, particularly Kobkun Saetang, the 
only woman that joined in the armed resistance against the Japanese invasion. Her 
bravery was praised by the government and her Chinese surname was later changed to a 













‘Traitors or Opportunists?’: the Splits amongst the Chinese 




I.         Introduction 
 
The anti-Japanese sentiment amongst the Chinese in Surat Thani and elsewhere had been 
brewing for decades, even before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War (SSJW) 
in 1937. One of the most effective anti-Japanese activities was organised boycotts of 
Japanese products. When China was agitated by Japan, the boycott was used as a tool to 
express their patriotism. However, the Siamese government closely observed the boycotts 
and cracked down on violence because it was afraid that this kind of political activity 
would damage its national trade, so when the war between China and Japan broke out in 
1937 notable Chinese from Surat Thani, particularly Liao Jingsong and his family 
members, contributed to the Chinese war effort to a great extent. In 1938, Liao and his 
friends registered the Teochew Association as a vehicle for organising contributions to 
the Chinese war effort. Liao also served as a vice president of the fundraising committee. 
After the Japanese military seized Shantou in Guangdong province in 1939, Liao 
travelled across Surat Thani and other provinces in peninsular Thailand to raise funds for 
his ancestral homeland. When the Japanese invaded Thailand in December 1941, he and 
his brother were imprisoned for their anti-Japanese activities after they refused to 
cooperate with the Japanese. On 8 December 1941, the Japanese also landed in the 
downtown of Bandon, the capital district of Surat Thani, seen as the Chinatown of the 
region at the time given that the majority of the population was Chinese. Clashes broke 
out there between Japanese forces and the Chinese people, who identified culturally and 
politically with China. Zhan Kimha, the owner of a gun shop, provided guns and bullets 
to Chinese fighters. During the fight, Kobkun Saetang, bravely transported ammunition to 
the police and volunteers. Compared with other provinces, Surat Thani had the highest 
number of casualties, mostly civilians, because the number of the Japanese soldiers was 
higher than in other areas and the fight occurred in the built-up and heavily populated 
area of Chinatown.  
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On 8 December 1941, a few hours before the seizure of peninsular Thailand, the 
Japanese troops attacked Pearl Harbour, expanding the conflict previously contained to 
China and its smaller island neighbour. The attack marked the beginning of the Pacific 
War, which was partly due to Japanese resentment at the deadlock in the mainland and 
American economic sanctions imposed by the Roosevelt Administration.534 For the 
Chinese, residing in the Chinese diaspora elsewhere, including Surat Thani, the Pacific 
War was a protraction of the SSJW. The Chinese living in South East Asia, however, had 
not yet experienced the war directly or suffered occupation, although they contributed to 
the Chinese war effort by using various tools such as boycotts and fundraising campaigns 
to help the motherland after the beginning of the SSJW. An examination of the Chinese 
diaspora in the separate war time frame is indispensable to set the context of the research.  
 
Prior to the Pacific War, Thailand, which was the only independent state in South 
East Asia and dominated by European colonial powers, became the object of competition 
between Great Britain and Japan in the 1930s. The rivalry came to an end once the 
Japanese army landed in Thailand on 8 December 1941 and the government of 
Thailand’s Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram agreed to an alliance with Japan.535 With 
strong backing from the military, in 1938 Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram became the 
nation’s Prime Minister. Influenced by the global political trend towards fascism, and 
himself a personal admirer of Mussolini, Phibun swiftly eliminated his political rivals and 
consolidated power into a military dictatorship.536 Perhaps a shift that signalled a tragic 
fate for the Chinese in the country was that in 1939 the Field Marshal formally changed 
their host country’s name, Siam, to Thailand, revealing his interest in recovering control 
of the nation’s economy from the Chinese to ethnic Thais. Prior to 1939, multiple ethnic 
Chinese consciousnesses had gradually evolved into a united national Chinese 
consciousness and refused to assimilate with the local society, but they also got involved 
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in the Chinese national politics by boycotting Japanese merchandise in response to the 
Japanese agitation in their ancestral homeland.  
 
Under the Japanese occupation, the economic Thai-ification policies were 
strengthened and accompanied by a series of cultural mandates to endorse the Thai-
ification of the country. In 1942, the Phibun government issued a royal decree to reserve 
twenty-seven different occupations and professions for Thai nationals. During this period, 
the number of the Chinese applying for naturalisation was higher than those in the 
preceding period.537 Some Chinese also changed their Chinese nationality to Japanese 
instead of Thai for business purposes. This not only disturbed the Thai government, but 
also caused tensions amongst Chinese migrants, with Chinese who co-operated with the 
Japanese accused of being traitors during the last phase of the war.  
 
This chapter examines the Chinese splits during the Japanese occupation in Surat 
Thani. In southern provinces, including Surat Thani, Chinese merchants were reportedly 
divided into two groups: those who supported the Japanese and those who did not. 
Chinese patriots condemned the Chinese who collaborated with the Japanese as traitors. 
This chapter will also examine the Chinese community under the Japanese occupation. 
On 8 December 1941, the Chinese in Bandon chose to fight back and fighting broke out 
in the city. The Chinese were shocked to learn that the Thai government had chosen to 
co-operate with the Japanese. It is therefore interesting to investigate Chinese life in the 
wartime Chinese community. After this, the economic Thai-ification programme will be 
examined to see how the Chinese responded to the policies. Lastly, the political and 
cultural Thai-ification programme that the Phibun government introduced to motivate the 
Chinese to assimilate into Thai society will be investigated. The political Thai-ification 
policies had a considerable effect on Chinese identity and self-identification. The last 
section addresses three themes related to this: changing name, nationality, and women 
and clothing.  
 
                                                
537 G. William Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1957), 275-276. 	
	 189	
II.       The Chinese Diaspora under the Japanese Occupation 
 
During the first phase of the SSJW, anti-Japanese sentiment was mirrored in the Chinese 
diaspora, including in Surat Thani. When the Japanese troops landed in Bandon’s 
Chinatown in 1941, the local Chinese decided to fight back. However, the Thai 
government agreed to an alliance with Japan, sparking a state of panic within the Chinese 
community. This section aims to investigate the Chinese diaspora and the lives of the 
Chinese under the Japanese occupation.  
 
In December 1941, Japan launched coordinated attacks on Pearl Harbour, Hong 
Kong, Malaya, and the Philippines. In Hong Kong, the Japanese launched an assault on 8 
December, triumphantly occupying the island after the British surrender on 25 December 
1941. The Chinese also engaged in looting to vent their envy of the luxurious life led by 
foreign-born business men, the Taipans (大班). Some stripped the dead lying in the 
streets of their clothes to keep themselves warm. Throughout the celebration of the fall of 
Hong Kong, for three days Japanese soldiers stalked the streets, taking whatever they 
wanted from stores and conducting rapes of local women. The population of the Chinese 
residents was reduced by famine, repatriation, and escapees to about one-third of its pre-
invasion level.538 In Malaya, the Japanese landed in peninsular Thailand and northern 
Malaya on 8 December 1941, choosing to invade Singapore overland through Malaya.539 
During the invasion, the Chinese Mobilisation Committee was founded under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Tan Kah-kee in order to recruit Chinese volunteers to defend 
Malaya. Many of them were labourers on defence work, although a force of about 1,000, 
mostly Chinese communists, became a part of ‘Dalforce,’ or a newly-recruited group of 
Chinese volunteers in Singapore to resist the Japanese invasion.540 During the Japanese 
advance, not only the Japanese engaged in the looting and rioting, but also Chinese gangs. 
However, these Chinese looters and robbers were publicly executed as an example and 
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their heads showed on poles in the market areas and on bridges to prevent locals from 
rioting. The Chinese gangs of armed robbers indulged in mass rapes, albeit on a smaller 
scale than that of the Japanese soldiers. Soon after the Japanese triumphantly occupied 
Singapore, on 15 February 1942, the Chinese were seen as enemies. Many victims 
accused of operating against the Japanese were singled out by informers and executed. 
According to the evidence given at the war crimes trials in 1947, about 5,000 Chinese 
were executed. These Chinese fell into various categories: 1) those who were related to 
the China Relief Fund; 2) rich merchants who donated to the Relief Fund; 3) supporters 
of Tan Kah-kee; 4) newspapermen, school headmasters, and high-school students; 5) 
Hainanese, whom the Japanese considered as communists; 6) newcomers to Malaya 
whom the Japanese thought had left mainland China because they hated the Japanese; 7) 
men with tattoos whom the Japanese assumed were members of secret societies; 8) 
volunteers and members of ‘Dalforce’; and 9) pro-British government officers.541  
 
In Thailand, on the eve of the Japanese military attack, Phibun disappeared, 
leaving his cabinet unable to decide how to respond to the Japanese invasion. The 
Japanese troops faced opposition from soldiers, policemen, government officers and 
civilians, both Thai and Chinese, when their army landed in Surat Thani and the Southern 
peninsula on 8 December 1941. After dawn on that day, Phibun returned to Bangkok and 
permitted the passage of the Japanese troops through Thailand. The Japanese delegates 
demanded an alliance providing for military, political and economic co-operation 
between the two nations. Phibun finally agreed to the alliance on 10 December and the 
agreement was formally signed on 21 December.542 He was partly eager to salvage a 
degree of autonomy and desperate to enjoy any potential benefits should Japan emerge 
victorious from the war; therefore, he agreed to the alliance and allowed the Japanese full 
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use of Thai facilities.543 Later, on 25 January 1942, he also acceded to the Japanese 
demands to declare war on Britain and the United States.  
 
The day after the Japanese landed in Thailand, there were arrests of the Chinese 
suspected of being connected with anti-Japanese activities at the outbreak of the SSJW. A 
large number of important Chinese leaders in Thailand, including Liao Jingsong and his 
brother, Liao Hinpoh, were captured by the Japanese soldiers and imprisoned. Liao’s 
friends from the Teochew Association Faction met the same fate. The Japanese also 
stripped the Hainanese, the largest dialect group in Surat Thani and the second largest in 
Bangkok, of their top leadership. In December, the chairman of the Kengjiu Association (
瓊州會所) was also arrested by the Japanese. The other ethnic groups’ leadership was 
also weakened.544  
 
After the alliance with Japan was agreed by Phibun, the movements and activities 
of the Chinese in Surat Thani were more heavily observed by the local authorities. The 
Chinese who worked in the government sectors were also observed. For example, Mr. Soi 
Munggu, who had recently changed his surname to Mungwatthana, had worked as a clerk 
of the district education section in Bandon since April 1941. After the Japanese occupied 
Surat Thani for about a week, he was accused of being a Chinese spy due to the fact that 
his father had migrated from China and he was loyal to China because he always 
associated himself with the Chinese and utilised his position to publicly and privately 
help the Chinese community. The provincial governor, therefore, took the opportunity to 
suspend him on 20 December 1941 after he forgot to ask for a one-day leave of absence a 
few days prior to this despite the fact that there was no evidence that he was a spy. He 
was finally dismissed from the position on 1 April 1943 after a suspension of over a 
year.545  
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Figure 4.1: Chinatown gateway to Wat Sai Temple, recently built in the centre of Bandon’s Chinatown, 
portrays the role of the local temple in serving the Chinese. 
 
After a ceasefire between the Japanese army and the provincial governor of Surat 
Thani was negotiated at 6.30 p.m. on 8 December 1941, the Japanese soldiers resided in 
the pavilion at Wat Sai Temple (see Figure 4.1), located in the centre of Bandon’s 
Chinatown, location of the present-day Chinese Temple Night Market.546 At the same 
time, the local authorities utilised the building of Tao Ing School (陶英學校), which was 
closed by the Phibun government before the Japanese occupation, as a temporary city hall 
of Surat Thani after the former one was burned down during the Japanese invasion.547 
Additionally, the Japanese also established their military base in the rubber plantation of 
Liao Jingsong in Phun Phin, another district in Surat Thani. The possible reason why the 
Japanese preferred to use Chinese institutions such as Wat Sai Temple rather than Thai 
institutions was that they would not want to undermine the relationship between them and 
the local – Thai – people. At the same time, the Thai authorities used the building of the 
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Chinese school as the temporary hall instead of the Thai school either because the 
building was available or they would not want to trouble the Thai people.  
 
Despite the resistance of the Chinese civilians in Bandon’s Chinatown, the 
Japanese army did not treat people badly compared to those in the southernmost 
provinces of Songkhla, Pattani and Yala. This was due to the fact that there were senior 
government officials on hand who negotiated a ceasefire with the Japanese. At the 
beginning, the Japanese aimed at winning the support of the Chinese, so there were none 
of the kind of mass persecutions and even killings which happened in British Malaya. In 
Bangkok, shortly after the occupation, the Japanese Commander visited the chairmen of 
the leading Chinese associations. Additionally, he paid respect to the patron saint of the 
Baode Benevolent Society (報德善堂) and donated 1,000 baht.548  
 
Although there was no official record of the monetary loss in the occupied 
provinces in Thailand, the following examples portray the hardships caused by the 
Japanese invasion and occupation during the first phase of the Pacific War. In terms of 
the economic loss, Songkhla was the most adversely impacted province in peninsular 
Thailand. It was estimated by the Thai government that the loss ran into many million 
baht. After hearing that the Japanese army was approaching, Mueang Songkhla and Hat 
Yai’s Chinatowns were abandoned within a few hours. The Japanese thought that they 
had defeated Thailand; therefore, people were treated similarly to those from the defeated 
nation. The Japanese promptly seized people’s properties and occupied in government 
offices, shops, markets and civilian houses in the abandoned Chinatowns. The Japanese 
occupied every nook and cranny of the Chinatowns and every shop was closed, causing 
many Chinese to become impoverished overnight.549 In the case of Pattani, almost all 
people had fled the Chinatown before the Japanese invaded. Lim Kiam Tai Shop was 
plundered by the Japanese.550 Meng Xian Shop in Yala’s Chinatown was also robbed and 
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its major market was inhabited by the Japanese soldiers.551 Although, as noted, there was 
no official record of the total monetary loss in the occupied provinces, these few 
instances are examples of the degree of hardship suffered by many Chinese citizens 
during the Japanese invasion and occupation in the early stages of the Pacific War.  
 
On 14 December 1941, when the Thai government announced that people should 
fly the Thai flag together with the Japanese to show harmony, some Japanese regiments, 
Thai government officers and civilians paraded through Bandon’s Chinatown.552 In the 
case of Prachuap Khiri Khan, located in the northern part of the Malay Peninsula about 
366 km north of Surat Thani, the Japanese wanted to hoist the Japanese flag together with 
the Thai flag after the ceasefire was negotiated on 8 December. However, there was no 
senior government officer to raise the Thai flag. A merchant in Chinatown, presumably 
Chinese, was therefore told by the Japanese to represent the Thai side.553 On 18 February 
1942, three days after the surrender of Singapore, the three flags of Japan, Thailand and 
the Chinese flag of the government in Nanjing were also flown by the Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce (CCC) to celebrate this victory. This was a superficial display of co-
operation from the leaders of the Chinese community.554 When Phibun sent the Thai 
army and triumphantly occupied the Federated Shan States, an administrative division of 
the British Empire during British rule in Burma, after getting rid of the Nationalist 
Chinese forces of Chiang Kai-shek on 5 May 1942, the government encouraged people, 
including all aliens in Thailand, to fly the Thai flag to celebrate the victory. In order to 
observe feelings of foreigners, Phibun simultaneously ordered the Ministry of Interior to 
have officers of every province observe whether foreigners, including Japanese, German, 
Italian, Indian, Burmese, and Chinese nationals, followed Phibun’s instruction.555  
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Overall, the Chinese from almost all the Southern provinces followed the 
instruction, including Surat Thani, where only 573 of all 6,654 Chinese nationals did not 
follow the instruction. This was probably due to the fact that many Chinese from 
peninsular Thailand had been arrested and deported for anti-Japanese activities since the 
outbreak of the SSJW, so those remaining were possibly afraid that their lives would be 
disrupted if they did not obey Phibun’s instruction. In addition, the Japanese invaded and 
established their military bases in many Southern provinces, so the Chinese had to be 
active to any news in order to know what happened because the Thai authorities and the 
Japanese in particular observed their movements. Only three provinces, namely 
Songkhla, Phuket, and Nakhon Si Thammarat, where more than 50 per cent of the total 
number of Chinese nationals in Thailand at the time lived, did not obey Phibun.556 
 
On 8 December 1941, many Chinese in Surat Thani were in sudden panic after 
they learnt that Japanese troops were about to invade Bandon’s Chinatown. Aui 
Phonglian (黃蘭蓮), a Hainanese, visualised how her Chinese father, Huang Shanye (黃
善業), a Hainanese goldsmith who owned a gold shop, coped with the Japanese invasion, 
which happened when she was 12 years old. Although Huang was scared of the Japanese 
soldiers, he was more worried about his treasure. Therefore, he did not flee from 
Chinatown with other family members, but rather put his wares in jars and buried them 
deep in his house.557 Although a week had passed, Soi Munggu, a clerk of the district 
education section in Bandon and a local-born Chinese, reported that people in Bandon’s 
Chinatown were still in a panic. The economy, commerce and communication of the 
town were in crisis.558 Similar to many provinces in southern Thailand, most of the shops 
in Bandon closed their doors because the Chinese probably wanted to play the situation 
by ear. Rice, moreover, was in short supply in Ko Samui, one of the most important 
strongholds of the Hainanese diaspora (known as the world’s second Hainan Island) 
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because the shipment of goods from Bandon to Ko Samui came to a halt for more than a 
week.559  
 
After a ceasefire was negotiated and Phibun agreed to contract an alliance with 
Japan, panic was still widespread across peninsular Thailand due to the occupation. In 
order to deal with the panic, a government delegation was sent to visit the provinces 
which had been most affected by the Japanese army. Its aims were to demonstrate its 
policies and persuade the civilians to co-operate with the government in alliance with 
Japan. Interestingly, the government visited only the Chinatown of each province to 
persuade the merchants, presumably the Chinese, to reopen their shops.560 The delegation 
reached Surat Thani on 17 December 1941 and convened a meeting with the government 
officers in the province to instruct them on government policies. After visiting the 
Japanese soldiers at Wat Sai Temple, the government representatives met with the 
merchants, the luminaries and people of Bandon’s Chinatown in the afternoon at a theatre 
in the centre of the Chinese community. Around 1,000 people were persuaded to reopen 
their shops, stay calm and strictly follow the government’s instructions.561After almost all 
the Japanese soldiers had moved from Bandon to other places in late December, the 
situation returned to normal. The relocation of the Japanese troops will be discussed in 
the final section.562  
 
When the Japanese army took over its occupied territories in South East Asia, the 
Japanese soldiers used their Japanese military yen, sometimes dollars, the currency issued 
by the Japanese Military Authority, as a replacement for local currency. The Japanese 
military yen could not be used in Japan. In Surat Thani and other provinces in Southern 
Thailand, the Japanese soldiers also used their Japanese military yen and dollar once they 
had successfully occupied Thailand (see Figure 4.2). In Prachuap Khiri Khan, most of the 
merchants had to close their shops during the first week of the occupation for this reason, 
while in the Chinatowns of Mueang Songkhla and Hat Yai there were many different 
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types of banknote, including Indochinese, Hong Kong, Korean, Manchukuo, Chinese, 
and Japanese.563 The exchange rate between the military dollar and Thai baht was 1 to 
1.564 In Nakhon Si Thammarat, relations between the Japanese and local people were 
good; therefore, the exchange rate was 152 dollar to 100 baht. Later, in show of remorse, 
the Japanese soldiers stopped using the military banknote in this province after the people 
acted in a friendly way towards them.565 Similar to Bandon’s Chinatown, the Japanese 
utilised their banknote in the first place and later used Thai money to purchase goods. 
The Japanese here were quite generous compared to other provinces, despite the fact that 
they had encountered resistance from the local community during the invasion.566 The 
Japanese generosity towards people in Surat Thani possibly derived from the fact that the 
local people followed the Thai government instructions on 14 December 1941 to fly the 
Thai flag together with the Japanese flag as a show of harmony. In addition, there was 
also a parade of Japanese regiments, Thai government officers and civilians through 
Bandon’s Chinatown as mentioned previously. Therefore, the Japanese possibly saw the 
local population as good natured and affable towards them, similar to the situation in 
Nakhon Si Thammarat.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: A Japanese military note used by the Japanese soldiers in Southern Thailand567 
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The difference in the exchange rate led to trade in the Japanese military notes, 
particularly in Surat Thani and other places in peninsular Thailand, after the Japanese had 
occupied the country for almost a year. Among Chinese merchants, the exchange rate 
was 83.30 Japanese military dollar to 100 baht, which was high because there was a need 
for Chinese merchants to buy goods such as cars, bicycles, and tyres, bicycles, etc., on 
the border of Thailand and Malaya. Therefore, many southern Chinese earned a profit 
from purchasing Japanese military dollars in Bangkok and northern Thailand where there 
was a circulation of the military notes throughout 1942 at 1 to 1.568 
 
In Songkhla, the entire Chinese community was in a state of panic for almost a 
year. Although the delegation visited Mueang Songkhla and Hat Yai, these two cities had 
important Chinese communities in Thailand, on 21 December 1941. In November 1942, 
people prepared to migrate to nearby suburbs again as rumours about an impending 
occupation by Japanese troops were circulating around the cities. The provincial 
governor, consequently, arranged a meeting to tell people to remain calm and prepare to 
sell their products to the Japanese soldiers in the event that they came instead of being 
afraid of them. In Hat Yai, 1,000 people, including Thais, Chinese and Malays, attended a 
meeting to this effect, with the governor using a Chinese translator to translate his 
messages.569 This small point reflected the fact that the Chinese community during this 
period remained a distinct Chinese national community although the government had 
launched a number of Thai-ification policies before the Pacific War. 
 
In sum, the Chinese residing in Surat Thani experienced hardships under the 
Japanese occupation. The Japanese army resided in Wat Sai Temple, at the heart of 
Bandon’s Chinatown, while the local authorities especially observed the movements of 
the Chinese after Thailand’s alliance with Japan. Commerce and communication in the 
Chinese diaspora were paralysed for a while and the Chinese were still in a panic 
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although some time had passed since the invasion. The Chinese were able to solve the 
problem of Japanese military banknotes used by the Japanese, even profiting from the 
situation. They furthermore tried to be amiable with the invaders, as witnessed in the 




III.      Chinese Collaborators during the Pacific War  
 
Under the Japanese occupation, the Chinese community faced a dilemma. While many, 
such as Liao Jingsong and his friends, refused to collaborate with the Japanese, others 
chose to co-operate, and some were forced to. These collaborators were condemned by 
the patriotic Chinese as traitors. This led to splits amongst the Chinese in Surat Thani and 
elsewhere in Thailand. This section examines how the Chinese coped with the situation 
when they were faced with the dilemma of choosing between patriotic displays of non-
cooperation and/or resistance and working with the Japanese. It also investigates how 
these Chinese collaborators were seen in the eyes of other Chinese.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, while Liao Jingsong and his friends were 
imprisoned after they had refused to collaborate with the Japanese in the pursuit of the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, many leading Chinese were persuaded or forced 
to cooperate. Amongst them were Tan Siewmeng, the leader of the commercial attaché 
faction and the former chairman of the CCC, and Tia Langsing (張蘭臣), the chairman of 
the CCC.570 Both of them went into hiding from the Japanese for a while.571 Succumbing 
to pressure, Tia Langsing later agreed to co-operate with the Japanese by giving an 
opening speech on behalf of the CCC in support of the alliance between Thailand and 
Japan and to offer co-operation in building a New Order in East Asia.572 In January 1942, 
the Japanese also demanded they telegraph both the Nanjing government to support 
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Wang Jingwei (汪精衛, 1883-1944), the head of the Nanjing government, and to Chiang 
Kai-shek in Chungking to stop fighting against Japan and merge with the government in 
Nanjing. The messages were addressed in the name of the representatives of all Chinese 
civilians in Thailand, and hence they represented Surat Thani’s Chinese.573  
 
Later, the Japanese told these leading Chinese to meet again in 1942 by asking 
them to organise a fundraising campaign to help Japan, but they declined. However, they 
did negotiate to run a fundraising campaign for the Thai army instead. In 1943, these 
Chinese were also forced by Kenji Fujishima, an officer of the Embassy of Japan in 
Thailand, to be a partner in establishing a company that provided sea-going vessels for 
the Japanese army to transport rice and weapons to Malaya. Tan Siewmeng, in particular, 
was a generous benefactor, donating around 50,000 baht, while at the same time also co-
operating with other Chinese leaders to establish an anti-Japanese organisation and 
secretly supplied it with funds.574 In late 1942, the CCC was asked by the Japanese again 
to provide coolies to work on the railway being constructed from Banpong to the 
Burmese border. These Chinese leaders rejected but promised to do if the Thai 
government asked for help.575 Finally, the CCC was pressured by the Thai authorities in 
March 1943 to send Chinese labourers to work on this line.576 Tan Siewmeng, now the 
chairman of the CCC, was unable to decline. 
 
When there was a need for additional labour in June, another 13,000 Chinese 
workers were recruited by the CCC, provincial governors and Chinese merchants in the 
provinces in July and August. 577  Cantonese from Bandon’s Chinatown were also 
recruited to construct the railway. The majority of the Cantonese in Bandon worked as 
building contractors, carpenters and woodworkers.578 One of the most well-known and 
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leading Cantonese families was the family of Huang Zuguang (黃祖光). Huang migrated 
from Guangdong to Bangkok in the early twentieth century. He was a carpenter in 
Bangkok and moved to Bandon’s Chinatown during the pioneering era of Bandon. As the 
town was growing, Huang, together with his Cantonese friends, received many building 
contracts to build townhouses and official places such as a police station in 
Kanchanadit.579 In addition, the Cantonese in Bandon privately worked for the Japanese 
in some construction projects such as a Japanese port and fixing a railway line in Surat 
Thani.580 Similar to Surat Thani, the Japanese also hired Chinese construction companies 
to provide Chinese and Thai coolies to work on building projects. For example, a Chinese 
from Namthai Company in Bangkok recruited Chinese coolies to split stone in 
Kanchanaburi.581  
 
In 1943, amongst the Chinese in Thailand there was a conflict. Some Chinese 
nationals in the country changed their Chinese nationality to Japanese instead of Thai for 
business purposes, which alarmed the Phibun government.582 Some of these Chinese used 
their Japanese nationality to arrogate to themselves the power to indulge in illegal 
activities. Other Chinese did not want to change their nationality to Japanese because 
they were afraid that they would not be allowed to return to China.583 In southern 
Thailand, including Surat Thani, the Chinese merchants split into two groups. There was 
a conflict between those who supported the Japanese and those who did not. According to 
a Thai officer, “There are lots of Chinese Taiwan or Chinese who flatter the Japanese for 
benefit.”584 It was possible that those mainlanders who worked for the Japanese were 
called “Taiwan” because Taiwan was under Japanese rule at that period and some 
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Taiwanese identified politically with the Japanese. It also referred to the Taiwanese who 
were in Thailand during the wartime period.   
 
The Taiwanese had migrated to Siam to trade around 1882. They pioneered a 
Taiwanese tea market. When many Taiwanese came to Siam, they realised that there was 
an urgent need to establish the Taiwanese Association, and from 1935, they temporarily 
used Mida Company (美達行) as a base.585 There are two possible reasons why the 
Taiwanese established their association late although they had been settled in Siam for 
more than 50 years. Firstly, before Taiwan fell under Japanese rule in 1895 following 
China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, the Taiwanese in Thailand would 
associate themselves with Fujian province rather than Taiwan. They saw themselves as 
Hokkiens because it became a part of Fujian province after Taiwan was integrated into 
China in 1683 (see Chapter Three). In 1887, Taiwan became an independent province, 
but its governor still had to report to the governor in Fujian province. Therefore, 
politically, Taiwan was still linked together with Fujian. Secondly, as the Taiwanese 
identity was not strong enough, the Taiwanese in Siam would need to find support from 
the Hokkien Association. However, in 1935, the year that the Taiwanese Association was 
founded in Siam, Taiwan had been under Japanese rule for 40 years. This lengthy period 
of time suggests two things. Firstly, Taiwanese identity had become stronger, as Taiwan 
had been separated from Fujian for a long time. Secondly, it would be a part of the 
Japanese government plan. The Taiwanese merchants would work together with the 
Japanese to promote a Japanese friendly pan-Asian identity. During the wartime period, 
some Taiwanese preferred to use their Japanese identity while staying in Thailand, as 
could be seen from the case of a Taiwanese called Chonsan in Chonburi, a province in 
Central Thailand, who preferred to identify himself with the Japanese and adopted a 
Japanese name.586 However, the number of the Taiwanese in Thailand was very small 
compared to those major five dialect groups. 
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After the Allied forces had successfully invaded Italy on 3 September 1943, the 
Italian government agreed to surrender to the Allies. The Chinese, who identified 
politically with the Chungking government, circulated this news across the country 
throughout September. The Thai authorities, therefore, in particular observed the 
movements of the Chinese.587 As the war started to go unfavourably for the Axis in 
Europe, there were many Chinese underground organisations operating against the 
Japanese in Bangkok and Southern Thailand. Therefore, the Kempeitai, the Japanese 
military police, who wore plain clothes Chinese trousers and a suit, were deployed to 
observe the anti-Japanese activities.588 From September to October 1943, thirty Chinese 
and local-born Chinese were captured by the Kempeitai. Of these, thirteen were arrested 
in Bangkok, followed by ten and seven in Hat Yai and Trang respectively.589 The capture 
was due to the fact that after the Japanese cracked down on the head office of a secret 
society in Shanghai in 1943, Shanghai communists were implicated in a relationship with 
Chinese merchants in Siam. Members of this secret society were interrogated by the 
Japanese and they disclosed that many other members went to British Malaya and 
contacted with Chinese merchants in Bangkok and Southern Thailand. Therefore, these 
Chinese merchants in Siam, who contacted with these Shanghai communists, were 
arrested and tortured by the Kempeitai. In the meantime, the Japanese simultaneously put 
many Chinese who had participated in the anti-Japanese activities prior to the Japanese 
occupation in Thailand into prison in order to prevent future resistance.590 In Surat Thani, 
Ngao Sengpu (吳清芙), a local-born Chinese of Hainanese descent in Tha Chana, born in 
1933, recalled that during the Japanese occupation there were a lot of the Japanese at Tha 
Chana’s train station and he went to sell watermelons to them. However, when he was 
around 10, his father and his Chinese brother, Ngao Sengwa, had escaped to a forest with 
the Japanese were heading towards his house because his brother had circulated the secret 
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news in late 1943 about the impending defeat of the Japanese and was accused by the 
Japanese of being a Chinese spy.591  
 
The military alliance between Thailand and Japan started to cause problems after 
the Phibun authorities did not gain the benefits of the relations between the two countries 
they had expected. As pledged in the treaty’s secret protocol, Phibun was interested in 
expanding the country’s territory, but the Japanese later withheld his plan and relations 
therefore decreased promptly.592 As a result, when the Chinese government in Nanjing 
proposed that diplomatic representatives of ambassadorial rank be exchanged with 
Thailand after the government of Nanjing was formally recognised by Thailand on 7 July 
1942, Phibun accepted the proposal due to his strategy that the two countries would co-
operate to work against Japan in the future.593 In the meantime, as the food situation in 
China was getting desperate. Nanjing wanted to establish diplomatic relations with 
Thailand as soon as possible to solve this problem by importing rice.594  
 
The Thai authorities believed that Wang Jingwei and his supporters, together with 
other Chinese collaborators in Thailand, did not wholeheartedly support the Japanese as 
they had pretended.595 This suspicion was confirmed by the revelation of the Chinese 
Ambassador to Japan that the Chinese in Nanjing hated the Japanese, as did Chinese 
students in Japan.596 While his government was condemned as a treacherous by the 
Chungking government, he thought that his way of dealing with the Japanese would bring 
China prosperity. Moreover, he noted that, “If the Chungking government is able to unite 
with us, Wang Jingwei and I are always ready to resign our posts and allow Chiang Kai-
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shek to be the leader, but he must pursue the policy of Wang Jingwei that China has to 
befriend the Japanese first.”597 
 
At the same time, the status of Chinese residents in Thailand remained a major 
obstacle in the path of the establishment of Sino-Thai relations. The Thai authorities then 
delayed the exchange of diplomatic representatives due to the fact that they wanted to 
settle this matter first.598 A draft of notes was sent to the Chinese on August 1942, the gist 
of which was to have the Chinese officially accept that they would not touch the status of 
Chinese people in Thailand. However, Nanjing rejected the proposal and insisted on 
looking after the interest of Chinese people in Thailand.599 On the other hand, the failure 
of the diplomatic exchange met the Japanese need to actually want to see their 
ambassadors second to none in Thailand or even across the whole Co-prosperity 
Sphere.600 The Japanese were also afraid that the Chinese would foster solidarity amongst 
the Chinese in Thailand.601 Although the Japanese mostly hired the Chinese as reporters 
to serve their propaganda, they still distrusted them, as Asada, a Japanese officer of the 
Japanese Embassy in Bangkok, pointed out: “the Chinese are still the Chinese,” who it is 
expected will protect their own benefits and help their compatriots.602     
 
Wang Jingwei is an extraordinarily complicated character in the history of 
modern China. In his youth, he was a more eminent nationalist and revolutionary than 
either Mao Zedong or Chiang Kai-shek. He was even second in command to Sun Yat-sen. 
However, Wang became a ‘traitor’ against the Chinese people during the war against 
Japan.603 The descriptions of him often differ. Hwang Dongyoun summarised different 
views of scholars towards Wang in his paper, “Some Reflections on Wang Jingwei’s 
Collaboration.” He wrote that Chinese scholars uniformly characterised him as a traitor. 
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For example, Cai Dejin, a Chinese scholar, tried to reveal his ‘bourgeois nature,’ an 
evaluation based on nationalistic emotion. Poshek Fu proposed that Wang’s collaboration 
with Japan was moral guilt. American scholars, such as John H. Boyle, wrote that Wang 
was a ‘collaborator,’ a term which had a broad scale of meaning, and provided an 
example of the story of Aung San of Burma, another collaborator with Japan who was 
widely accepted as a hero, not a traitor, in his homeland. Hwang concluded that Wang 
should be understood as a historical figure, rather than be judged as “a villain in a 
morality play”. Moreover, he proposed that Wang’s collaboration meant saving China 
from the leadership of Chiang’s Nationalist Government, which had failed to preserve 
territories and protect people, and the dangerous influence of the CCP, which he believed 
would lead his nation to inevitable extinction.604 
 
Lily Chang argued that rigid orthodoxies dominated Chinese-language 
scholarship on the subject of collaboration, leading to China’s official narrative of the 
war as one of Japanese aggression and Chinese resistance. Collaborationist activities 
were filled with not only political implications but also moral ones. Thus, how 
collaborationist activities could have served as a reasonable alternative to patriotism, or 
how a person could collaborate with the Japanese while keeping one’s Chinese identity, 
is not easy for many Chinese to understand because it opposes the dominant historical 
narrative of the war. In contrast, the subject of collaboration is not a new concept for 
historians of Europe.605 
 
Timothy Brook, in his essay “Hesitating before the Judgment of History,” 
researched the 1946 trial of Liang Hongzhi (梁鴻志), China’s first head of state under the 
Japanese and Wang’s predecessor in the Nanjing regime. Brook proposes that the 
historian’s job is not to create moral knowledge and render judgment, but to use the 
wisdom of hesitation. Hesitation is important for understanding that the moral 
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circumstances as people understand them were different from the circumstances in which 
historical figures understood themselves to be embedded. In his trial in Shanghai on 5 
June 1946, Liang said that his collaboration could be regarded as resistance by other 
means. Throughout the two years of his government, he did everything to relieve the 
plight of war victims and hobble the Japanese. He also insisted that he made secret 
reports on the situation of the Japanese to Chungking. However, in November, Liang was 
executed for treason.606 It seems appropriate to agree with Hwang and Brook that Wang 
and other collaborators should be understood as historical actors and not be judged with 
the benefit of a hindsight devoid of concrete context in which they operated. Under the 
Japanese occupation, the Chinese were confronted with a dilemma. Wang Jingwei and 
Tan Siewmeng collaborated with the Japanese because they were compelled to. Their 
collaboration was superficial and they all shared the same anti-Japanese sentiments that 
other patriotic Chinese held.  
 
As Japan had suffered constant defeats by the end of 1943, Phibun contacted the 
Chungking regime to broker relations with Britain and the US in January 1944. However, 
the plan was unsuccessful. Another example of his conciliatory gestures to the Chinese 
was that he had permitted the Thai-Chinese Business Newspaper (泰華商報) to operate 
in 1943.607 The new Chinese newspaper was Thai-owned, but it was supported by Free 
Thai leaders and hired many Chinese newspapermen who were anti-Japanese. 608 
However, its content was pro-Japanese, similar to the Chinese Daily News (中原報), 
another Chinese newspaper that was taken over by the Japanese and served as a 
propaganda organ. This was possibly due to the fact that the Japanese often went to the 
office of the Thai-Chinese Business Newspaper in order to threaten the Chinese 
newspapermen.609   
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Phibun’s change of heart could not wash away the feelings of resentment towards 
him in the Chinese community. To observe the movements and feelings of the Chinese 
residents in Thailand, the Thai authorities therefore investigated the newspaper headlines 
of these two printing presses, together with Bangkok Nippo, a Japanese newspaper, 
during May to September 1944. 610  Unable to refuse, the Thai-Chinese Business 
Newspaper had to publish false news and untrue articles supporting the Japanese and 
implanting anti-Chungking sentiments that were “in a strong contrast to the genuine 
feelings of the Chinese”.611 
 
In brief, under the Japanese occupation the Chinese were faced with a difficult 
dilemma. While Liao Jingsong refused to co-operate with the Japanese, many leading 
Chinese in Thailand, such as Tan Siewmeng and Wang Jingwei, the head of the Nanjing 
government, co-operated with the Japanese because they were forced to. Therefore, the 
co-operation was superficial. The Cantonese people from Surat Thani were also recruited 
to construct a railway and some of them worked for the Japanese in construction projects. 
Patriotic Chinese condemned these collaborators as traitors, so the Chinese split into two 




IV.      The Economic Thai-ification Programme  
 
Over the course of the early twentieth century, the Chinese in Siam participated in 
Chinese national politics and reacted to the Japanese agitation in the mainland by 
boycotting Japanese goods that threatened the Siamese economy. At the same time, Thai 
leaders started to realise that most of their country’s economy was controlled by the 
Chinese. When Phibun came to power in 1938, the programme of economic Thai-
ification was launched to overturn the economic domination of Siam by the Chinese. The 
Phibun government strengthened the programme during the Japanese occupation. This 
                                                
610  NAT, (2) MFA 7.1/59 ขอ้ความแปลจากหนังสอืพมิพจ์นี (ไดร้ับจากกรมโฆษณาการ) (The content 
translated from Chinese newspapers). Document dated 9/08/1944 to 3/10/1944, 1-246. 	
611 Ibid., 19-20. 	
	 209	
section investigates the Chinese hardships and their reactions towards the economic Thai-
ification programme in Surat Thani during the Pacific War. 
  
To see clearly the picture of the difficult lives for the Chinese during the wartime 
Chinatown in Surat Thani, it is vital to sketch a brief history of the position of the 
Chinese prior to 1938. Their position in Siam was strong in 1938 with nearly 90 per cent 
of commerce in the hands of the Chinese owing to their superior commercial ability, 
industriousness, and networks throughout South East Asia. As the Chinese refused to 
assimilate into Siamese society, their Chinatowns had remained “distinct national 
communities in every Siamese town of any size, even down to the second and third 
generations,” although the law in 1913 forced any child born in Siam to become a 
Siamese subject automatically.612 
 
The position of the Chinese in the economy of Siam was very strong, so they had 
enjoyed the lion’s share of national income. From 1910 to 1938, the four major products 
of Siam were rice, timber, tin and rubber, accounting for 85 to 90 per cent of total exports. 
Excluding timber, these goods were predominantly controlled by the Chinese at all levels. 
Other major food products, such as pork, fish, vegetables, and sugar were mostly 
produced and marketed by the Chinese. Following the Siamese revolution of 1932, one of 
the major policies of the Peoples’ Party, the first political party in Siam, was to resolve 
the unemployment problem of Thai people because the majority of nonagricultural labour 
was also done by Chinese. Therefore, a law was regulated in 1935 to have rice mills hire 
at least 50 per cent Thai workers and prohibit aliens from taxi driving from the following 
year. Furthermore, the Chinese even controlled shop-keeping and interregional trade in 
rural areas.613 Additionally, the situation of the trade in rural areas was resented by the 
Siamese authorities. Long-range economic planning was introduced to encourage young 
Thai to know how to enter trade; therefore, vocational, and commercial training was 
emphasised.614 Similar to other provinces, an agricultural school was also established in 
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Surat Thani during 1930s.615 However, many economic Thai-ification policies which 
were launched against the Chinese before 1938, had little effect on the Chinese 
position.616  
 
In December 1938, Phibun, an advocate of hyper-nationalism, had become the 
Prime Minister and changed the country’s name from Siam to Thailand in June 1939 in 
order to define specifically that it was a country of ethnic Thai people.617 This move was 
symbolic of his longer-term aim of diminishing Chinese control of the economy. Under 
his leadership, a strong sense of Thai nationalism emerged. Phibun had a hatred for the 
Chinese influence over their country’s economy.618 To promote nationalistic feelings 
amongst children in February 1939, students of every school had to attend the Thai 
national flag raising ceremony each morning and they also had to sing while the flag was 
raising.619 This practice was emphasised in the meeting of education officers and teachers 
in Surat Thani, when a senior government officer from the Ministry of Education visited 
many districts in Surat Thani in August 1940.620  
 
In January 1939, another law was implemented to reserve bird’s nest concessions 
for government development.621 This affected the family business of Liao Jingsong, 
whose father had the largest monopoly of the bird’s nest industry in Siam and established 
himself in Bandon, the capital of his bird’s nest empire. However, Liao specially 
provided his motorboat to pick Phibun up from the train station in Phun Phin to Bandon 
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when Phibun’s committee visited Surat Thani in May 1940. People in Bandon, including 
Chinese merchants, warmly greeted him despite the fact that many policies against the 
Chinese were promulgated throughout 1939. The objective of his visit was to inspect 
Bandon’s Chinatown. At the same time, he also went to a nearby Thai community to 
examine the occupations of Thai people.622 It goes without saying that the information 
collected during this tour would contribute to the economic Thai-ification programme to 
improve economic conditions for the Thai people as opposed to the Chinese.  
 
Another move in the economic Thai-ification campaign was the Revenue Code on 
March 1939, which aimed to increase the income of the government. It had an effect on 
many Chinese communities in Surat Thani. The merchant class was taxed heavily, and 
fees for gambling and opium-den licences were increased.623 The Chinese in Surat Thani 
and elsewhere in Siam had enjoyed a card game, the most popular form of gambling, 
during the Chinese New Year. Moreover, the Thai authorities limited licences and areas 
where gambling occurred because they were afraid that Thai people would become 
addicted to gambling. The Chinese residents in Surat Thani were also fond of playing 
poker, with one observer noting in August 1936 that “This kind of gambling is popular 
amongst the Chinese while almost all Thai people do not know how to play…”624. As a 
result, only big Chinatowns such as Bandon, Phun Phin, and Ko Samui were permitted to 
grant the licence, although its number was allowed to exceed this limit during Chinese 
festivals throughout the year.625 At the same time, those Chinese who were granted 
licences, were encouraged to donate money to be used for public spending in the 
province, for example, by Phra Boriboonwutthirat, the provincial governor of Surat Thani, 
in 1936.  
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One of the indispensable laws, which was passed in March 1939, was the Act for 
the Slaughter of Animals for Food, intending to replace Chinese by Thais as pig 
slaughterers and pork wholesalers. For the first time in history, the Thai people started to 
slaughter and butcher pork in November 1939 under the provisions of the Act.626 Due to 
their Buddhist beliefs, Thais avoided any work connected with killing animals. Therefore, 
the Chinese ran the pork and poultry industry in the country and controlled prices.627 This 
belief was reflected in a mural painting at Phattanaram Temple in Bandon’s Chinatown, 
which was built by Phat Phatthanapong, whose Chinese surname was Lao (劉) (1862-
1942), a descendant of Teochew migrant and a well-known abbot in South Siam (see 
Figure 4.3). This led to difficulties experienced by the government during the Pacific War 
because Thais still refused to sell pigs and the Chinese were still controlling the trade.628 
 
 
Figure 4.3: A mural painting at Phattanaram Temple in Bandon depicts the Buddha refusing to receive 
a pork dish offered by the son of a Chinese migrant and telling him to bury it.  
 
In 1939, the Thai authorities not only encouraged the Thais to slaughter pig, but 
they also encouraged local people to do edible gardening and raise chickens in their own 
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house gardens for consumption as preparation for possible food shortages in the future 
due to the outbreak of war in Europe. It was also aimed at getting Thais to stop buying 
poultry and vegetables from the Chinese, who controlled these industries. To set a good 
example for people, government officials, teachers, and students were told to obey the 
government instruction first. The command was sent to Surat Thani in September. The 
following month, vegetable seeds were dispatched to every district in each province 
throughout Thailand, except the market areas.629 This confirms the belief that this policy 
operated against the Chinese, owing to the fact that most of the Chinese stayed together 
in the market areas in every town of any size. Shortly before the war, on 18 August 1941, 
the director-general of the Ministry of Interior also visited Surat Thani to inspect the 
progress of this policy and check on improvements in the economic conditions of Thai 
people.630 
 
Phibun consolidated this policy when he agreed to contract an alliance with Japan 
on December 1941. Afraid that there would be acute food crises and rising food prices 
because many provinces including Surat Thani were occupied by Japanese troops, Phibun 
commanded within a month that everyone had to become more serious about edible 
gardening and raising animals for meat.631 The rice price crisis was normally caused by 
the Japanese, who bought rice from unscrupulous merchants irrespective of high prices. 
Thus, the Thai authorities strengthened the policy again when the Japanese increased the 
number of soldiers deployed in the southern provinces, including Surat Thani, in 1943.632 
Phibun not only commanded people and government officials throughout the country to 
                                                
629	NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.1/2 เลขาธกิารคณะรัฐมนตรตีั 2งกรรมการสง่เสรมิการทําสวนครัวและเลี2ยงสตัว ์ (The 
Secretary-General to the Cabinet established a committee to encourage people to do edible gardening and 
raise meat animals). Document dated 25/07/1939 to 22/01/1939, 3-53. 
630 NAT, MOI 2.2.5/854 คณะกรมการจังหวดัสรุาษฎรธ์านรีายงานเรื(องอธบิดกีรมมหาดไทยไปตรวจราชการ 
ที#จังหวดัสรุาษฎรธ์าน ี(The director-general of the Ministry of Interior visited Surat Thani). Document dated 
1941.  
631  NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.2/3 ขอความรว่มมอืสง่เสรมิไหร้าสดรหรอืองคก์ารตา่งๆชว่ยปลกูผักไหม้ปีรมิาน 
เพิ$มขึ(น (Asking for a co-operation to encourage people and organisations to increase the amount of 
vegetable produce). Document dated 21/12/1941 to 28/12/1941.  
632	NAT, (2) MFA 7.1/39, 37. 	
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raise chicken, but also duck, pig, pigeon, frog, fish, river snail, rabbit, etc. In addition, 
Phibun threatened to punish those anyone who did not obey his command.633 
  
In 1943, the Japanese wanted to establish their second base in Ban Na San, a 
district in Surat Thani. They originally chose a Chinese community as the location. 
However, this alarmed the Chinese because they were afraid that their community would 
become a target of allied air strikes. Therefore, Ouan Surakun, the district officer of Ban 
Na San, acted as a middleman for the Chinese to inform the Japanese company 
commander that the Chinese would close their market and evacuate to other areas, 
leading to a lack of provisions for both Thais and Japanese. The negotiation was 
successful, as in the end the Japanese changed their base to a district that was four 
kilometres from the Chinese district.634 
 
Ban Na San was not only the capital of the tin mining industry in Surat Thani, but 
there were also many forests and rubber trees. Before the Pacific War started, Hakka tin 
miners from Penang not only dominated the tin industry in Ban Na San, but also the 
British and Japanese. However, after Phibun declared war on Britain and the US, the Thai 
government seized a British dredger. Phibun had the Mineral and Thai Rubber Company, 
a state-owned, carry out mining operations. This company also hired only Thai citizens as 
workers.635 In Ko Samui and Ko Phangan, strongholds of the Hainanese diaspora, the 
Thai government successfully started experimental mining with Thai labour in 1939.636  
 
Phibun’s policy was actually modelled on the previous work of Kaw Sim Bee (許
森美), a Chinese who was appointed governor of Phuket in 1902. Kaw Sim Bee 
encouraged people under his rule to do edible gardening and raise animals for meat, and 
                                                
633 NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.2/6 ขอความรว่มมอืขา้ราชการทําสวนครัวและเลี7ยงสตัว ์(Asking for a co-operation 
from government officers to do edible gardening and raise animals for meat). Document dated 13/08/1943, 
2. 	
634 Diary of Ouan Surakun, the district officer of Ban Na San in 1943. See Kiang Koetnasan, 77 
ปีบา้นนาสาร พทุธศกัราช ๒๔๘๒-พทุธศกัราช ๒๕๕๗ (77 years of Ban Na San from 1939 to 2016) (Surat 
Thani: Udomlap, 2017), 143-144.  
635 Ibid., 142. 	
636 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 264. 	
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he inspected progress regularly.637 Nevertheless, these activities were practiced in most of 
the Chinatowns in Siam for a long time despite the fact that the Chinese had limited space 
in their houses. Some of them made a fortune in the meat industry, particularly pork. This 
habit of the Chinese was reflected in Nirat Mueangphet, a poem by Sunthorn Phu (1786-
1855), the Shakespeare of Thailand, about his journey to Phetchaburi, describing the 
Chinese community that all Chinese in their houses sold pigs.638 
 
In Ko Samui, a centre of the Hainanese diaspora, chicken and pig breeds were 
also carried on junks when they migrated from Hainan. A Hainanese breed of domestic 
pig, widely known as Diamboo in Hainanese and Keephra in Thai, was commonly raised 
in coconut gardens. Furthermore, coconut residues were utilised as an ingredient to feed 
these pigs. Importantly, these animals were also very indispensable to rituals held in a 
Chinese community throughout the year. For example, to worship deities in the Chinese 
temple, pig heads, whole chickens, whole ducks, among other animals, were 
indispensable offerings during weddings and at Chinese New Year.639 Ko Samui was also 
designated as “the coconut island,” reflecting the agricultural produce. This industry was 
nevertheless controlled by the Hainanese. Even the Hainanese Guanwu Temple (蘇梅島
關帝神廟) in Hua Thanon had been established in the coconut garden around the market 
area of Na Khai’s Chinatown. Prince Bhanubandhu Vongsevoradej recorded in 1884 that 
a coconut garden and a store in this area were owned by Kim Yee, a Hainanese laoban 
(老闆), or boss. Moreover, other smaller gardens were owned by the Hainanese.640  
 
Another economic Thai-ification campaign was aimed at Chinese noodle hawkers. 
In 1942, Phibun persuaded people to eat noodles and every government official to sell 
                                                
637 NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.2/9 ขอความรว่มมอืไหข้า้ราชการทําสวนครัวและเลี9ยงสตัวเ์พื?อเป็นตวัอยา่งแก ่
ประชาชน (Asking for a co-operation from government officers to do edible gardening and raise animals for 
meat to set a good example for people). Document dated 27/05/1949 to 3/11/1949, 29-30.  
638	Santi Leksukhum, จติรกรรมไทยสมยัรัชกาลที0 ๓: ความคดิเปลี+ยน การแสดงออกกเ็ปลี'ยนตาม (Mural 
paintings in the era of King Rama III: the change of concept and expression) (Bangkok: Mueang Boran, 
2005), 253. 	
639	Pu Gui. Interview, 2 October 2015. Pu Gui is a guardian of Guan Yu Temple and Association of Hua 
Thanon, Ko Samui district. 	
640	Jittra Kornanthakiat, “Guanwu Temple at Na Khai Hua Thanon in Ko Samui: Part 1,” Nationweekend. 
The extract of this article was displayed at a museum at the Guanwu Temple in Hua Thanon.   
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noodles in order to attract Thais into this industry.641 His next move was to provide 
financial support to Thai civilians throughout the country to work as noodle hawkers. At 
the same time, a number of Thai people were trained to produce noodles and sell them 
together with beansprouts and other ingredients in each market to serve Thai hawkers. 
However, many hawkers preferred to buy noodles from the Chinese manufacturers, who 
were dumping their products at cheaper prices to compete with the Thais, brining Thai 
noodle production to a halt.642 
 
Whilst most Thai hawkers quit their job due to the fact that they were not skilled 
at carrying goods and wandering the streets selling their wares compared to the Chinese. 
Therefore, the Thai authorities especially invented noodle pushcarts for the Thais and 
started selling them to government officials in Surat Thani and elsewhere to set an 
example for Thai civilians.643 From 1943 to 1944, provincial governors throughout the 
country were commanded to select and train numbers of Thai civilians to produce 
noodles and other major ingredients such as tofu, soybean paste, fish sauce, etc. They 
were also taught to know how to enter trade.644 
 
To conclude, in 1938 the position of the Chinese in Siam was strong, controlling 
most of the country’s commerce and thus enjoying the bulk of the national income. After 
Phibun became Prime Minister in December 1938, he launched the economic Thai-
ification programme in order to eliminate the economic domination of the Chinese. The 
bird’s nest business of the Liao family was affected by the law of 1939 to reserve bird’s 
nest concessions for government development. In Ko Samui and Ko Phangan, the Thai 
government successfully began experimental mining with Thai labour. In 1939, the 
Revenue Code was introduced to increase the income of the government, taxing the 
                                                
641 NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.1/26 ใหเ้จา้หนา้ที*ของกระทรวงทบวงกรมตา่งๆ รว่มมอืในการขายกว๋ยเตี:ยว (Asking 
for the co-operation from government officers of each ministry to sell noodles). Document dated 
12/11/1942, 2. 	
642 	NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.1/32 การขายกว๋ยเตี+ยว (Noodle selling). Document dated 14/10/1943 to 
23/12/1943, 2-3, 8. 	
643 Ibid., 3, 8. 	
644  NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.1/28 สง่ระเบยีบการประชมุและอบรมสั4งสอนราสดรของกะซวงมหาดไทยมาไห ้
(Sending the meeting agenda of the Ministry of Interior on the people training). Document dated 3/06/1943 
to 21/03/1944, 3-6. 	
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merchant class heavily and increasing fees for gambling and opium-den licences. Phibun 
also wanted to replace the Chinese with Thais as pig slaughterers and pork wholesalers 
by introducing the Act for the Slaughter of Animals for Food. In addition, Phibun 
encouraged Thai people to engage in edible gardening and raising chickens in their house 
gardens for consumption in order to not only have people prepare for the possibility of 
food shortages, but also to have Thai people stop purchasing poultry and vegetables from 
the Chinese. After the Pacific War started, the economic Thai-ification programme was 
consolidated by the Thai government. Phibun was afraid that there would be acute food 
crises and rising food prices, as Surat Thani and many provinces were occupied by the 
Japanese troops. In 1942, Phibun also persuaded Thai people to sell noodles. However, 
the Chinese were still able to control some industries such as the meat and vegetables, as 
could be seen in the case of Ban Na San, where the Chinese successfully prevented the 
Japanese from establishing a military base in their community and thereby disrupting 
their trading activities.  
 
 
V.      The Political Thai-ification Programme  
 
The Phibun government did not only launch economic Thai-ification policies, but they 
also introduced many laws to motivate the Chinese to assimilate into Thai society. In 
1939, Phibun encouraged officials of Chinese descent to take a Thai name and surname. 
He also introduced naturalisation for the first time in history to encourage Chinese 
citizens to change their nationality to Thai. During the war, these political Thai-ification 
policies were strengthened due to the fact that the Chinese still remained Chinese citizens 
and refused to assimilate into Thai society. In addition, many policies were launched by 
Phibun that had an effect on the self-identification of the Chinese. This section aims to 
investigate these political Thai-ification policies. In order to discuss the political Thai-
ification programme properly, this section, however, comprises three major themes: 
changing name, nationality, and women and clothing.  
 
To better understand the practice of changing name from Chinese to Thai, it is 
important to appreciate the history of this practice, as it had existed before Phibun’s 
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policy in 1939, although in a very different form. The practice was influenced by 
Buddhist monks in Siam. As mentioned in Chapter Three, one of the well-known abbots 
in Surat Thani, who was widely revered by both Thai and Chinese people throughout 
Southern Siam, was Phat Phatthanapong (1862-1942), a local-born Chinese whose 
Chinese surname was Lao (see Figure 4.4). His father, Chun, had migrated from Shantou. 
When he was 25, Lao entered the priesthood at Wat Phrayok, a Thai temple in Bandon’s 
Chinatown, where he was educated by monks from a young age. During his priesthood, 
he was notable for spiritual enlightenment and invulnerability.645 In 1900, he founded 
Phatthanaram Temple in Bandon’s Chinatown, with considerable support from local 
people due to his reputation and service as the first abbot. Owing to the fact that he was 
Chinese, he preferred to adopt a Chinese surname, Kimchun, which was combined from 
his Teochew uncle and father’s names under the law in 1913 which stated that people in 
the country must have surnames. However, Phattharamunee, a Bandon citizen and a prior 
at Thong Nopphakhun Temple in Bangkok, instructed him to change his surname to Thai, 
Phatthanapong (博打那蓬).646 This practice was expanded to those Chinese who worked 
as teachers in Siamese temple schools located in the precinct of Thai temples. The 
Chinese teachers and workers were normally instructed to change their surnames by 
monks. Many monks who were the benefactors of the schools normally thought that the 
Chinese should change their names to Thai if they wanted to make a progress in 
government jobs, whilst others thought that the Chinese names were not melodious.647 
 
                                                
645 Santithammarangsri, ed., ๑๐๐ ปี วดัธรรมบชูา (100 years of Wat Tham Bucha) (Bangkok: Thammasapa, 
2004), 241-245. 	
646 Praphan Ruengnarong, ๑๐๐ เรื$องเมอืงใต ้(100 stories of southern Thailand) (Bangkok: Amarin, 2010), 
195. 	
647 NAT, MOE 3.13/4 นายเตก๊ฮวด ครโูรงเรยีนสายบรุ ีขอเปลี8ยนชื8อเป็นนายฮวด (Tekhuad, a teacher of 
Saiburi School asked for a permission to change his name to Huad). Document dated 1914, 2 and NAT, 
MOE 3.13/2 นายเสง ครโูรงเรยีนวดับางพลใีหญข่อเปลี9ยนชื9อเป็นนายสําเนยีง (Seng, a teacher of Bangpliyai 
Temple School asked for a permission to change his name to Samniang). Document dated 1914, 1-3. 	
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Figure 4.4: The tomb of Kimchun and a stone tablet carving of  
his Chinese and Thai names at Phatthanaram Temple 
 
One of the most efficient Thai-ification policies that had a huge effect on Chinese 
identity was the instruction of Phibun’s government to encourage government officials 
and employees to have a Thai name and surname in June 1939.648 It was particularly 
targeted at those officials of Chinese descent whose surname normally began with the 
prefix Sae, meaning surname (姓) in Chinese, and followed by their original Chinese 
surname after the Surname Act was passed in 1913 by King Vajiravudh. The policy was 
strengthened again in 1942 to warn all government officials to follow the Phibun’s 
instruction.649   
 
One illustrious exemplification of the Thai-ification of names is the case of 
Kobkun Saetang, widely known in Surat Thani as Miss Kobkun, who, as seen in Chapter 
Three, became a national heroine for her bravery in resisting the Japanese. Her 
compelling story was that she quickly headed to the police station to receive a gun in 
order to join the fight after she learned that the Japanese were about to invade Bandon’s 
Chinatown. Despite the fact that many senior government officials escaped from the town 
                                                
648 NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.1/1 ใหแ้นะนําขา้ราชการและลกูจา้งเปลี4ยนนามเป็นสําเนยีงไทยเสยีจงทั4วกนั (The 
instructions to have government officers and employees change their names to Thai). Document dated 
5/06/1939 to 19/06/1939, 2-17. 	
649  NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.1/23 ไหเ้ตอืนขา้ราชการปฎบิตัติามประกาสสํานักนายกรัฐมนตร ี เรื:องชื:อบคุคล 
(Please warn government officers to follow the announcement of the Office of the Prime Minister about the 
name). Document dated 3/02/1942, 3. 	
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prior to the invasion, she was the only woman from amongst Chinese and Thai 
volunteers. As she did not know how to shoot, she volunteered to transport the 
ammunition and food to the police and volunteers on the front line. During the fighting, 
she bravely transported the ammunition until her story was widely spoken by the Chinese 
and Thai throughout Surat Thani. She became a national heroine. Her brave resistance 
was published in many newspapers and reached the ears of the Thai authorities.650   
  
Khuang Aphaiwong, the Minister of Transport during Phibun’s government and 
later Prime Minister from August 1944 to 1945, from January to May 1946, and from 
November 1947 to April 1948, and Seni Pramoj, the Prime Minister from September 
1945 to January 1946, were particularly impressed by her courage. Therefore, when Seni 
and his committee visited Surat Thani after the end of the Pacific War, Paew was invited 
to a dinner at Tiechunki, one of the best Chinese restaurants in Bandon’s Chinatown at 
the time. 651  Influenced by Phibun’s Thai-ification policy, Seni and his committee 
questioned Paew’s Chinese surname, Saetang (姓陳), and instructed her to change her 
surname to Thai. Her new name was Kobkun Pinphithak.   
 
The Thai-fication programme with regards to acquiring citizenship was one of the 
most effective policies enforced by Phibun to make the Chinese become Thai citizens. 
Afraid that China would ask for the exchange of the diplomatic representatives when the 
SSJW ended, Phibun quickly launched the naturalisation policy on 1 April 1939, 
allowing Chinese citizens to apply for naturalisation for the first time in history.652 To 
encourage assimilation, Phibun publicly revealed on November 1939 that he was also of 
Chinese ancestry and that there was even a Chinese altar table in his house. Phibun’s 
father, Wujie (吳杰), was a local born Chinese whose own father was a Cantonese who 
had married a Siamese woman. At the outbreak of the SSJW, many Chinese were 
arrested and deported to China owing to their anti-Japanese activities. Many Chinese 
hence bribed officials to register their nationality to Thai in the 1937 census of the 
                                                
650  Thossaphon Nganphairot, หลายเรื(องเมอืงสรุาษฎรฯ์ (many stories of Surat Thani) (Surat Thani: 
Lertchai, 2000), 36.	
651 Ibid. 	
652 Murashima, การเมอืงจนีสยาม, 176-180.  
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Siamese government. However, some still operated against the Japanese and were later 
deported after the authorities discovered that they were actually Chinese nationals.653   
 
 
Figure 4.5: Picture of Sui Phaksunthorn in a uniform 
at his granddaughter’s grocery store in Paknam Tha Krachai 
 
Prior to the Japanese occupation, there were few applications by the Chinese for 
naturalisation, down to fewer than 170 per year.654 However, those who were granted 
naturalisation were normally high-income earners and had social status to some extent. 
Such people usually worked as government officials, employees of western companies, 
merchants, mine and rubber plantation owners, etc. Of the number of those Chinese who 
resided outside Bangkok, they were mostly village headmen.655 Two village headmen 
were Chinese from Surat Thani: Sui and Kiewli (see Figure 4.5). After the naturalisation 
policy was launched in 1939, Sui and Kiewli, who were relatives and had migrated from 
Fujian to Tha Chana, Surat Thani, applied for naturalisation in April and May 1940. 
Hired to construct the southern railway during the early 20th century, they were among 
the first group of the Hokkien that settled in Tha Chana district. They then established 
themselves in Paknam Tha Krachai, a Thai and Chinese fishing village, where the 
Hainanese was the majority group, followed by the Hokkien and Teochew 
                                                
653 Ibid., 178-180. 	
654 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 275. 	
655	Murashima, การเมอืงจนีสยาม, 186. 	
	 222	
respectively.656 Later, they served as headmen, with Sui working in the Chinatown of Tha 
Chana and Kiewli in the fishing village.  
 
However, to change their Chinese nationality to Thai was not easy as the 
authorities thoroughly checked many things, such as Thai language skills, property, 
occupation, spouse’s nationality and children’s education. In the case of these Hokkiens 
from Surat Thani, two of them changed their Chinese names into Thai, with Sakon 
Phaksunthorn becoming the name of Sui and Maitree Phaksunthorn belonging to Kiewli. 
The two headmen, moreover, donated money to the Thai army and government for public 
spending. All of these efforts had been made in order to be granted Thai nationality.657 
Nevertheless, those Chinese that had changed their nationality to Thai remained 
spiritually Chinese and still refused to assimilate into Thai society. Therefore, in 1942 the 
Thai government convened a meeting to find an effective way to resolve this problem and 
control the Chinese in Thailand more effectively. The Thai government commanded that 
the authorities only allowed the Chinese to be the unofficial head of their Chinese 
community but not official Chinese headmen, as they were afraid that the Chinese would 
establish a state within a state and thereby accrue too much power.658 
 
During the Pacific War, many Chinese applied for Thai nationality, with more 
than 6,086 in 1943 applying for naturalisation. 659  It was possible that the Thai 
government strengthened the economic Thai-ification programme during the Japanese 
occupation. Nevertheless, this number was considered comparatively small to the total 
number of Chinese nationals in Thailand because many Chinese were afraid that they 
would be conscripted into the Thai army, although some of them wanted to apply for 
naturalisation.660 However, only 2,761 of the 6,086 were granted Thai nationality.661 This 
                                                
656	Ngao Sengpu. Interview, 30 March 2017. 	
657	NAT, (2) SOC 0201.82.2/3 คนในบงัคบัจนีขอแปลงชาตเิป็นคนในบงัคบัไทย (Chinese subjects asked for 
a permission to change their nationality to Thai). Document dated 19/03/1939 to 4/11/1941, 62-76, 192-
198. 	
658 NAT, (2) SOC 0201.77/2 เบ็ดเตล็ด(หลายเรื(อง) เกี$ยวดว้ยจนีในประเทศไทย (Miscellaneous stories 
about the Chinese in Thailand). Document dated 1942, 98-101. 	
659 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 275.	
660 NAT, (2) MFA 7.1/39, 68. 	
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was due to the fact that obtaining Thai nationality was not easy, because, as detailed 
above, the Thai authorities thoroughly checked a number of factors related to 
naturalisation. Those who were granted naturalisation were high-income earners and had 
social status to a certain extent, as noted earlier. In addition, those Chinese who did not 




Figure 4.6: Chinese men in their Chinese trousers standing on the left, and their Siamese wives sitting 
on the right. The first woman from the left is dressed in a sabai (a silk breast-wrapper) across her left 
shoulder over a blouse with a chong kraben, while the two women sitting next to her are dressed in 
shawls over blouses with chong krabens. This photo was taken when King Chulalongkorn (1853-1910) 
visited Nakhon Si Thammarat. (NAT 59M0054). 
 
 
With regard to culture, Phibun also launched many policies that also had an effect 
on the self-identification of the Chinese. He asked people to stop wearing Chong Kraben, 
a cloth, worn by both men and women, that is drawn tightly up between the legs and 
secured around the waist, and to wear instead international-style attire (see figures 4.6, 
4.7 and 4.8). Additionally, Phibun encouraged women to wear western skirts or sarongs 
                                                                                                                                            
661 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 275.	
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instead.662 He finally issued a law on dress in 1941 mainly aimed at forcing people to 
wear western attire. It was part of Phibun’s policies to make Thailand become what he 
saw as a more civilised nation in order to make a favourable impression on the 
Japanese.663 At the same time, the Thai authorities discouraged men from wearing 




Figure 4.7: A woman holding an umbrella on the right and other women standing on the 
street next to her, dressed in sabais across their left shoulders over blouses with chong 
krabens, Bandon’s Chinatown, 1933.665 
 
                                                
662	NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.1/13 ขอความรว่มมอืใหช้ว่ยสง่เสรมิการแตง่กายของสตรไีทย (Asking for a co-
operation to promote the instructions for Thai women about the dress). Document dated 14/03/1941, 4. 	
663 See Somchok Sawatdirak, “Military relations between Thailand and Japan in the War of Greater East 
Asia 1941-1945” (Master’s thesis., Chulalongkorn University, 1981), ฑ-ฒ. Quoted in Puengthip 
Kiattisahakul, “The Japanese Army and Thailand’s Southern Railways During the Greater East Asia War, 
1941-1945” (PhD diss., Chulalongkorn University, 2004), 32-33.  
664	NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.1/20 ความสําคญัในการบํารงุวฒันธรรมของชาต ิ(The importance of cherishing the 
national culture). Document dated 1941-1942, 6.  
665 ๗๕ ปี สรุาษฎรธ์านนีามพระราชทาน (75 years of Surat Thani after King Vajiravudh bestowed a title of 
the city) (Surat Thani: Lertchai, 2010), 139.  
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Figure 4.8: A Hainanese man in his Chinese shirt with chong kraben and his Siamese wive wearing a 
sabai over a blouse with chong kraben, at Ko Pha-ngan. 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Jia Guangyian’s Hakka family in Ban Na San. Peranakan women are dressed in sarong 
kebaya while men wear Western attire.666  
 
                                                
666 Koetnasan,	77 ปีบา้นนาสาร พทุธศกัราช ๒๔๘๒-พทุธศกัราช ๒๕๕๗, 35.  
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Figure 4.10: Two Peranakan women wearing sarong kebaya in Penang, ca 1930s.667 
 
The Chinese community in Siam prior to the twentieth century was called ‘Chin 
Chong Kraben,’ a term suggested by Phuthorn Bhumadhon because the Chinese 
assimilated into the Siamese society under the influence of Siamese wives, who wore 
chong krabens. Although their sons remained Chinese, their daughters wore chong 
krabens as their Siamese mothers did.668 However, in the Straits Settlements and many 
provinces in South Siam, Peranakan women wore a sarong kebaya, a long-sleeved blouse 
worn with a batik sarong (see Figure 4.9). Peranakan men were known as Baba (峇峇) 
while the women were referred to as Nyonya (娘惹). While Phuket was home to 
Peranakan, primarily Hokkiens who had been encouraged by Kaw Simbee, the governor 
of Phuket, to work in the tin mining industry in Phuket via Penang, Ban Na San in Surat 
Thani was home to Hakka Peranakan, who had migrated from Penang. The Peranakan 
costume worn by Nyonyas, as seen in the figure 4.10, also portrayed the close connection 
between Hakka Peranakan in Surat Thani with Penang in British Malaya. However, the 
                                                
667 This photo was from Peter Lee, Sarong Kebaya: Peranakan Fashion in an Interconnected World 1500-
1950 (Singapore: Asian Civilisations Museum, 2014), 271. 	
668  Pimpraphai Bisalputra, อตัลกัษณจ์นีโจงกระเบน (The identity of Chin Chong Kraben), in 
ศลิปะในชมุชนจนีประเทศไทย (The art of Chinese community in Thailand) (Bangkok: Piriya Krairiksh 
Foundation, 2016), 10-11.  
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Chinese in Siam during the Republican era in China were called “overseas Chinese” 
because they refused to assimilate into local society. 669  Despite this, the self-
identification of the Chinese as Chinese had become less conspicuous as both Chinese 
and Thai men, especially those from the upper classes, chose to wear western attire in the 
twenties. Whilst women in general were more conservative in terms of dress, younger 
women started to wear western dress in the late thirties.670 Nevertheless, some Chinese 
women in Surat Thani got used to wearing the sarong although the war had ended and the 
policy had been lifted (see Figure 4.11).  
 
 
Figure 4.11: Chinese students wearing sarongs in front of Zhonghua School  
of Ban Na San (那訕中華學校 ) after 1950671 
 
To sum up, Phibun launched numerous policies to encourage the assimilation of 
the Chinese into Thai society, many of which had significant effects on the self-
identification of the Chinese. Influenced by Phibun’s policies, the Thai authorities 
instructed Kobkun to change her Chinese surname to Thai. Many Chinese also applied 
for naturalisation, encouraged by the Thai government after they had begun to experience 
the hardships of the economic Thai-ification programmes.  
 
                                                
669	Ibid., 11.  
670 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 254. 	
671 Koetnasan,	77 ปีบา้นนาสาร พทุธศกัราช ๒๔๘๒-พทุธศกัราช ๒๕๕๗, 72.  
	 228	
 
      VI.       Conclusion  
 
During the last stages of the Pacific War in 1943, Allied bombing became more extreme 
in Bangkok and the southern provinces, including Surat Thani. On October 1943, the 
government prepared to evacuate people from crowded communities where train stations 
were located because they were used by the Japanese to transport their soldiers and 
provisions and hence were being targeted by Allied aircraft.672 For example, in Surat 
Thani, after the Japanese successfully landed in Bandon in December 1941, they 
strategically established their military base at Tha Kham (呈坎), a Chinese district of 
Phun Phin, in which the provincial train station was located.  
 
 
Figure 4.12: The bridge over Tapi River before it was destroyed by the aircraft in 1943673 
 
There were many Japanese military bases in Tha Kham, but two that were 
indispensable were in the rubber plantation of Liao Jingsong and around the bridge on the 
Tapi River. The Chinese community also suffered from the Allied bombings. In modern 
warfare, railways became an arm that the Japanese employed for military transport from 
                                                
672	NAT, (2) MOE 15.3/53 การอพยพพลเมอืงเพื,อบนัเทาภยัทางอากาศ (The evacuation of people for the 
air raid relief). Document dated 16/10/1943, 2. 	
673 ภอ. 002 หวญ 25/22 NAT-P008446.  
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Malaya to Burma. Therefore, the railway bridge on the Tapi River (see Figure 4.12) was 
an allied target and in 1943 it was destroyed. Many Chinese went into air raid shelters 
after they heard the air raid siren, located in the middle of the Chinese community, 
sounded over the Chinatown. Another bomb that had a considerable effect on the Chinese 
community was dropped on a Japanese warehouse behind the train station, setting both 
the train station and the wider Chinatown area on fire. Moreover, the fighter plane also 
fired into the community, injuring many and killing a few people.674 
 
Under the Japanese occupation, the Chinese were faced with the dilemma of 
deciding to co-operate despite generally sharing anti-Japanese sentiments. At the same 
time, they were caught “between the tiger and the crocodile” as the Thai authorities 
agreed to an alliance with Japan and simultaneously strengthened the economic Thai-
ification policies to eliminate Chinese domination of the nation’s economy. The Thai 
authorities also pushed the Chinese towards assimilation into Thai society by launching 
cultural policies.  
 
Based on the Chinese reactions to the hardships experienced under the Japanese 
occupation, this study shows that the Chinese were divided into four groups. The first 
group, with individuals such as Liao Jingsong and the Chinese in Surat Thani, refused to 
co-operate with the Japanese and resisted them. The Chinese merchants and others who 
still ran the underground activities against the Japanese were also in this group. The 
second group was the Chinese who were pressured by the Japanese and succumbed to 
pressure to work for them, such as Wang Jingwei and the Chinese in Bandon who 
superficially welcomed the Japanese. The third group was those who made a profit from 
the Japanese, such as the Cantonese in Bandon and those who changed their nationality to 
Japanese for their own interests. The last group was the Chinese who co-operated with 
the Japanese but financially supported various anti-Japanese activities. However, the 
Chinese reactions to the Thai authorities during the period could be broken down into two 
groups. The first was those who changed their nationality to Thai for their benefit, and 
                                                
674 Kanok Nganphairot, “Back in time on Tha Kham,” in หลายเรื(องเมอืงสรุาษฎรฯ์ (Many stories of Surat 
Thani) (Surat Thani: Lertchai, 2000), 117-119. 	
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those who did not and surrendered economic opportunities. Nevertheless, both of them 
faced the difficulties which followed from Phibun’s policies to some extent.  
 
Eiji Murashima, in his book Sino-Siamese Politics, separated the Chinese during 
the outbreak of the SSJW into three groups. One of these groups was the Chinese who 
followed the Thai government’s policies, changed their nationality to Thai, and benefitted 
from the Japanese because they had become Thai citizens. Nevertheless, despite their 
superficial co-operation with the Japanese, my study shows that these Chinese were still 
Chinese, with a shared anti-Japanese sentiment. Although the Chinese had changed their 
nationality to Thai, they still preserved their Chinese identity to a great extent. As Phibun 
himself, these Chinese were trying to survive the hardships under Japanese occupation, 
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I.         Introduction 
 
During the Second Sino-Japanese War (hereafter SSJW) of 1937-1945, a large number of 
Chinese residents in Surat Thani identified politically and culturally with their 
motherland. They therefore contributed to the Chinese war effort by using various means 
such as boycotts and fundraising campaigns to help China fight against the Japanese 
during the first phase of the war. They also resisted the Japanese invasion when the 
Japanese landed in Bandon’s Chinatown on 8 December 1941. Under the Japanese 
occupation, the Chinese suffered immense hardships as a result of Japanese repression 
and the Thai government’s policy of Thai-ification of the economy. The Chinese were 
faced with a dilemma. Liao Jingsong, a patriotic Teochew entrepreneur, refused to 
collaborate with the Japanese and was instantly imprisoned at the outbreak of the Pacific 
War. In contrast, Tan Siewmeng, another leading Chinese, and Wang Jingwei, the head 
of the Nanjing government, decided to co-operate with the enemy. They and other 
Chinese who collaborated with the Japanese were accused of being traitors during the last 
phase of the war.  
 
Following the dropping of the second atomic bomb on the Japanese city of 
Nagasaki, Japan unconditionally surrendered on 15 August 1945, bringing the eight-year 
Resistance War (八年抗戰) and the Pacific War to a sudden end. On the mainland, the 
Japanese were commanded to surrender not to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
forces but only to the Guomindang (GMD). Gradually, the GMD forces regained control 
of the majority of the cities that had been occupied by the Japanese.675 Following news of 
Japan’s defeat, there were not only spontaneous victory celebrations in the majority of the 
                                                
675 Diana Lary, The Chinese People at War: Human Suffering and Social Transformation, 1937-1945 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 169. 	
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cities in China, but the Chinese in Thailand and elsewhere also celebrated. After the 
victory celebrations, they would become dispirited and weary because of acute upcoming 
hardships. A full-scale civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists was 
imminent.676 Many urban elites, such as businessmen, intellectuals and local leaders, 
were alienated by the introduction of new taxes, monopolies, and levies on them to fund 
the civil war. The GMD government’s mismanagement of the economy had a dramatic 
impact.677 There was no reduction in government spending on the military, and rising 
inflation caused economic misery for the bulk of the population.678     
 
In Thailand, there was a resurgence of Chinese nationalism in the post-war period. 
The flags of the Republic of China (hereafter ROC) were hung throughout Chinese 
communities to celebrate the victory of China in September 1945. The celebrations, 
however, abruptly led to incessant conflict with local Thai people. The Chinese not only 
wanted to hoist their national flags on their own (despite a law stipulating that any 
foreign flags must be flown together with the Thai national flag), but they also regarded 
Thailand as a defeated nation. Revenge came shortly thereafter. In the events which came 
to be known as the “September Incidents,” or the “Yaowarat Incident of 1945,” many 
Chinese shops in Bangkok’s Chinatown were plundered and looted.679  
 
During World War II, the Thai government declared war on Britain and the 
United States in 1942. However, Seni Pramoj, the Thai ambassador to Washington, 
refused to deliver Phibun’s declaration of war to the US. The American government thus 
did not declare war on Thailand. Seni also organised the Free Thai Movement, a Thai 
underground resistance movement against Japan, with help of the US. Following Japan’s 
defeat, Seni, the new prime minister, successfully prevented the US and the Allied 
Powers from treating Thailand as an enemy country through the good offices of Chiang 
                                                
676 Ibid., 170. 	
677 Chi-kwan Mark, China and the World since 1945: an International History (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 
9. 	
678	Lary, The Chinese People at War, 170. 	
679 TNA, WO 203/5587, Commander HQ, Force 136 to Director of Intelligence HQ, S.A.C.S.E.A., report 
on Sino-Siamese relations in Bangkok dated 14/11/45, 7 and G. William Skinner, Chinese Society in 
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Kai-shek in the post-war negotiations.680 Nevertheless, before signing a peace treaty with 
Thailand, Britain demanded war reparations in the form of rice shipments to Malaya. 
Meanwhile, France ordered Thailand to return the Indochinese territories annexed during 
wartime, while the Soviet Union demanded that all legislation against communism be 
repealed. In order to avoid conflict with the west, Thailand and Thai, the names of the 
country and people, were renamed Siam and Siamese on 7 September 1945.681 Seni 
Pramoj was appointed prime minister on 17 September, the day he returned from the US, 
in order to negotiate with the world powers.682 Under Seni’s government, Chinese 
schools and newspapers were allowed to reopen. 
 
In the post-war period, there was a lack of cohesion in Chinese society. The CCP, 
which had become stronger during the war, was ready to fight the GMD for control of 
China. The victory over Japan was the beginning of a bitter civil war which lasted from 
1946 to 1949.683 Meanwhile, in Thailand this conflict could also be seen in the Chinese 
community in Surat Thani and elsewhere. In Bandon’s Chinatown, the two sides 
established and financially supported Chinese schools to implant their ideologies in 
Chinese students. However, in November 1947, Phibun overthrew the elected 
government and seized power in a military coup. He then changed the name of the 
country back to Thailand in 1948 and resumed his anti-Chinese campaign. The country’s 
policy became severely anti-communist.  
 
Following the end of World War II, China had emerged as a world leader and 
Thailand had to rely on the GMD government in order to remain independent. The 
Chinese Embassy was established in Thailand to protect Chinese residents and Chinese 
schools thrived. However, after the GMD government entered the war with the CCP and 
                                                
680 Jeffery Sng and Pimpraphai Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese (Singapore: Editions Didier 
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suffered constant defeats, Chinese native-place associations and schools were divided 
into two basic groups: pro-GMD and pro-CCP. As the GMD government became weaker, 
the Thai government seized the opportunity to reinforce the Thai-ification programme 
and launch its anti-Chinese policies. With the victory of the Chinese communists in the 
civil war, the CCP’s leader, Mao Zedong (毛澤東), proclaimed the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949. Following the victory of the CCP, 
China became isolated from the rest of the world and also from the Overseas Chinese. 
The Thai government utilised this situation to do whatever it wished with Thailand’s 
Chinese community. In 1953, following a disastrous fire in Surat Thani, the Thai 
government launched an economic Thai-ification programme.  
 
This chapter investigates the ideological conflict between GMD and CCP 
supporters that was reflected in the division of Chinese native-place associations and 
schools in Surat Thani from 1945 to 1949. It comprises four sections: treatment of 
collaborators and native-place associations; disputes between Chinese and Thais; Chinese 
schools from 1945 to the 1950s; and the Great Fire of Bandon. The first section examines 
what happened to Chinese collaborators after the war ended and how the tensions 
between those collaborators and patriotic Chinese were resolved. It also investigates the 
division of native-place associations in the post-war years. The second section examines 
how the Chinese took revenge on the Thai authorities and how this aggravated the 
situation until it grew into violent disputes between Chinese and Thais. The third section 
discusses the ideological divisions in the Chinese schools. It explores out how the Thai 
government took advantage of the situation in China to control Chinese people and their 
education. The last section investigates Phibun’s housing policy, a part of the economic 
Thai-ification programme after the Great Fire of Bandon in 1953.  
 
 
II.       Treatment of Collaborators and Native-place Associations  
 
Immediately after Japan’s surrender, no one knew what the fate of the Chinese who had 
co-operated with the Japanese would be. In mainland China, many major collaborators 
were committed to trial and some of them received the death sentence. Meanwhile, in 
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Thailand the government did not have a policy on how to treat those collaborators as the 
Thai government had also co-operated with Japan during the war. Therefore, ‘unofficial 
punishment’ was meted out to Tan Siewmeng, a major collaborator. After the 
assassination of Tan, lesser collaborators continued to thrive and control local resources 
and facilities as they were not punished. In Surat Thani, many Cantonese collaborators 
became wealthy and officially founded their native-place associations immediately after 
the war ended. The Chinese Civil War had sparked an ideological conflict amongst 
Chinese residents in Thailand. This conflict was also reflected in the division of the 
native-place associations, which was divided between pro-GMD and pro-CCP 
associations. This section investigates the fate of Chinese collaborators in Surat Thani 
and other parts of the country in order to discover what happened to them after the end of 
the war and how the tensions between the collaborators and the patriotic Chinese were 
resolved. It then examines the ideological conflicts reflected in the native-place 
associations in the Chinese community in Surat Thani in the post-war period.  
 
Following news of Japan’s defeat, there was a resurgence of Chinese nationalism. 
They celebrated their victory as a sense of excitement swept over the Chinese community 
of Surat Thani, one of the largest Chinese communities in Thailand.684 Besides their great 
joy, the Chinese also used these celebrations to vent their anger on the Thai government, 
who had caused their hardships during wartime. As the celebrations of the Chinese laid 
the foundations for incessant disputes between Chinese and Thai people, a brief history of 
the celebrations is necessary.  
 
At the end of World War II, Chiang Kai-shek gained considerable prestige and 
influence in the international arena. In contrast, Phibun and his fascist ministers were 
arrested and put on trial at the War Crimes Tribunal in Bangkok.685 China was one of the 
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victorious “Big Five”.686 The emergence of China as a world leader made the Chinese in 
Thailand feel confident and more united than ever before.687 They were joyous at the 
news of their victory and the new status of their motherland.  
 
To vent their anger on the Thai government, the Chinese residents in Surat Thani 
and other parts of the country immediately regarded Thailand as a defeated nation, while 
their motherland was celebrated as one of the victorious five powers.688 They also began 
to spread rumours that GMD troops were about to occupy Thailand. In Bangkok, some 
Chinese people assaulted Thai people as acts of revenge.689 Moreover, Chinese people 
ignored a law stipulating that the Siamese national must be flown alongside any foreign 
flags by decorating their houses, shops and associations with ROC flags to celebrate their 
victory and to challenge the Thai authorities. There were also parades in many major 
Chinatowns throughout the country.690  
 
In Surat Thani, the Cantonese established the Kwong Siew Association (廣肇高
公所), their native-place association, in the centre of Bandon’s Chinatown on 10 October 
1945, the anniversary of the Double Tenth Day, or the national day of the ROC. Shortly 
after Japan’s defeat, the Cantonese were finally able to be reunited for the first time in the 
history of the Chinese diaspora in Surat Thani. Such defiant expressions of patriotism 
stemmed from the new-found confidence that the emergence of China as a world leader 
had instilled in them.691  
 
                                                
686 The “Big Five” has referred to the five powers that were given permanent seats on the Security Council 
of the United Nations since World War II. The five great powers were composed of the Republic of China, 
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For Thais, they witnessed the first manifestation of the growth of Chinese 
political influence throughout South East Asia. As Seni, Thailand’s new prime minister, 
had resorted to relying on the support of Chiang Kai-shek in post-war negotiations to 
prevent the Allies Powers from treating Thailand as a defeated nation, the Thai 
authorities could not do much about the Chinese community’s expressions of patriotism 
beyond requesting that they abide by the law regarding the national flags and refrain from 
indulging stories about Thailand being a defeated nation.692 
 
As China was one of the victors and had become one of the five global powers at 
the end of the war, “Chineseness” was no longer looked down upon.693 Many ruling elites 
came forward to claim that they had Chinese blood and praised their Chinese names. For 
example, Pridi Banomyong, a leader of the civilian faction that carried out the Siamese 
revolution of 1932, was of Chinese descent with the surname Tan (陳). Thamrong 
Navasawad, the Prime Minister of Siam from 1946-1947, was Zheng Liandan (鄭連淡). 
Luang Wichitwathakan, a Thai politician and novelist who had in 1938 compared the 
Chinese to the Jews in Germany, was born Tan Kimliang (陳金良).694 
 
The end of the war saw countless family and community reunions of people who 
had escaped from the Japanese in China during late 1945 and early 1946.695 One example 
of that is the story of Liao Jingsong, who, as was mentioned in Chapter Three, was 
sentenced to life imprisonment, and his brother, Liao Hinpoh sentenced to a sixteen-year 
term when Japanese troops landed in Thailand on 8 December 1941 because they had 
refused to collaborate. Liao Hinpoh’s wife and children had escaped to Penang before the 
Japanese invasion. The grief Liao Hinpoh felt over the separation was unbearable, as no 
one was certain when the war would end. However, he was finally reunited with his 
family when they immediately returned from Penang after the end of the war.696  
                                                
692 “Communiqué,” issued by Publicity Department on 22 and 23 September 1946 see ibid., 11-12. 	
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As a result of the war, Liao family’s businesses were shattered, so Hinpoh 
avoided all political activities. Social charities were greatly reduced. The Teochew 
Association of Thailand was handicapped because everyone was reluctant to resume top 
offices after they saw the example of Liao’s family and two former Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce (hereafter CCC) chairmen of Teochew origin, Hia Guang-iam and Tan 
Siewmeng, who decided to co-operate with the Japanese and met a tragic fate after the 
SSJW came to an end.697 However, Jingsong continued to help the Chinese community in 
Surat Thani and other areas. Although he had been staying in Bangkok at the end of the 
war, Liao Jingsong still regarded Surat Thani, the capital of his family business, as his 
hometown. He donated 600,000 baht to Suratthani Hospital, a sum higher than another in 
Nakhon Si Thammarat, where his Siamese mother and he were born. He also gave his 
businesses in Bandon to Kamthorn and Kamyong Sethbhakdi, his eldest and second sons, 
who had been staying in Surat Thani, to look after.698    
 
In Malaya, during the Japanese occupation, there was a minority that collaborated 
with the Japanese for financial reasons, but many of these collaborators overtly despised 
the ‘barbarian dwarf,’ a derogatory term applied to the Japanese, for whom they were 
working. They did not become involved with the Japanese and avoided offering their 
services as much as possible. On the other hand, the majority of Malays welcomed the 
Japanese occupation because the Japanese promised to eliminate the economic and 
political encroachment of the Chinese. At the same time, the Japanese utilised the 
Malayan police force, consisting mostly of Malays, to suppress the anti-Japanese 
movement. Accordingly, the Chinese harboured considerable resentment towards the 
Malays. In September 1945, the British reoccupied Malaya. Following the news of 
Japan’s surrender, the Chinese retaliated against the Malay police. They also took 
revenge on Malay aggressors with whom they had clashed during the war, killing 30 or 
40 Malays at a village on the Perak River in March 1946. The Chinese communists also 
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challenged the British in order to bring them into hatred. They issued manifestoes 
promulgating that the British had cowardly abandoned the people of Malaya in 1942, a 
betrayal mourned by declaring a public holiday on 15 February 1946 to celebrate the day 
Singapore fell to the Japanese. There would be processions throughout the country on this 
day, but in Singapore cordons successfully surrounded the city to prevent this movement. 
Ten Chinese, acting behind the scenes, were later deported to China.699 
 
In China, official vengeance was wreaked upon major collaborators. The Chinese 
government brought important people who had co-operated with the Japanese to trial. 
Although Wang Jingwei had left for Japan to undergo treatment for wounds inflicted by 
an assassination attempt in 1939, and died in Japan in 1944, less than a year before Japan 
surrendered his closest colleagues, including Zhou Fohai (周佛海), Chu Minyi (褚民誼) 
and Chen Gongbo (陳公博), were convicted of treason and executed. Liang Hongzhi, 
Wang’s predecessor in the Nanjing regime, met the same fate. Furthermore, Chen Bijun 
(陳璧君), the wife of Wang, was sentenced to a long term of imprisonment.700  
 
Tan Siewmeng, meanwhile, a major collaborator in Thailand, received an 
unofficial punishment. On 16 August 1945, one day after Victory over Japan Day, he was 
shot by an anonymous assassin. The main motive for the murder was the fact that he had 
recruited a great deal of Chinese labour, including those in Surat Thani, to work for the 
Thai-Burma railway. Many Chinese patriots thus verbally attacked him, as well as 
Chinese merchants who had worked for the Japanese, and reported them to the 
Chungking government. Later, Tan Siewmeng and other CCC directors were condemned 
by Chungking Central Radio Station in a broadcast that caused some Chinese patriots, 
who wanted to express loyalty towards their motherland, to kill Tan.701  
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The death of Tan Siewmeng was symbolic of the political controversy that was 
about to disturb the Chinese community throughout the postwar period.702 Following a 
police investigation, the crime was committed by unknown members of the CCP because 
he paid a far smaller sum of money after he had been asked for a contribution of 20,000 
baht to support anti-Japanese activities in Thailand.703 In the 2000s, Henri Chen KeZhan, 
a renowned Singapore artist and a descendant of the Tan family in Singapore, believed 
that a Hainanese communist assassin killed the ex-chairman of the CCC after a 
Communist source confided to him.704 This emphasised the fact that the majority of the 
CCP members were Hainanese, as discussed in Chapter Two. It should be noted that 
Surat Thani was one of the most important Hainanese and CCP networks in South East 
Asia, and one where the CCP had been politically active since the late 1920s. Many 
Chinese teachers in Ko Samui were arrested and deported from the country for spreading 
communism.  
 
Following the assassination of Tan Siewmeng, lesser collaborators continued to 
move on with their lives. Following Japan’s defeat, the strongest and most influential 
native-place association in Thailand was the Cantonese Association.705 In Surat Thani, 
the Cantonese privately worked for the Japanese in some construction projects and some 
of them were also recruited to construct the Thai-Burma railway during the war. 
Immediately after Japan’s surrender, many Cantonese found money that the Japanese had 
buried underground and took some materials off the Japanese.706 They survived the 
punishment of the patriotic Chinese and continued to control resources, becoming 
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wealthy in the process. In October 1945, they finally established the Cantonese 
Association in Bandon’s Chinatown, as noted above.  
  
There were three reasons for their survival. Firstly, Tan Siewmeng, a major 
collaborator, was killed in reprisal for treason. The conflict was, accordingly, considered 
settled to some extent. Similar to the situation in mainland China, the Chinese 
government did not have a definite policy on the treatment of lesser collaborators beyond 
the trials of major collaborators, as mentioned above. As the civil war was impending, 
many collaborators were considered useful for the GMD to revive the pre-war economic 
and social situation. The CCP also needed many new supporters as the party extended its 
control over the northern parts of China. Hence, both sides had to make sure that they 
were not too harsh in meting out justice for wartime acts. Furthermore, an enormous 
number of people had lived under the Japanese occupation, so the Chinese government 
could not hold them all responsible for being traitors.707 Secondly, as communism was 
illegal in Thailand at that time, the activities of the CCP sympathisers might be specially 
observed after the assassination of Tan, the most important collaborator.708 The Chinese 
communists, consequently, could not do much about it, although there were many 
Chinese communists and there was evidence of CCP activities in many Hainanese 
communities throughout Surat Thani. Lastly, the Chinese might not have had time to 
exact revenge on other collaborators as they were probably exhausted from the eight-year 
Resistance War and there were already concerns about the brewing civil war. Moreover, 
conflict between Thais and Chinese was also on the horizon.  
 
The fate of Taiwanese civilians and Chinese migrants who had changed their 
nationality to the Japanese during the war was dictated by the Thai army, who received 
instructions at the end of the war. In September 1945, they had been under house arrest 
and later transferred to a concentration camp in Bangkok, along with Japanese and 
Korean people in Thailand. Additionally, their property was confiscated as enemy 
property. They were only allowed to take as much property as they could carry by 
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themselves to the camp.709 As noted in Chapter Four, during the war there was a conflict 
between those who supported the Japanese and those who did not. Those who had 
worked for the Japanese were called “Taiwan”. This term meant “traitors” at that time, 
owing to the fact that some Taiwanese in Thailand identified politically with the Japanese 
during the war. Thus, the conflict was resolved to a certain extent, as the Taiwanese and 
those mainlanders who had changed their nationality to Japanese were imprisoned in 
concentration camps.  
 
In Taiwan, locals were the target of mainland Chinese anger. The incoming 
Chinese treated the Taiwanese almost as enemy aliens. Their property was also 
confiscated because they had lived with the Japanese. This process satisfied the needs of 
newcomers from mainland China and the Taiwanese felt that they were being reoccupied. 
Many Taiwanese were unemployed when the economic ties between Taiwan and Japan 
were broken.710 Subsequently, this caused another conflict between the Taiwanese and 
Chinese mainlanders. These economic losses paved the way for huge demonstrations in 
February 1947, known as the Ererba Incident (二二八事件). The protests were violently 
suppressed by the Chinese government and a large number of people were massacred. 
Four decades later, this incident was a major impetus for the Taiwanese independence 
movement.711 
  
However, the Taiwanese in Thailand were released from the concentration camp 
after Li Tiezheng (李鐵錚), the Chinese ambassador to Thailand, and Sun Binggan (孫秉
乾), the consul general, had successfully negotiated with the allied forces. The Taiwanese 
claimed that they realised the importance of mutual assistance and cooperation. They 
therefore organised and registered their native-place association with the Committee of 
Overseas Chinese Affairs and the Thai government. The Taiwanese native-place 
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association (台灣同鄉會) was officially established in 1946.712 The official establishment 
of their association shortly gained a position alongside the five major native-place 
associations and the Jiangzhe Association (江浙會館). This change was considered local 
recognition of China’s postwar reincorporation of Taiwan.713 In 1947, the association was 
renamed the Taiwan Association of Thailand (泰國台灣會館).714  
 
The ideological conflict of the Chinese was also reflected in the Chinese native-
place associations. The Hainanese community split in half immediately after the end of 
the Pacific War. Since 1909, there had been two Hainanese associations in Thailand: the 
Qiongdao Association (瓊島會所) and the Kengjiu Association (瓊州公所). The first 
was established by Dr. Sun for political purposes, while the latter was organised along 
similar lines to other native-place associations and was the oldest Hainanese organisation 
in the country. The majority of the Hainanese in Surat Thani belonged to the Kengjiu 
Association. However, the Qionghai Native-place Association (瓊海同鄉會 ) was 
founded in 1945. After the GMD government learnt that it was pro-CCP, it insisted that 
the Qiongdao Association be reorganised as the only Hainanese association. This led to a 
protest of the Kengjiu Association, which did not want to cede priority, so the two 
organisations were incorporated into the Hainan Association (海南會館) in 1946, which 
followed the regulations of the GMD government.715  
 
As the civil war went unfavourably for the GMD from late 1947 onwards, many 
native-place associations began to be pro-CCP. To have the former and newly formed 
Chinese associations controlled by the Nanjing government, the Chinese embassy and 
consulates were used a tool.716 After the end of the civil war, the Chinese embassy 
continued to function as normal.717 In September 1957, a representative of the Chinese 
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ambassador visited Surat Thani and five other southern provinces to show a film about 
everyday life, commerce, agriculture and industry in Taiwan and to comply with the 
instructions of the GMD government in Taiwan. Many pro-GMD Chinese in Surat Thani 
welcomed the delegates.718 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The consul general of the ROC, together with Chen Bibo (陳碧波 ), the vice-consul, in 
Songkhla, visiting the Cantonese Association of Surat Thani. They took a picture with leaders of 
overseas Chinese in Surat Thani in front of the Cantonese Association on 15 August 1964. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that the Cantonese Association of Surat Thani continued to 
support the GMD, even though Chiang Kai-shek suffered from constant defeats in the 
civil war and Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the PRC in 1949. Li Jinzhi (
李金枝), or Kobkarn Chaisong, the only woman in the picture, who was an advisor of the 
Hokkien Association, also welcomed the GMD government officers. Her daughter, Chusi 
Chaisong, married Shou Kiangjiao, a grandchild of Shou Caikun, whose family had 
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financially supported the pro-GMD Dongjia School. Therefore, it could be assumed that 
the Hokkien Association at the time was also pro-GMD.719  
 
In short, the Chinese in Surat Thani and other parts of Thailand were joyous after 
they learnt that China had won the war. The emergence of China as a world power made 
them confident and more united than ever before. Therefore, they regarded Thailand as a 
defeated nation and hung their national flags in front of their houses to challenge the Thai 
authorities. Violent conflicts between Chinese and Thai in the post-war period were 
initiated by these provocations. Moreover, the tensions between Chinese collaborators 
and patriotic Chinese were resolved to some extent. Tan Siewmeng, a major collaborator, 
was murdered. The Chinese communists, who were suspected of assassinating Tan, could 
not harm others because the Thai authorities were closely observing the movements of 
the communists following the death of Tan. Additionally, everyone was exhausted from 
the SSJW and, moreover, the Chinese Civil War was approaching. Meanwhile, the 
Taiwanese were put into concentration camps. This explains why lessor collaborators in 
Surat Thani survived and continued to control resources and move on with their lives. In 
addition, there was also an ideological conflict that was reflected in the division of the 
native-place associations. The Hainanese community was split in two – the pro-GMD 
Hainan Association and the pro-CCP Qionghai Native-place Association – while the 
Cantonese and Hokkien associations identified politically with the GMD.  
  
 
III.      Disputes between Chinese and Thais  
 
While the conflict between the Chinese collaborators and the patriotic Chinese was to 
some extent settled, tensions between the Chinese who had experienced the hardships of 
the Thai-economic campaign and the Thai government, who had also collaborated with 
the Japanese, had not yet been resolved. After the end of the war, the Chinese regarded 
Thailand as a defeated nation and challenged the Thai government by flying their 
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national flags in Chinese communities. These provocations caused violent conflicts 
between Chinese and Thai in Surat Thani and other parts of the country. This section 
examines how the Chinese exacted revenge on the Thai authorities. In addition, a Chinese 
embassy was also established to represent Chinese residents in Thailand. Therefore, this 
section also investigates how the existence of the Chinese embassy had an impact on the 
Chinese community in Surat Thani and beyond.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, in 1938, Phibun came to power and launched an 
anti-Chinese campaign. The programme of economic Thai-ification was also introduced 
to dissipate the economic domination of the Chinese. His government strengthened the 
programme during the Japanese occupation. Many Chinese in Surat Thani and other parts 
of the country had thus experienced hardships during wartime. For example, the merchant 
class was taxed heavily. In addition, Surat Thani’s Chinese enjoyed card games, the most 
popular form of gambling, during the Chinese New Year, but fees for gambling were 
increased. Another important law that had an effect on the Chinese of Surat Thani, who 
ran the province’s pork and poultry industry, was the Act for the Slaughter of Animals for 
Food, a law designed to replace Chinese domination of this industry with Thai merchants 
and wholesalers. Many government companies were also founded to compete with 
Chinese merchants. Apart from these policies, the police also suppressed the Chinese 
anti-Japanese movement during the SSJW.720 The local authorities closely observed the 
activities of the Chinese in Bandon as it was seen as one of the most important 
Chinatowns in Thailand during the Pacific War. Soi Munggu, a local-born Chinese, was 
dismissed from his position as a public official after he was suspected of being a Chinese 
spy. Although the government adopted a conciliatory approach to the Chinese and many 
laws against Chinese migrants were repealed during the latter stages of the war, feelings 
of resentment towards the Thai authorities lingered.  
 
Immediately after Japan’s surrender, the Chinese in Thailand were now ethnically 
descended from one of the world’s big five powers, celebrated the victory. They flew the 
Chinese national flag throughout major Chinatowns in Bangkok and other parts of 
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Thailand to challenge the Thai authorities, in direct contravention of a law preventing 
foreigners from flying their national flags without the Thai flag, as noted earlier. Due to a 
sense of growing power of the motherland and their long-standing grievances against the 
Thai government during the war, some Chinese took revenge on the Thai authorities by 
assaulting Thai people.721 Tensions between Chinese and Thais were coming to a climax. 
On the night of 20 September 1945, many Chinese assaulted Thai people in Bangkok’s 
Chinatown and then a group of Chinese fired warning shots from machine guns. On the 
following day, the Thai authorities dispatched the police and troops to protect Thai 
people and ordered that Yaowarat Road, the main artery of Bangkok’s Chinatown, be 
closed to traffic in order to search for arms.722  
 
The Chinese, now nationals of one of the “Big Five”, resented the fact that they 
were not allowed to fly their national flags alone whilst they saw the national flags of the 
other four powers decorated without those flags of Thailand. This provocation led to a 
police clampdown on Chinatowns across the country, essentially a state of siege, which 
the Chinese saw as reason to punish the police. The Chinese had not forgotten that their 
anti-Japanese activities during the SSJW had been suppressed by the police.723 With such 
memories still fresh in their minds, a group of Chinese shot at police officers from high 
buildings in Bangkok’s Chinatown on the night of 21 September. The police, together 
with troops, returned fire and a firefight lasted the whole night.724 At the same time, the 
Thai police and soldiers looted Chinese shops and forcibly extracted money from Chinese 
shopkeepers the next day. To resist, leaflets were circulated to Chinese shopkeepers on 
23 September to ask them to close down their shops in protest against the injustices being 
done to them. At the same time, they demanded the withdrawal of armed troops and the 
police from Chinatown. The shops were reopened after the police and military were 
withdrawn in late September and the Thai authorities had promised to give equal justice. 
This incident came to be known as “the September Incidents.”725 
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Five important groups had been formed to resist the Japanese during the war, and 
Chinese political divisions were numerous and unclear due to the fact that their activities 
had to be carried out secretly to avoid a crackdown by the Japanese and the Thai 
authorities. GMD was the first of these groups, with approximately 50,000 members 
drawn largely from small merchants and the middle classes in Bangkok and Southern 
Thailand, including Surat Thani. The second was the Overseas Chinese Resistance 
Group, organised by Pra Pinit, a Thai police general, and financially supported by rich 
Chinese merchants. The CCP was the third, with around 20,000 members made up 
mostly of Chinese labourers. The fourth was the Blue Shirts Society (藍衣社), a secretive 
fascist clique in the GMD consisting mostly of men and youths. The last was the Free 
Thai Movement, which also recruited some local-born Chinese. Their headquarters was 
established in Bangkok and recognised by the Thai government as the Headquarters of 
the Overseas Branch of the GMD.726 It was unknown which of these groups had taken 
part in the attacks on the Thai police in Bangkok’s Chinatown, and it was difficult to 
postulate, as the incident did not last long. Some believed that the CCP was responsible 
while others claimed it was the Blue Shirts, as they had been sent to stir up trouble in 
Thailand.727  
 
 After the September Incidents, conflicts between Chinese and Thai increased 
dramatically. At least two Thai secret societies, namely the ‘Black Swan’ and the ‘Black 
Lion,’ operated against the Chinese. The Chinese complained that there were attempts to 
cause fires in Bangkok’s Chinatown.728 Additionally, there were many other disputes 
throughout Thailand. On 27 January 1946, there was a dispute between Chinese and 
Thais in Nakhon Pathom (佛統府), a neighbouring province of Bangkok, resulting in 
many casualties and the death of Chinese man. This dispute happened when Chinese 
from all walks of life headed to Nakhon Pathom to welcome the Chinese envoy headed 
by Li Tiezheng, who had come to negotiate the formal establishment of Sino-Thai 
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relations.729 In Surat Thani, Thai people also threatened Chinese and plundered their 
shops.730  
 
Shortly thereafter, extreme Thai nationalists demanded that the Thai government 
resume the anti-Chinese campaign that had been forced on the Chinese during 
wartime.731 The disputes between Chinese and Thais paved the way for the anti-Chinese 
policies that were resumed after Phibun seized power in 1947 to restore the confidence of 
the army and to control the Chinese. His return to power represented a Thai nationalism 
to counter the surge of Chinese nationalism. Many Chinese in Surat Thani later suffered 
from his anti-Chinese campaigns.   
 
However, the arrival of the Chinese envoy brought hope that there would be the 
presence of a Chinese Embassy to represent their voice would led to an end to tensions. 
The Chinese envoy impressed the Chinese in Thailand. Li called for the repeal of the 
economic Thai-ification policies during negotiation with the Thai government. He also 
insisted that all Chinese descendants, either Chinese- or Thai-born, should be considered 
Chinese citizens.732 Moreover, he put pressure on the Thai authorities to investigate the 
incident in Nakhon Pathom. The Chinese were satisfied with Li’s actions and tensions 
between Chinese and Thai eased to a certain extent. The Chinese hoped that Li would be 
selected to become the first Chinese ambassador to Thailand in order to represent their 
voice and solve their problems.  
 
Indeed, once Sino-Thai relations were consolidated in January 1946, the Chinese 
did appoint Li as the first Chinese ambassador to Thailand following requests from the 
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Chinese community in Thailand.733 In September 1946, houses and shops in Chinatowns 
in Bangkok were decorated with the national flags of the two countries to welcome 
him.734 Enormous crowds of Chinese flocked to the wharfside to greet him on the day 
that he arrived.735 The Chinese had been waiting for the establishment of a Chinese 
embassy for a long time, as they wanted a Chinese ambassador present to resolve their 
issues with the Thai government, particularly concerning Chinese schools and education 
for their children. The law on nationality had been another problem because they had 
been unable to record their children as Chinese nationals.736     
 
The flag-hoisting ceremony on 17 September marked the beginning of the formal 
establishment of Chinese diplomatic representation in Thailand. Chinese representatives 
of major native-place associations and students from Chinese schools in Bangkok and 
nearby provinces thronged the Chinese embassy to witness its official opening.737 In 
addition, overseas Chinese financially supported the embassy. In the afternoon, a group 
of Chinese merchants from overseas Chinese organisations met Li and donated 495,000 
baht to the embassy for relief in China.738 Hence, the Chinese embassy served as a new 
centre of their networks that they did not have to rely merely on their native-place 
associations and secret societies. 
 
Furthermore, the Chinese embassy replaced the former office of the Japanese 
embassy and its flagpole was adjusted to have the same height as the British embassy, a 
symbol of China’s growing power.739 A Chinese consulate was also established in each 
main region of the country. In Peninsular Thailand, a Chinese consulate was established 
in Songkhla, meaning Surat Thani’s Chinese could rely on local Chinese government 
officials to solve their problems. In the meantime, the Thais saw this manifestation of 
China’s growing power and the grand reception the local Chinese put on for the arrival of 
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the Chinese ambassador with mixed feelings. For the first time, the Chinese in Thailand 
were officially represented; they could now raise issues directly with the Chinese 
government.740 Furthermore, it would be more difficult for the Thai government to deal 
with the Chinese problems on account of the growth of Chinese political influence 
throughout South East Asia. Therefore, the establishment of the Chinese embassy opened 
a new chapter in the history of Thailand. The arrival of Li would inevitably raise the 
profile of problems local Chinese were facing.741 Based on the Law of Nationality 
(Siam), the first nationality law, introduced in 1913, every person born on Siamese 
territory had to be considered Siamese except when his or her parents recorded the birth 
at the father’s consulate, legation or embassy. Since there had been no exchange of 
diplomatic representatives between the Chinese and Thai governments prior to 1946, no 
Chinese, therefore, could register their children as Chinese nationals.742 From 1946 
onwards, it would accordingly be difficult for the Thai authorities to push the Chinese 
toward assimilation and Thai citizenship.  
 
According to the 1947 census, there were 835,915 people of the Chinese race 
from every nationality, accounting for 4.79% of the total population of 17,442,689. Of 
this number, 476,588 were Chinese nationals. But these figures exclude the descendants 
of Chinese.743 Although it was difficult to document in a legal sense the exact size of the 
Chinese population, Li claimed there were over three million Chinese in total residing in 
Thailand when he presented his credentials to the Thai government in September 1946.744 
It was often calculated that Chinese nationals and local-born Chinese accounted for 
around 20% of the total population.745 Based on this estimation, then, there were some 
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3,488,538 Chinese. However, other estimates have put the figure at five million, meaning 
Thais accounted for only 12 million.746  
 
About a year after the war had come to an end, there was a huge influx of Chinese 
into Thailand, estimated at more than 170,000.747 Economic misery, caused by the 
economic mismanagement of the GMD government, post-war famine, and social 
dislocation had caused this movement of people. In August 1946, one month before the 
formal establishment of the Chinese embassy, 40,000 to 50,000 Chinese in famine-
stricken southern China were waiting to embark to Thailand.748 In addition, the entry fee 
was cheap at the time owing to the fact that it had not been raised since the pre-war days, 
whilst the value of the baht had fallen dramatically due to post-war inflation. These 
factors contribute to the wave of Chinese migrants to Thailand at the time.749 In 
September, however, the Thai government directed Kenneth Patton, an American adviser 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to study the most effective tool to curb Chinese 
migration into Thailand.750 To tackle the crisis, the Thai government in the end decided to 
place a quota on the number of Chinese migrants for the first time in the country’s 
history. After an extended negotiation with Li in 1947, both agreed that only 10,000 
persons per year were allowed to enter the country.751 The Thai government, however, 
did not impose a quota on Chinese teachers sent by the Chinese government.752 
 
In brief, due to the fact that the Thai police had suppressed Chinese anti-Japanese 
movements during wartime, the Chinese in Thailand loathed the Thai authorities and took 
revenge by assaulting Thai people after they had become nationals of a new emergent 
world power. In September, when Bangkok’s Chinatown was put under police siege, the 
Chinese shot at them from high buildings. This incident sparked other events, in Surat 
Thani and other parts of the country. However, the arrival of the Chinese envoy brought 
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hope that a Chinese Embassy would lend authority to their voice. The embassy became a 
new centre for Thailand’s Chinese community. They did not have to depend only on 
native-place associations and secret societies. In southern Thailand, a Chinese consulate 
was also founded in Songkhla, to which the Chinese in Surat Thani could address their 
problems directly to the Chinese government. Additionally, they could now register their 
children as Chinese nationals at the Chinese Embassy in Bangkok and the local consulate. 
It therefore became more difficult for the Thai authorities to push the Chinese towards 
assimilation and Thai citizenship. The Chinese were satisfied and the tensions between 
Chinese and Thais eased. The founding of the Chinese Embassy seemed to be an 
effective solution at the time. However, it did not last very long because a civil conflict in 
China soon began, weakening greatly the operations and effectiveness of the Chinese 
Embassy in Bangkok. The Thai government saw a window of opportunity to exploit the 
situation and deal with the problem of Chinese education and renew a reinforced Thai-
ification programme.  
 
 
IV.      Chinese Schools from 1945 to the 1950s  
 
The Chinese school issue had existed before the Pacific War. Chinese schools in Thailand 
were all closed down in 1939 and the issue was temporarily resolved during World War 
II as a result of them being closed down. Following the end of the war, the issue was 
taken up again and increasing numbers of Chinese schools were reopened throughout the 
country. Therefore, Chinese education thrived during the early post-war years. Indeed, 
the Chinese embassy had been opened partly to protect Chinese schools. The sufferings 
of the Chinese, who had experienced hardships under Japanese occupation and as a result 
of the Thai-ification programme, were temporarily eased. However, the situation changed 
when in June 1946 the Chinese Civil War broke out fully after Chiang launched large-
scale attacks in Manchuria, the heartland of the CCP. In Thailand, there was a new surge 
of ideological conflict between Chinese supporters of the GMD and the CCP. Bangkok 
became a centre where Chinese of all political colours and from all parts of South East 
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Asia met.753 The ideological conflict was not only reflected in the division of the Chinese 
native-place associations, but also in Chinese schools. This conflict was also seen in 
Surat Thani’s Chinese community. The two sides established and financially supported 
Chinese schools to implant their ideologies in Chinese students. Nevertheless, due to the 
weakness of the GMD government during the Chinese Civil War and ideological 
differences, the Thai government exploited the opportunity to tighten control over 
Chinese schools and reinforce its Thai-ification programme. Chinese education declined, 
as many Chinese schools were closed after Phibun became prime minister again in 1948. 
This section seeks to investigate the ideological conflict between the GMD and CCP 
supporters, which was reflected in the division of Chinese schools in Surat Thani from 
1945 to 1950s. It also examines how the civil war in China influenced Thailand’s policies 
towards the Chinese.  
 
Phichai Rattanapon, in his master’s thesis “Development of the Controls of the 
Chinese Schools in Thailand,” proposed that Chinese schools be divided into three 
groups following the end of the war in 1945. The first group identified politically with the 
GMD. The second was with the CCP. The last one was neutral. The pro-CCP schools 
were mostly small and had little property. Most of them followed the regulations of the 
Thai government while the other two refused to register with the Thai government and 
took to flying ROC flags.754 However, after the CCP won repeated victories against the 
GMD, Chinese committees and teachers at Chinese schools in Thailand were largely 
divided into two groups: the GMD and the CCP sympathisers. When Mao Zedong 
conquered the entire mainland and proclaimed the PRC on 1 October 1949, many 
Chinese school’s supporters began to identify politically with the CCP, and some 
children ran away from their Chinese parents and went to mainland China to study.755 By 
1949, the Assembly Hall of the CCC was no longer available for celebrating the 
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anniversary of Double Tenth Day, or the national day of the ROC, after Tia Langsing, a 
pro-CCP, became its president.756  
 
As a large number of Chinese schools were immediately established at the end of 
the war throughout the country within a few years, the Thai government saw dangers in 
Chinese education in the country. The GMD government declared that the Chinese 
education system in Thailand should be directly controlled by the Chinese embassy in 
Bangkok.757 Additionally, the Chinese government wanted to found Chinese teachers 
colleges and Chinese universities so that Chinese children in Thailand could access a 
Chinese education at every level.758  
 
Any policy on Chinese schools was to be carefully designed by the Thai 
government because it was obvious that the Chinese government wished to use Chinese 
education as a tool to exert influence over the Chinese community in Thailand. At the 
same time, Thailand could not respond too harshly to the Chinese government’s requests 
owing to the fact that the country wanted China to guarantee Thailand’s independence 
after the war and support Thailand’s designs on restoring international standing. 
Therefore, the majority of Chinese schools did not follow regulations and did not even 
register their schools with the Thai government because they were aware that they were 
being protected by the Chinese embassy.759 Li also sent many appeals from the Chinese 
community to the Thai government during 1946 and 1947.760 Up until November 1946, 
the Chinese Embassy received a handful of anonymous Thai letters. In turn, the Chinese 
were accused of oppressing the Thais and were threatened with a violent response.761 
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Figure 5.2: All students and teachers of Dongjia School in Bandon in 1949762 
 
In the early post-war years, Chinese schools thrived in Surat Thani. Iao Ing 
School, or Thow Ing School (陶英學校), an old school, reopened in 1947. New schools 
were established, such as Peicai Primary School (培材小學) in 1946 and Dongjia School 
(中止學校) (see Figure 5.2) and Zhonghua School of Na San (那訕中華學校) in 1947. 
Additionally, the Li Jin Association of Bandon offered Chinese tutorial classes at 
night.763 By 1947, there were more than 600 Chinese schools throughout Thailand, but 
only 38 were legally registered with the Thai government.764 
 
Meanwhile in mainland China, the balance of power between the two rival 
Chinese parties still stood in the GMD’s favour following Japan’s surrender in 1945. But 
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when the Chinese Civil War started fully in 1946, the GMD suffered constant defeats 
despite US economic and military assistance. CCP troops began to seize the military 
initiative from late 1947 onwards.765 In the midst of this political turmoil, Phibun, 
together with a number of conservative civilians, carried out a coup on 8 November 1947, 
forcing Prime Minister Thamrong to step down. Li Tiezheng warned his countrymen not 
to get involved in Thai politics. As the military coup risked international condemnation, 
Khuang became prime minister again.766  
 
The Thai government could no longer tolerate the flourishing of Chinese schools 
in the country. In late 1947 and 1948 there was a resurgence of Thai ultra-nationalism, 
boosted by the Thai military, to oppose Chinese nationalism. In February 1948, The 
Chinese were accused in an anti-Chinese diatribe of possessing “filthy habits and a 
rapacious character” in Tahan Mah, a military journal sponsored by Phibun.767 As Li’s 
term came to an end, he immediately told the Chinese government that the anti-Chinese 
campaign would be resumed upon his departure for Nanjing. In the meantime, the Thais 
began to question and attack the flying of ROC flags in Chinese schools, regarded by 
them as a violation of their sovereignty and a symbol of Chinese ultra-nationalism.768 
 
In March 1948, the government of Khuang closed 14 Chinese schools in Bangkok 
due to their refusal to fly the flag of Thailand.769 However, there was no marked shift in 
government policy towards the Chinese more generally. Phibun, Commander-in-Chief at 
the time, issued an ultimatum in April that the authorities must closely control foreigners. 
Khuang was forced to resign and Phibun became Prime Minister in April.770 Siam, the 
name of the country, reverted back to Thailand, possibly revealing Phibun’s 
determination to remind the Chinese that the country was for Thais. Although he did not 
say anything specifically about the Chinese, he admitted that he was studying the 
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immigration policy of the UK and US.771 Within a month, 342 Chinese schools that had 
previously violated regulations were closed. The police simultaneously arrested many 
Chinese teachers, who were immediately deported from Thailand despite protests from 
many Chinese community leaders and the GMD government.772  
 
The Thai government then determined to impose a quota on the number of 
Chinese schools as part of the Thai-ification programme. On 11 May 1948, Mangkorn 
Promyodhi, the Minister of Education, announced that the government allowed Phra 
Nakhon to have only eight Chinese schools, while only three were to be allowed in each 
of Thonburi, Chiangmai, Nakhon Si Thammarat and Ubon Ratchathani. Other provinces, 
including Surat Thani, were allowed to have only two each. Nevertheless, the 
government permitted those that asked the permission before this date to establish their 
schools.773  
 
Only three Chinese schools in Surat Thani, namely Iao Ing School, Dongjia 
School, and Zhonghua School of Na San, received permission from the Thai government 
before 11 May 1948. In 1948, Dan Siton and Phu Khikiao, two Hainanese, ran a 
fundraising campaign to establish a Chinese school in Hua Thanon, Ko Samui. A two-
storey building was constructed, but was not allowed to open.774 In the meantime, in Tha 
Kham market, a Chinatown of Phun Phin, the Chinese bought a piece of land and built a 
two-storey wooden building for Zhonghua School (中華學校). However, the school was 
not allowed due to the new regulations. The building was abandoned in 1948. Later, in 
1950, Decho Boonchuchuai, a Thai, asked for permission from a Chinese committee to 
utilise the building of the Chinese school and transform it into Theerasom Wittaya School, 
a Thai school.775 
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To deal with the ongoing crisis in Chinese education in Thailand, the GMD 
government strongly protested and threatened to send troops to protect Chinese people 
and their interests from Phibun’s anti-Chinese campaign. As the GMD government had 
been suffering ongoing defeats in mainland China and was losing its bargaining power on 
the global stage, the Thai government saw these threats as hollow, and Phibun was 
unyielding in his policies towards the Chinese.776 The Private School Act of 1936, as 
mentioned in Chapter Two, was used as a tool to close remaining Chinese schools again. 
By the end of May, many Chinese schools had been closed on the basis of this law, 
leaving only around 500 across the country. This led to a protest by Carmel Brickman, a 
British representative of the International Union of Students, who had been invited by the 
Chinese government to observe the situation and ask for an amendment to the law to help 
Chinese schools in Thailand.777 The Thai government, however, considered the issue as 
interference in its internal affairs despite the fact that Brickman threatened to refer the 
matter to UNESCO.778 By early July 1948, only 426 Chinese schools remained in the 
country, including the three schools in Surat Thani. Mangkorn, the Minister of Education, 
was sharply criticised by UNESCO in mid-July.779 In the meantime, many Chinese 
parents started to send their children to Hong Kong and mainland China to receive a 
Chinese education.780 Many Chinese students whose Chinese schools were closed moved 
to study in the remaining Chinese schools.781 
 
Due to the weak position of the GMD in China, Phibun seized the opportunity to 
suppress secret Chinese associations because Chinese supporters of the GMD were 
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demanding higher contributions from Chinese merchants to finance the civil war. In 
every Chinatown across the country, the fundraising was mainly organised by a 
committee of each Chinese school and Chinese association, who put quotas on people 
based on their personal income. Chinese merchants who refused to donate were often 
condemned by other members of the Chinese community, and in some cases their 
children were prevented from entering Chinese schools.782 This behaviour angered some 
people, so this conflict was based on money, not about ideology. In addition, it pushed 
some people into supporting the CCP.  
 
Most Chinese merchants were unable to refuse, so some of them doubled the price 
of their goods to contribute to the war effort, causing commodity prices to increase. 
Others lowered the prices of agricultural products, which had an adverse effect on Thai 
people. Phibun, accordingly, commanded provincial governors of Surat Thani and other 
provinces to observe this illegal activity.783 Many Chinese who had become involved in 
collecting these donations were arrested throughout the country in August 1948. The 
GMD could do nothing but only call for their release.784 Some were later deported to 
China in late 1948.785  
 
Meanwhile, in China CCP forces had mounted a full-scale attack in Manchuria in 
September and occupied the entire region by November 1948. Beijing and Tianjin, the 
two major northern cities, fell to CCP occupation. The CCP went on to conquer the 
northern half of China by the end of January 1949.786 These victories had an influence on 
the Chinese community in Surat Thani and elsewhere. Chinese schools became a 
contested space, with sympathisers of the two rival Chinese parties seeking to utilise 
them to disseminate their respective ideologies in Chinese students. At the same time, 
Phibun used the situation in China as a pretext to arrest of many Chinese who were 
collecting contributions to finance the civil war and crack down on Chinese schools. 
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Despite the fact that Phibun revealed anxiety about the political situation in China during 
November and commanded provincial governors of Surat Thani and others to observe the 
movements of Chinese communists, Phibun, in fact, arrested many well-known 
supporters of the GMD, who forced many Chinese to finance the war.787  
 
The Thai government began to blame the Chinese for bringing communism to 
Thailand.788 Because Phibun regarded northern Thailand as vulnerable to infiltration of 
communism, he closed many Chinese schools even though their headmasters and 
students identified politically with the GMD. In addition, some smaller anti-GMD 
schools thrived despite their ‘red’ reputations.789 In January 1949, Phibun also seized on 
the opportunity to cut the quota for Chinese migration from 10,000 to 200 persons 
annually.790 
 
In Bandon’s Chinatown, Shou and Liao’s families, the two leading Chinese 
families in Surat Thani, had not only competed in business and local charities from the 
early twentieth century, they also financially supported Chinese schools that were said to 
be competing with one another. Iao Ing School, established and supported by Kamthorn 
and his friends, was widely seen as identifying politically with the CCP, whereas Dongjia 
School, founded by Jenkit, an heir to Shou Caikun, was a pro-GMD school.791 After the 
end of the Chinese Civil War, Kamthorn’s school began celebrating the National Day of 
the PRC every 1 October. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Kamthorn’s grandfather and 
father, Liao Chiangsoon and Liao Jingsong, had had political connections with the CCC 
before. Chiangsoon was one of the founders and the ninth chairman of the CCC. Jingsong 
had a strong connection with Seow Hoodseng, a central committee of the Xinan 
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government, who fled the crackdown by Chiang Kaishek to Bangkok in 1936, and was 
also a close friend of Hia Guang-iam, a chairman of the CCC during the early SSJW.792 
 
   
Figure 5.3: Graduation certificate of Qiu Lixiang, a Chinese student of Dongjia School in Bandon’s 
Chinatown, issued on 5 December 1949793 
 
Although the CCC under the pro-CCC Tia Langsing was not active, as 
communism was illegal in Thailand, its chairman was still a leader of seven major native-
place associations in the country.794 According to the close connections with the CCC and 
the new political realities, Kamthorn chose to identify politically with the PRC. In 
contrast, Jenkit, an heir to Shou’s family, and other supporters of Dongjia School, had 
been loyal to the GMD although Chiang Kaishek had retreated from mainland China to 
Taiwan in December 1949. This school still celebrated the GMD’s Double Tenth Day 
anniversary. In addition, some students of this school also went to Taiwan for more 
Chinese education after graduation.795 The graduation certificate of Qiu Lixiang (邱立响), 
an eighteen-year-old Chinese student from Dongjia School, issued on 5 December 1949 
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by Chen Dongmeng (陳東猛), a headmaster at that time, reaffirms the conviction that 
this school was pro-GMD (see Figure 5.3). The portrait of Sun Yat-sen, the flag of the 
ROC, and the party flag of the GMD or the blue-and-white canton of the ROC flag were 
still displayed on the graduation certificate, although the CCP had already conquered 
mainland China.  
 
Following the establishment of the PRC in October 1949, Phibun decided to ally 
himself with the US and became staunchly anti-communist in the 1950s, and the Anti-
Communist Act was enacted in 1952. Phibun, however, utilised the law as a tool to 
suppress the Chinese until anti-communist equated with anti-Chinese. In 1950, there were 
about 300 Chinese schools, including the three from Surat Thani. Many Chinese teachers 
had by 1953 been arrested on the basis of this act.796 In the meantime, Phibun did not 
only allow the Chinese sympathisers of the GMD to run activities to help the ROC, but 
also co-operated with these supporters to establish Chinese voluntary organisations in 
1952 to suppress the CCP in Thailand. Therefore, the Chinese community lost much of 
its cohesion.797 In late 1950s, Chinese schools were largely primary schools and allowed 
to teach the Chinese language for only 6 hours per week. From the 1960s onwards, 
Chinese children began to enter Thai schools, either public or private, and missionary 
schools. In this way the problem of Chinese schools decreased.798 
 
In sum, Chinese education thrived during the early post-war years. As China 
became one of the victorious five powers and Thailand’s Chinese were protected by the 
Chinese embassy, most Chinese schools did not follow government regulations and the 
Thai government could not crack down on them. However, from late 1947 onwards, the 
GMD suffered a series of defeats and the position and authority of the Chinese Embassy 
in Thailand weakened. Phibun’s government seized this opportunity to carry out anti-
Chinese policies and strengthen its Thai-ification programme. Many Chinese schools that 
violated the regulations were immediately closed. At the same time, many of the Chinese 
                                                




who collected donations to help the GMD fight against the CCP in mainland China were 
arrested. By the end of January 1949, Chinese schools were largely divided into two 
groups: pro-GMD and pro-CCP schools. This ideological division was also reflected in 
the native-place associations. In Surat Thani, Dongjia School was pro-GMD, while Iao 
Ing School was pro-CCP. After the establishment of the PRC in 1949 and the GMD had 
become powerless to protect the Chinese in Thailand, the Thai authorities felt that they 
were able to treat the Chinese as they wished. The anti-communist law was used as a tool 
to suppress them. In other words, anti-communist equated to anti-Chinese. The next 
section will discuss the Great Fire of Bandon in 1953, which the Thai government used as 
a pretext to reinforce its economic Thai-ification programme.  
 
 
V.   The Great Fire of Bandon  
 
By the 1950s, Bandon was one of the largest market towns in Peninsular Thailand. The 
market was the commercial heart of Surat Thani, and the place where most Chinese lived 
together in tightly packed townhouses constructed of wood and thus highly vulnerable to 
fire. In the Chinese community, townhouses were not only places of residency, but also 
served as commercial premises and as stores of diverse materials. This dual function gave 
them the title ‘shophouses’. Other Chinese migrants lived in simple wooden huts. On 4 
June 1953, a fire spread through the business centre of Bandon, one of the largest 
Chinatowns in Thailand, leaving more than a thousand families homeless. Some 100,000 
square metres, making up almost the entirety of Chinatown, were on fire in a seven-hour 
conflagration considered one of the worst in Thai history, far more damaging than any 
other that had occurred anywhere in the country up to that date.799 Suspicions soon arose 
that the fire was no accident, and because of the ideological conflict in the Chinese 
community, Chinese communists were immediately suspected of having started it. At the 
same time, after the GMD government was defeated in the Chinese Civil War and the 
overseas Chinese community became isolated from mainland China, the Thai 
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government saw in the conflagration a chance to reinforce its economic Thai-ification 
programme by launching a housing policy to diminish the economic domination of the 
Chinese. This section examines the economic Thai-ification programme that began with 
the Great Fire of Bandon.  
 
The Great Fire of Bandon was not the first disastrous conflagration in the area. 
Two other fires had occurred, in 1947 and 1951. On November 1947, a fire accidentally 
started by Yong Kao, a Cantonese employee of a Chinese furniture shop, destroyed about 
360 houses. It was estimated that the total financial loss was 15 million baht, but no one 
was killed. The local authorities provided relief for the fire victims.800 The second fire 
was started accidentally at the Kobkarn Rice Mill of the pro-GMD Li Jinzhi on 17 May 
1951, and, lasting from 2 a.m. to 5.30 a.m., destroyed 61 houses, a value of 1.5 million 
baht. The local authorities also established a fire relief committee to help the victims. A 
city plan, devised after the 1947 fire, was officially launched immediately after this 
second fire. The Expropriation of Immovable Act, moreover, was issued to eliminate fire 
risk and widen the roads, based on the city plan drawn up after the first disaster.801 
Therefore, the local authorities devised new tools to deal with such events following the 
1947 fire.  
 
On 4 June 1953, a fire started at 3.30 a.m. in Yoo Seng’s shophouse, which Mang 
Sae was renting to store goods (which he sold from a shophouse opposite) and use as a 
dwelling for his children. The winds fanned the townhouse fire into a firestorm that lasted 
seven hours and devoured more than a thousand houses, two major Chinese markets, two 
major Chinese temples, three Thai temples and a number of properties belonging to the 
city authorities. A survey of 310 families made by the local authorities four days later 
revealed that the loss was calculated at 30 million baht. The fire also killed Mang Sae’s 
six daughters and a local beggar.802 Later, the government estimated that the loss was 
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calculated at 100 million baht and an expert analysed that it would cost more than 200 
million baht to rebuild Chinatown, which lay in ruins (see figures 5.4 and 5.5).803    
 
   
Figures 5.4 and 5.5: Bandon’s Chinatown after a big fire, taken while fire victims were waiting to 
welcome Phibun and his committee in Bandon for inspection, 19 June 1953.804 
 
Following a police investigation, it was determined that the fire was deliberately 
started by someone residing in Xinhua Shop (新華), a tailor’s located on the left side of 
Yoo Seng. The police concluded two possible reasons for the fire: either to claim 
insurance money (the owner of Xinhua Shop, as the majority of local shopkeepers, had 
fire insurance); or for political reasons (Li Patdong and Oui Bochiat, pro-CCP Hainanese 
living in Xinhua Shop, were immediately arrested).805 A relief committee was established 
after the big fire to register victims and provide them with free food, other necessaries of 
life and temporary accommodation. After only three days, commercial activities resumed 
as the local authorities allowed the Chinese to establish temporary market stalls to get on 
with their lives while they were waiting for resettlement. In fact, within a day of the 
disaster more than four hundred people had pressed the local authorities to allow them to 
reopen their shops.806  
 
It is ironic that only three months prior to the fire the government had commanded 
the police to prevent arson in Surat Thani. The police subsequently observed a movement 
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of pro-CCP saboteurs, but the local authorities did not act on the police’s concerns. 
Nevertheless, the two Hainanese were later deported to mainland China through the Anti-
Communist Act of 1952.807 Phibun also used this law as a vehicle to arrest and deport 
non-CCP Chinese who opposed Thai government policy. Gradually, being pro-CCP was 
not the specific reason for repressing the Chinese community: merely being Chinese was 
enough in itself.808 However, the Chinese who went back to the PRC were not all 
deportees. The victory of the CCP in China’s civil war in 1949 attracted members of the 
intelligentsia and young people inspired by Mao Zedong’s victory. On 12 November 
1953, a ship carried a thousand Chinese passengers back home, of which only 250 were 
deportees.809 
 
After the fire of 1953, fire victims did not immediately receive resettlement in the 
area of fire. Instead, the government seized the opportunity to introduce a city plan 
devised after the 1947 fire and used the Expropriation of Immovable Act in the fire area 
that prevented the resettlement of fire victims without the government’s permission. In 
addition, a decree was immediately passed to control building. The government 
encouraged landowners to borrow money from the government to construct new 
buildings and repay the loans within ten years. However, they had to follow the building 
plans of the government in order to make sure that they were strong enough to prevent 
conflagration in the event of a fire.810 
 
On 19 June 1953, Phibun visited Bandon’s Chinatown and expressed his 
condolences to the victims of the fire (see figures 5.6 and 5.7). On the surface, Phibun 
announced his intention to assist the victims, but in reality he did not. Instead, the 
housing policy launched by the Thai government was intended to eliminate the economic 
domination of the Chinese. Those landowners who borrowed money from the 
government were legally bound by the contract to have Thai people rent at least 50% of 
the number of newly constructed townhouses to do business. This was a direct attempt by 
                                                
807 NAT, SOC 0201.4/31, 30-31, 41. 	
808	Songprasert, จนีโพน้ทะเลสมยัใหม,่ 221-222. 	
809	Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 363. 	
810 NAT, SOC 0201.4/31, 28. 	
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the Phibun government to break the hold on the city’s commercial hub in order to allow 
Thais to compete with the Chinese.811  
 
    
Figures 5.6 and 5.7: The Chinese of Bandon’s Chinatown welcomed Phibun and later listened to the 
speech of the prime minister delivered to express his condolences to fire victims, 19 June 1953.812 
 
In short, the Great Fire of Bandon was a fortuitous tragedy for the Phibun 
government because it could be used as a pretext to kickstart his economic Thai-ification 
programme. With this new housing policy, the Thai government not only wanted to 
reduce the economic activity of the Chinese in Surat Thani, but also make it harder for 
the Chinese to stay together and help each other as a community. Not only did the 
boundaries of each ethnic group in the Chinese community become less defined, but the 
boundary of the entire Chinese community also became less important as the housing 
policy made it easier for Thais to infiltrate the heart of Chinese commercial power. 
Another side-effect of the policy was that it would make it easier, theoretically, for the 
Chinese to assimilate into Thai society.  
 
To conclude, the ashes of the Great Fire of Bandon benefited the Thai government. 
The fire brought about a new housing policy that Phibun used to reinforce the economic 
Thai-ification programme. With this housing policy, the Phibun government not only 
destroyed the financial domination of the Chinese, but also eroded the physical 
boundaries of the Chinese community by ensuring that Thai people could make 
                                                
811 Ibid. 	
812 NAT, ฉ/ท/1061 and ฉ/ท/1063. 	
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significant inroads into the Chinese community’s stranglehold on commerce by making it 
easier for them to compete. Highlighting how Phibun was quick enough to exploit the 
tragedy for his advantage, the fire represented a victory for the Thai government over the 
Chinese community.  
 
 
VI.        Conclusion    
 
Following the end of the SSJW, tensions between those who collaborated with the 
Japanese and those who did not were to an extent settled. Tan Siewmeng, a major 
collaborator, was assassinated. Chinese communists, the suspects, were closely observed 
as a result, making it difficult for them to target other collaborators. This explains why 
lesser collaborators in Surat Thani survived. In addition, all participants were exhausted 
from the war and were apprehensive about the impending Chinese Civil War. Tensions 
between the Chinese and Thais were resolved to a certain extent after the arrival of the 
Chinese envoy and the establishment of a Chinese Embassy in 1946 to represent the 
Chinese community’s voice and solve their problems.  
 
The Chinese Embassy became a new centre for the Chinese community, while 
Surat Thani’s Chinese could rely on the consulate in Songkhla. They could now register 
their children as Chinese nationals for the first time. Chinese schools thrived during these 
early post-war years, with over 600 founded in 1947 alone. However, shielded from 
criticism by the Chinese Embassy, most of these schools did not adhere to the regulations 
of the Thai government. Additionally, the Thai government could not crack down on the 
Chinese school as it sought China’s help to guarantee its independence.  
 
After the civil war began to go unfavourably for the GMD from late 1947 
onwards, the authority of the Chinese Embassy was weakened. Chinese native-place 
associations and schools were essentially divided into two: pro-GMD and pro-CCP. 
When Phibun seized power and became prime minister, he took advantage of the political 
turmoil in China to resume the Thai-ification programme, and many Chinese schools 
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were closed. At the same time, he suppressed the secret associations that were collecting 
money to finance the Chinese Civil War.  
 
After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Phibun introduced an anti-communist 
law to suppress the Chinese. Chinese education had declined as many schools were 
closed. Most of the major native-place associations identified politically with the GMD, 
whilst the Hainanese were split in half. The Great Fire of Bandon in 1953 helped the Thai 
government to reinforce the economic Thai-ification programme by introducing a new 
housing policy that not only aimed to eliminate the economic domination of the Chinese 
by helping Thai people infiltrate their commercial centre, but also to bring about more 
Chinese assimilation into Thai society. Phibun’s success in these actions represents a 























During the first half of the twentieth century, the Chinese communities in Surat Thani 
and also more widely across Thailand adapted themselves to changing socio-political 
contexts to forge their own national, diasporic, and communal identities. Surat Thani was 
the destination for some of the earliest Chinese migration to Thailand. In the late 
sixteenth century, early migrants established networks and exerted their Chinese identity 
through the donation of two Chinese bells to local temples. In nineteenth-century Siam, 
colonialism brought a huge influx of Chinese, mostly Hainanese, into Surat Thani. There 
was the expansion of rice cultivation for export after Siam had agreed to sign the 
Bowring Treaty in 1855. Therefore, Surat Thani was the base for transnational Hainanese 
networks, unlike the west coast of the Southern Peninsula, which was dominated by the 
Hokkien, and Bangkok, where the Teochew prevailed. These migrants built Chinese 
temples to be at the centre of their communities in order to serve people who spoke 
common dialects.  
 
Before Chinese women arrived in early-twentieth-century Siam in large numbers, 
Chinese men assimilated into Siamese society via intermarriage with local Siamese 
women. The Chinese became an established part of Siamese society, participating in 
Siamese temples’ activities, acculturating themselves to the Siamese form of Buddhism, 
and sending their children to Siamese schools. The offspring of the intermarriage 
between Chinese and Siamese were called lukchin, or Chinese children, by the Siamese, 
whilst these children called themselves dengnangkia. In the countryside, these Sino-
Siamese children, who had many opportunities to interact with the native Siamese, 
established hybrid temples to serve both Chinese and native Siamese people. These 
hybrid temples represented inter-cultural exchanges and processes of assimilation.  
 
Owing to the reformed system of the provincial administration in the late 
nineteenth century and the construction of the peninsular railway in the early twentieth 
century, Surat Thani became an important port, a development that drew a large number 
of Chinese from many different ethnic groups, in particular in Bandon. In spite of the fact 
that the largest number of Chinese population was Hainanese, the most influential dialect 
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group in early-twentieth-century Surat Thani was Teochew. In particular, the Liao and 
Shou families had intimate connections with the Siamese royalty in Bangkok and 
Siamese elites in the peninsula and as a result enjoyed exceptional privileges. As these 
Chinese communities thrived and enlarged, the Chinese gradually stopped assimilating 
into Siamese society. For example, the Teochew and Hainanese established their own 
schools to preserve their Chinese ethnic community, utilising their own dialect as a 
medium of instruction.   
 
The southern railway also drew Chinese immigrants from Northern Malaya, 
especially Penang, to Surat Thani. Unlike the west coast of Southern Siam, which 
attracted Hokkien tin miners from Penang, the tin mining industry in Ban Na San was 
mostly owned and operated by Hakka tin miners from Penang. The peranakan 
community in Ban Na San represented the family and business networks which existed 
between Surat Thani and Northern Malaya. The arrival of these tin miners was important 
in reinforcing economic links with Northern Malaya. Moreover, education tied the 
Chinese communities of Surat Thani with Penang. In the early twentieth century, many 
Penang-oriented Chinese parents in Surat Thani and across South Siam sent their children 
to Penang for an education in Chinese and English.  
 
Despite the fact that the Chinese communities grew in the early twentieth century, 
the Chinese nevertheless were oriented towards their original locality. Similar to the 
Chinese communities elsewhere in South East Asia, modern Chinese education was 
transmitted to Surat Thani’s Chinese schools, where Mandarin was used as the language 
of instruction following the founding of the Chinese Nationalist Government in Nanjing 
in 1928. Indeed, Dr. Sun Yat-sen became a central symbol of China after his death and 
veneration of Sun became a mark of Chinese nationalism. Therefore, ethnic Chinese 
consciousness gradually evolved into a united national Chinese consciousness. When the 
Second Sino-Japanese War (SSJW) broke out in 1937, the Chinese, who identified 
politically and culturally with China, were not reluctant to contribute to the Chinese war 
effort and armed themselves against the Japanese when the Japanese landed in Bandon’s 
downtown on 8 December 1941.  
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Under the Japanese occupation, despite their strong anti-Japanese sentiments, the 
Chinese were faced with the thorny dilemma of deciding whether or not to co-operate 
with the invaders. The Chinese were essentially divided into two groups: those who 
collaborated with the Japanese and those who did not. Whilst Liao Jingsong was 
imprisoned after he refused to collaborate, many Chinese, such as Tan Siewmeng and 
Wang Jingwei, decided to collaborate with the Japanese, albeit after being put under 
significant pressure to do so. In reality, this “co-operation” was superficial. In Surat 
Thani and across southern Thailand, those who worked for the Japanese were called 
“Taiwan,” meaning “traitors”, as some Taiwanese in Thailand were politically oriented 
towards Japan. However, in reality both patriotic Chinese and Chinese collaborators 
shared anti-Japanese sentiments.   
 
During the SSJW, the Phibun government launched an economic and cultural 
Thai-ification programme to motivate the Chinese to assimilate into Thai society. Many 
Chinese not only indulged in Thaification of their names and surnames, but also became 
Thai nationals. However, these Chinese retained their Chinese identity by remaining 
culturally and socially Chinese. Assimilation was a somewhat superficial phenomenon 
whereby name-changing and applying for naturalisation was seen as a means of making 
life easy rather than a heartfelt move to become Thai.  
 
Another dimension of the Chinese community in Surat Thani was the political 
movement of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP hereafter). Surat Thani had one of the 
most essential CCP networks in South East Asia. As most CCP members in South East 
Asia were Hainanese, the largest dialect group in Surat Thani, a large number of 
Hainanese in Surat Thani were politically oriented to communist ideas. The CCP had 
been politically active in Surat Thani, particularly in Ko Samui, since the late 1920s. 
Chinese schools were found to be hotbeds of communism and many teachers were 
arrested and deported for spreading communist ideas. In addition, pro-CCP Hainanese 




The early post-war years saw a resurgence of Chinese nationalism. Following the 
victory of China over Japan and a concomitant sense of growing Chinese power, the 
Chinese in Thailand felt confident and more united than ever before. At the same time, 
the Thai government found it more difficult to push the Chinese towards assimilation and 
Thai citizenship because the Chinese could now register their children as Chinese 
nationals following the establishment of the Chinese Embassy and the local consulate in 
1946. Due to the Chinese Civil War (1946 to 1949), the operations and effectiveness of 
the embassy weakened. The ideological conflict between communism and nationalism 
was reflected in the Chinese communities in Surat Thani, where the Chinese were 
essentially divided into two groups: pro-Chinese Nationalist and pro-CCP. At the same 
time, the Thai government took advantage of the political turmoil in China to resume the 
Thai-ification programme and push the Chinese towards assimilation again.  
 
At the end of the Chinese Civil War, Mao Zedong, China’s communist leader, 
declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC hereafter) in Beijing’s 
Tiananmen Square on 1 October 1949. Following this move, the overseas Chinese 
community was cut off from mainland China. Observation of the role of Chinese temples 
as an aspect of investigating post-1949 Chinese identity reveals that the second half of the 
twentieth century saw a strengthening of diverse ethnic Chinese identities and a 
resurfacing of disputes within the Chinese community in Surat Thani. 
 
One of the disputes was a claim on Bentougong Temple (本頭公廟), a dispute 
that still rages to this day amongst the ethnic Chinese in Bandon’s Chinatown. In the fire 
that swept Bandon in 1947, more than 300 houses, as well as Bentougong Temple, were 
destroyed. The temple is referred to as a “Teochew Temple” in an official document of 
the local authorities in 1949 (and is a name shown in the list of the landowners) by the 
ethnic Teochew, who were the main victims of the fire.813 However, there was no 
evidence when the temple was actually founded because all related documentation and 
                                                
813 Phongsak Phothikruprasert et al., งานประชมุสมาคมแตจ้ิ1วสมัพันธภ์าคใต ้ครั 9งที< 4 วนัที& 13-14 กรกฎาคม 
2555 จังหวดัสรุาษฎรธ์าน ี(The fourth meeting of Teochew associations in Southern Thailand during 13-14 
July 2012 at Surat Thani), 28. 
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artefacts were destroyed in the fire. The temple was rebuilt in 1954 according to a city 
plan devised by the city after the 1947 fire. According to the Teochew Association’s 
account, members of the Liao and Shou families, the two leading Teochew families, 
organised a fundraising campaign to rebuild the temple, but other dialect groups also 
donated and helped. Therefore, when a nameplate of this temple as a “Teochew Temple” 
was hung after reconstruction, the Teochew immediately got embroiled in a dispute with 
other dialect groups. The upshot of the dispute was that the temple was renamed a 
Bentougong Temple.814 Today, the Teochew still claim over the temple and refer to it as 
a “Teochew Temple” even though they still cannot hung their nameplate outside.  
 
After Shou Kiangjiao, a leading Teochew and a grandson of Shou Caikun, 
became a committee member of the temple and realised that other major dialect groups 
all had their own native-place associations in Surat Thani, Shou and his friends hence 
established the Teochew Association of Surat Thani (素叻府潮州會館) in the new area 
on 10 October 1980, the national day of the Republic of China, and Shou served as the 
first chairman of the association.815 This choice of opening day illustrates that Shou was 
still loyal to the Guomindang, although Thailand established diplomatic ties with the 
PRC on 1 July 1975. It took fourteen years for Shou, together with the other four leaders 
of the major dialect groups in Bandon, to welcome delegates of the PRC consulate from 
Songkhla in front of the Teochew Association in 1994.  
 
The Cantonese and Hakka associations have also claimed rights over the temple 
and have their own version of its history. According to the Cantonese account, 
Bentougong Temple was constructed by the Cantonese. The Teochew only gained control 
over the operation of the temple after the fire in 1947, so the Cantonese gradually 
retreated from involvement in temple’s activities.816 Whilst the version of the Hakka 
concurs with the Cantonese, the Hakka claim that the temple was constructed by the 
Cantonese but did not belong to any particular dialect group. Therefore, the Hakka 
                                                
814 Ibid., 25.  
815 Ibid., 29. 	
816 Kam Hamnam. Interview, 7 January 2017. Kam is the president of the Kwong Siew Association of 
Surat Thani. 
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became involved in the temple’s activities. During the early twentieth century, the temple 
was called the “Chinese City Pillar” and was revered by all dialect groups. However, the 
Teochew, led by Shou Kiangjiao, organised a fundraising campaign from every dialect 
group to rebuild the temple after the 1947 conflagration. As they contributed a large 
proportion of the donations, they hence controlled the operation of the temple.817 
Interestingly, this kind of conflict was also reflected in other Chinese communities in 
Surat Thani. For example, in Phunphin district, the Hainanese claimed Bentougong 
Temple of Surat Thani (素叻本頭公廟), which belongs to the Teochew today.818  
 
The story of a conflict within the Hakka in Bandon was also remarkable. In the 
early twentieth century, earlier arrivals worked as vegetable gardeners on government-
owned property located quite far from the business centre of Bandon at the time. 
However, most latter arrivals migrated from Kanchanaburi, the province where the 
Chinese were hired to construct the Thai-Burma railway.819 This was due to the fact that 
in December 1942 Kanchanaburi, where the line was to pass through, was designated a 
prohibited area that aliens, including the Chinese, were told to evacuate within seven 
days.820 The Hakka vegetable gardeners from Kanchanaburi migrated to settle with the 
earlier arrivals, while Hakka merchants settled in the centre of Bandon’s Chinatown. The 
majority of the gardeners were Hakka of Banshanke descent (半山客) from Chaozhou, 
while the merchants of Shenke (深客) hailed from Meizhou (梅州). After the end of the 
war, Zhang Zhenhua, a Chinese headmaster of Iao Ing School, gathered a small group of 
Shenke people in downtown Bandon to form an unofficial Hakka association. The 
Banshanke, however, were prevented from participating in the association’s activities as 
they tended to have less wealth.821 Therefore, the Hakka split into two groups, each with 
                                                
817	Wang Ronghui (王榮輝), Cai Wanrong (蔡萬榮), Huang Liangcai (黃良才), Wen Tihua (溫掦華), Cai 
Weijian (蔡偉建). Interview, 18 March 2017. All interviewees are the important members of the Hakka 
Association of Surat Thani. 	
818 Kanok Nganphairot, “Back in time on Tha Kham,” in หลายเรื(องเมอืงสรุาษฎรฯ์ (many stories of Surat 
Thani) (Surat Thani: Lertchai, 2000), 126.   
819 Huang Liangcai. Interview, 18 March 2017.  
820 	G. William Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1957), 273. 	
821 Wang Ronghui, Cai Wanrong, Huang Liangcai, Wen Tihua, and Cai Weijian. Interview, 18 March 
2017.	
	 277	
its own association to serve them. The Hakka gardeners built Dabogong Temple (大伯公) 
as the centre of their community while the Hakka merchants officially founded the Hakka 
Association of Surat Thani (素叻客家會館) in 1963. They had been rivals, as the Hakka 
merchants refused to associate with the gardeners and often looked down on them. Until 
1981, many Banshanke were allowed to join the Hakka Association in the Chinatown. 
However, the two organisations remain separate until today. Due to the fact that the Thai 
authorities wanted to suppress communists that were active at the time, the Hakka 
gardeners’ community, together with their temple, was replaced by a military camp. 
Dabogong Temple was relocated and established in another area in 1982 and renamed 
Wudimiao (五帝廟).  
 
Although the early twentieth period saw the evolution of a nationalist Chinese 
identity, it would not be wrong to state that after the establishment of the PRC in 1949 the 
Chinese in Surat Thani reverted to a strengthening of diverse ethnic Chinese identities. 
Supang Chantavanich, in her study “From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai,” claimed 
that political circumstances in China and the Thai-ification programme after 1949 forced 
the Chinese to downplay their Chinese national identity and to emphasise instead their 
Chinese ethnic identities and aspects of Thai identity in order to survive.822 As mentioned 
in Chapter Five, the Chinese Nationalist Party had become powerless to protect the 
Chinese in Thailand. At the same time, the uncertain future of the communist regime in 
mainland China accelerated the orientation of the Chinese towards Thailand. The Thai 
authorities also launched the Nationalist Act of 1956, which allowed any person born in 
Thailand to register as a Thai citizen, leading to more Chinese becoming Thai citizens.823 
In other words, the Chinese reverted once again to seeking assimilation into Thai society 
again while at the same time emphasising their ethnic Chinese identities over a united 
Chinese national identity. As Chantavanich claimed, the Chinese during the second half 
                                                
822 Supang Chantavanich, “From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai: Political Conditions and Identity 
Shifts among the Chinese in Thailand,” in Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians, ed. Leo Suryadinata 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), 256.  
823 Ibid. 
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of the twentieth century were referred to as “Chinese-Thai” because while they expressed 
their Thai national identity they also demonstrated their ethnic Chinese identities.824 
 
The political movement of the Chinese communists in Surat Thani is also worth 
noting. After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, many Chinese communists joined the 
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT hereafter). Khao Chong Chang, a mountain range in 
Ban Na San district, became an important stronghold of the CPT. Li Patpoon, a local-
born Chinese of Hainanese descent in Pak Kradae, Kanchanadit district, recalled that he 
felt resentful of Phibun’s government, which had limited the rights of Chinese 
descendants over certain occupations. Thus, he went to Khao Chong Chang and joined 
the CPT.825 Two key events occurred. In 1979, in Ban Na San, a train was robbed by 
Surachai Saedan (陳嘉前), a leading member of the CPT of Hainanese descent from 
Nakhon Si Thammarat, and his forces. The second event was the bombing of Surat 
Thani’s city hall in 1982. Due to these events, many Hainanese in Surat Thani, who 
shared the Chinese surname with Surachai, had to change their surname to Thai out of 
fear they would be persecuted and/or rejected from job applications on account of their 
surname.826 
 
During the term of Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988), a “Peaceful 
South” (Tai Rom Yen) policy was introduced in 1981 against the communists. This 
policy prioritised political solutions over a military response by encouraging communists 
to defect and granting amnesty to them.827 As the political movement of the CPT was 
very active in Surat Thani, in 1982 Harn Leenanon, the southern army chief, asked for 
co-operation from leading Chinese merchants to subvert the communists. Shou Kiangjiao, 
a supporter of the Guomindang, and Chaweng Srisawat, a successful merchant of 
                                                
824 Ibid.  
825 Li Patpoon, the guardian of the Hainanese Temple of Pak Kradae. Interview, 9 September 2015.  
826 For example, Mengdek Saedan, the guardian of Chaopoe Bantai Temple in Ko Pha-ngan, changed his 
name to Somsak Danwiriyakun. Interview, 19 March 2017.  
827 John Funston, Southern Thailand: The Dynamics of Conflict (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2008), 17.  
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Hainanese descent, were not reluctant to co-operate. This policy led to a decline in the 
CPT over the next three to four years.828 
 
From 1950 to today, many other Chinese temples have been founded, such as 
Yangde Charitable Temple (陽德善堂), Mingmiaorenxin Charitable Temple (明妙仁心
善堂), Bansong Fude Charitable Temple (萬松福德善堂), Old Bentougong Temple in 
Ban Na San (本頭公古廟), Bentougong Temple of Chaiya (採耶本頭公廟), Dabogong 
Temple of Tha Chana (大伯公廟), Goddess Shuiwei Temple (水尾聖娘廟), Caishen 
Temple (財神廟). In the second half of the twentieth century, Zhonghua School of Ban 
Na San was the only Chinese school that had survived the crackdown of the Thai 
authorities and was able to offer Chinese language classes (and continues to do so today). 
Iao Ing School and Dongjia School in Bandon were both closed down by the Thai 
government as they were alleged to have been spreading communist ideas among their 
students. In 2005, the Chinese community in Bandon founded Wamin Wittaya School (華
盟學校). Zhang Jiuhuan (張九桓), China Ambassador to Thailand, presided over the 
opening ceremony of the school and the number of the students rapidly increased, from 
367 in 2006 to 810 in 2012.829 
 
Another Chinese association of note is the Bandon Christian Association (萬崙基
督教會), which was established after the war by Western missionaries and a small 
number of Chinese from different dialect groups.830 The association has its own cemetery 
for members, but its space is inside a Chinese graveyard where people from all dialect 
groups are buried. A visit to the graveyard found that rich members could secure the best 
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feng shui (風水), a Chinese philosophical system of harmonizing everyone with the 
surrounding environment.  
 
Many well-known Chinese from Surat Thani have played prominent role in Thai 
society, such as Buddhadasa Bhikkhu (佛使比丘, 1906-1993), a leading Thai Buddhist 
thinker of Hokkien descent who was officially listed by UNESCO as one of the world’s 
“great personalities” in 2006, Somdet Kiaw (1928-2013), the acting Supreme Patriarch of 
Hainanese descent and leader of all Buddhist monks in Thailand, Banyat Bantadtan 
(1942-present), a Chinese of Hainanese descent and chairman of the Democrat Party 
(2003 to 2005), and Suthep Thaugsuban (1949-present), another person of Hainanese 
descent and a former Thai deputy prime minister, secretary-general of the People’s 
Democratic Reform Committee, and organiser of the street protests against the 
Shinawatra government in Bangkok in 2013-2014, which paved the way for the 2014 
military coup.831 It should be noted that this conclusion does not pretend to be exhaustive 
and much more research is needed to generate a more comprehensive picture of the 
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This table shows the chronological list of Chinese bells in Surat Thani from 1848 through 
to the first half of the twentieth century.   
 
Years Temple Location Ethnic 
group 











Kanchanadit Hainanese Bentousanxian 
yeye 
From Wenchang, 
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Ruemun, over 80 years old, is a Tanka. She, together with her family, migrated from 
China when she was a child. She lived on a junk with other members of her family until 
the age of 13, when the junk was damaged and she and her family were forced to move 
onshore at Ko Pha-ngan. She fished for a living. She married Go Tek, a Hainanese 
merchant. She refers to herself as Cantonese.  
 
Khuay Ngiyuat, or Prayat Saekhuay 
Born in 1932, Khuay Ngiyuat is a guardian of Guanshengdijun Temple (關聖帝君廟) at 
Thongsara, Ko Pha-ngan district. His parents migrated from Hainan to the province of 
Chonburi in Central Thailand, where he was born and grew up. After his father died, his 
mother and Khuay migrated to Ko Pha-ngan when he was around 11-12 years old.  
 
Pu Gui, or Gui Saepu  
Born in 1948, Pu Gui is a guardian of Guan Yu Temple and Association of Hua Thanon 
(蘇梅島關帝神廟會館) at Hua Thanon, Ko Samui district. Her parents migrated from 
Bon-shio, or Wenchang (文昌), Hainan, to Bangkok and subsequently to Ko Samui. Her 
parents worked as coconut gardeners and pig farmers. As her house is next to the temple, 
she has been responsible for the temple since the age of 50. At the same time, she works 
as a coconut gardener.  
 
On Srirak  
On Srirak was born in 1920 and is a guardian of Maeyaichao Temple at Tha Chang. She 
was a daughter-in-law of Champa Srirak (Saeli), who constructed the temple and was an 
agent who sourced Chinese migrants to build the railway. Champa was a merchant and 





Over 80 years old, Go Kaew is a successful Hakka merchant from Tha Chang. His father 
migrated from China to Bangkok and later moved to Tha Chang. His father owned a local 
cinema.  
 
Cai Guohui (菜國輝), or Boonchart Thamcharoensak  
Born in 1965, Cai Guohui is a committee member of the Hokkien Association. His 
grandparents migrated from Putian in Fujian province to Hat Yai in Songkhla province, 




Born in 1955, Sese Kwankawin is a second-generation Hakka. His family was the biggest 
Hakka family in the Hakka community. Lee Chinhon (呂清漢), his father, migrated from 
China to Songkhla and finally settled in Bandon, where Lee, together with his family 
members, worked as a vegetable gardener. Lee had eleven children. Sese’s family is a 
successful Hakka family in Surat Thani. Lee Chinhon Ancestral Hall (河東公祠), 
founded by Sese and his family members, is where more than 200 family members gather 
annually to celebrate Chinese New Year. Sese is the owner of a video rental shop.  
 
Li Patpoon, or Nikoon Chuleetham  
Born in 1932, Li Patpoon, a third-generation Chinese, is the guardian and spirit medium 
of the Hainanese Temple of Pak Kradae (關聖帝君廟), Kanchanadit district. His 
grandparents migrated from Hainan to Surat Thani. His paternal grandfather was a basket 
weaver and strong supporter of the Chinese Communist Party, and his maternal 
grandfather was a successful merchant. Li Honglop, his father, served as chairman of the 
temple and the Kengjiu Association of Pak Kradae. Two of his uncles were sent by his 
paternal grandfather to be soldiers, one of whom was killed by the Japanese during World 
War II. Li Patpoon studied at Iao Ing School in Bandon. In the post-war years, he felt 
resentful of Phibun’s government, so he went to Khao Chong Chang and joined the 
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Communist Party of Thailand. After he defected to the Thai government, he returned 
home and worked as a fisherman.  
 
Sakorn Wongsuban  
Born in 1953, Sakorn Wongsuban is a third-generation Chinese of Teochew descent. She 
is a niece of Koi Anaui, who armed himself to fight against the Japanese during the 
Japanese invasion of Surat Thani, and a granddaughter of An Aui, who had migrated 
from Chaozhou and was elected a village headman of Maluan in Phunphin district. She 
was the only person who settled near An Aui’s tomb.  
 
Aui Phonglian (黃蘭蓮), or Kanda Kanchanasuk  
Born in 1929, Aui Phonglian is a local-born Chinese of Hainanese descent. Her father, 
Huang Shanye (黃善業), who migrated from Bon-shio in Hainan, was a Hainanese 
goldsmith who owned a gold shop in Bandon’s Chinatown. As a girl, she attended a Thai 
school while her brothers were sent to Hainan for a Chinese education. After the Second 
Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, her brothers fled to Thailand. On 8 December 
1941, the day the Japanese landed in Thailand, Aui Phonglian, aged 12, went to help her 
mother sell goods at City Hall on Constitution Day. Learning that Japanese troops were 
about to invade Bandon, she fled Chinatown with other family members. When Allied 
bombing became more extreme in Surat Thani, she found refuge in air raid shelters 
located at Wat Phra Yok, a Thai temple, together with other people in Chinatown. She 
later opened Baoxing (寶興), a dressmaker’s shop in the centre of the Chinatown.  
 
Kam Hamnam (譚錦南), or Namkiat Wiriyokhun  
Born in 1957, Kam Hamnam is the president of the Kwong Siew Association of Surat 
Thani (素叻廣肇會館) and a former president of the Lions Club of Surat Thani. Kam is a 
third-generation Chinese of Cantonese descent. His grandparents migrated from 
Guangdong to Chumphon and later moved to Surat Thani. His father worked as a 
building contractor and undertook many large construction projects such as Tapee Hotel. 
Kam is a building contractor.  
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Huang Chunxin (黃春新), or Sathorn Luengpratiphan  
Born in 1937, Huang Chunxin is a leading Cantonese in Bandon and the former president 
of the Kwong Siew Association of Surat Thani. His father, Huang Zuguang (黃祖光), 
migrated from Guangdong to Bangkok in the early twentieth century and moved to 
Bandon’s Chinatown. His father was a successful Cantonese who received many building 
contracts to build townhouses and official places in Surat Thani. During World War II, 
his father also made substantial profit by working for the Japanese in construction 
projects. In 1979, Huang Chunxin was the Secretary of the Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce in Surat Thani. He is the owner of Sathorn Book Centre, one of the largest 
bookshops in Surat Thani.  
 
Ngao Sengpu (吳清芙), or Pot Chayakun  
Born in 1933, Ngao Sengpu is a second-generation Chinese of Hainanese descent in Tha 
Chana district. His father, Ngao Sengwa, had migrated from Hainan and was a merchant. 
Ngao Sengpu attended Iao Ing School in Bandon in the post-war years. He is a leading 
Chinese and owns of a gold shop in Tha Chana’s Chinatown. He was also one of the 
founders of Dabogong Temple of Tha Chana (大伯公廟).  
 
Bang Daokian (馮所權), or Somboon Phongvutipong  
Born in 1946, Bang Daokian is a successful merchant and leading Chinese of Hainanese 
descent from Phunphin district. He is also the president of Thakham Temple and 
Association (呈坎公所). He is the owner of a gold shop in Thakham’s Chinatown and a 
major financial supporter of Wamin Wittaya School (華盟學校), a Chinese school in 
Bandon.  
 
Wang Ronghui (王榮輝), Cai Wanrong (蔡萬榮), Huang Liangcai (黃良才), Wen 
Tihua (溫掦華), and Cai Weijian (蔡偉建) 
These five people are local-born Chinese of Hakka descent and important members of the 
Hakka Association of Surat Thani (素叻客家會館). Born in 1949, Wang Ronghui was in 
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charge of looking after the Hakka association. Cai Wanrong and Huang Liangcai were 
born in 1935 and 1951. Cai Weijian was a student of Iao Ing School.  
 
Dan Mengdek, or Somsak Danwiriyakun  
Born in 1933, Dan Mengdek is a second-generation Chinese of Hainanese descent and 
the guardian of Chaopoe Bantai Temple (萬前廟), Ko Pha-ngan. His father, Dan 
Yuankee, migrated from Hainan to Ko Pha-ngan and was a merchant. Aged around 9-13, 
Dan Mengdek used to take private Hainanese language classes at the temple with Bin 
Tintae (先生), meaning Teacher Bin, who was a Chinese teacher and guardian of the 


























The National Archives of the United Kingdom  
Colonial Office  
CO 537/4755 Law and order: survey of Chinese population in Siam. Document dated 
1949.  
 
Foreign Office  
FO 628/31 Correspondence and registers.  
 
FO 371/54416 Siamese-Chinese relations: Chinese politics in Bangkok. Document dated 
1946.  
 
FO 991/22 Chinese Consul General and matters affecting Chinese. Document dated 
1948.    
 
FO 371/70030 Chinese in Siam. Problem of Chinese Schools. Arrest of Chinese Consul 
at Bangkok and other Chinese. Document dated 1948. 
 
War Office  
WO 203/5587 Siam and China: position of Chinese in Siam: various reports. Document 
dated 1945.  
 
 
The National Archives of Thailand  
The Ministry of Education  
MOE 54.5/13 เรื$องขอตั *งโรงเรยีนของนายมุย้เกยีบ (Asking for the permission to establish 
a school by Mui Kiab). Document dated 4/11/1927.  
	
MOE 7.6/6 เรื$องนายโต นายหลําเชา่ที$ป่าชา้วดัสงัเวชวศิยาราม (Toe and Lam asking 
permission to rent a cemetery of Sangveswitsayaram temple). Document dated 1905. 
 
MOE 4.2/4 เรื$องการปิดเปิดโรงเรยีน 29 เม.ย.-29 ม.ีค. 2456 (Asking permission to cancel 
the class in 1913). Document dated 1913.   
 
MOE 4.2/5 เรื$องการปิดเปิดโรงเรยีน ศก 2457 (Asking permission to cancel the class in 
1914). Document dated 1914.  
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MOE 4.2/3 เรื$องการปิดเปิดโรงเรยีน ศก 131 (Asking permission to cancel the class in 
1913). Document dated 1913.   
 
MOE 4.2/6 เรื$องการปิดเปิดโรงเรยีนตา่งๆ พ.ศ. 2459 (Asking permission to cancel the 
class in 1916). Document dated 1916.  
  
MOE 54.9/3 อนุญาตใหดํ้ารงโรงเรยีนคมีง ตั #งอยูท่ี+ตลาดหมูท่ี+ 4 ตำบลตลาด อําเภอบา้น 
ดอน จังหวดัสรุาษฎรธ์าน ีอยูต่อ่ไป (Granting Keemong School, located at Moo 4, Talat, 
Bandon, Surat Thani, permission to maintain). Document dated 10/12/1918 to 
17/12/1919.  
 
MOE 54.8/1 มณฑลสรุาษฎรส์ง่รายงานประจําปี พ.ศ. 2462 ของโรงเรยีนคมีงและ โรงเรยีน 
คมีงขอรับครนูอ้ย (Monthon Surat Thani submitted the annual report of 1919 about 
Keemong School and Keemong School asked permission to receive a teacher). Document 
dated 13/05/1920 to 25/02/1920. 
 
MOE 541/31 เรื$องอนุญาตใหดํ้ารงโรงเรยีนจิ6นเตก้อยูต่อ่ไป (The permission for Jin Tek 
school to exist). Document dated 2/09/1918-19/05/1920.  
 
MOE 541/212 เรื$องอนุญาตใหต้ั 0งโรงเรยีนศาลเจา้กวนอ ู (The permission for Guan Yu 
temple school to be established). Document dated 08-31/10/1919. 
 
MOE 54.5/11 ร.ร.เตยีงถอ่นโอเฮี,ยว ร.ร.เตอืงฮั(ว มณฑลนครศรธีรรมราชขอมอบฉัน ทะใหผู้ ้
จัดการคนหนึ+งลงชื%อในหนังสอืโตต้อบกบักระทรวงแตผู่เ้ดยีว (Tiang Thon O’iao and 
Tueanghua Schools asked for a permission to give an authorisation to only one manager 
to represent their schools). Document dated 18 February-21 March 1926). 
 
MOE 4/11 กระทรวงมหาดไทยควรจะมกีารบงัคบัใหค้ณะโรงเรยีนจนีรอ้งเพลงสรรเสรญิพระ 
บารมกีระทําความเคารพตอ่ชาต ิศาสนา พระมหากษัตรยิ2 ในโอกาสอนัควร (Ministry of the 
Interior should force Chinese students to sing the royal anthem in order to pay respect to 
the nation, religion and king at appropriate occasions). Document dated 1928.  
 
MOE 54.1/1399 เรื$อง เพลงสรรเสรญิภาษาจนีที0นักเรยีนโรงเรยีนจนีเตก๊รอ้งถวาย เมื0อคราว 
เสด็จพระราชดําเนนิโรงเรยีน  (The Chinese anthem sung by the students of Jintek School 
to pay respect to the king when the he visited the school). Document dated 19/04/1928 to 
11/05/1928. 
 
MOE 54.1/1398 เรื$องกรมตํารวจภธูรหาวา่ร.ร.ซนุหวนุใหจ้นี 3 คน ทําหนังสอืจนีพรอ้มดว้ย 
รปูหมอซนุยดัเซน็ไปเที2ยวแจกตามหา้งรา้นเพื1อเรี1ยไรบํารงุโรงเรยีนในลทัธเิกก็เหม็ง (The 
Provincial Police Division accused three Chinese from Sunwen School of making and 
distributing Chinese books and pictures of Dr, Sun Yat-Sen to Chinese shops to gather 








MOE 54.5/83 เรื$อง เปลี$ยนแปลงผูจั้ดการและครใูหญโ่รงเรยีนมณฑลนครศรธีรรมราช 
(Changing the managers and headmasters of the schools in Monthon Nakhon Si 
Thammarat). Document dated 7/04/1933 to 29/08/1934.  
 
MOE 54.5/46 เรื$อง ตั )งเลกิยา้ยสถานที$ ร.ร. ม.ฑ. นครศรธีรรมราช (The establishment and 
relocation of schools in Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat). Document dated 12/03/1931 to 
3/03/1932.	
 
(2) MOE 8.1/1 เรื$องเกี$ยวกบัพระราชบญัญัตโิรงเรยีนราษฎรปี์ 2473-2477 (About the 
Private Schools Act 1930-1934). Document dated 1918 to 4/12/1934.	
 
(2) MOE 8/77 ธรรมการมณฑลขอใหก้รมศกึษาธกิารสง่ครสูอนภาษาจนี (Monthon 
Education officer asked the Department of Education to send Chinese teachers). 
Document dated 21/11/1917 to 28/12/1917. 
 
MOE 54.1/1400 เรื$อง แจง้ความจํานงตั 2ง ร.ร. ตา่งๆ มณฑลนครศรธีรรมราช (Asking a 
permission to establish schools in Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat). Document dated 
23/04/1928 to 11/04/1929. 
 
MOE 54.5/10 เรื$อง ขออนุญาตตั .งโรงเรยีนยดัเซน็ อําเภอขนัเงนิ จังหวดัหลงัสวน (Asking a 
permission to establish Yat-sen School in Khan Ngoen, Langsuan). Document dated 
8/04/1926 to 23/11/1927.  
 
(2) MOE 8/341 เรื#องสง่สําเนาเรื#องครนูอ้ยโรงเรยีนราษฎรเ์ตยีงถอ่นโอเฮี1ยว อำเภอเกาะ 
สมยุตั #งสมาคมแซจฮียุขึ#นในโรงเรยีน (To send the photocopied documents about the 
establishment of ‘Sae Ji Hui’ society in Tiang Thon O’Hiao school, Samui). Document 
dated 23/01/1929. 
 
MOE 54.1/21 เรื$อง ตั )งและเลกิ ร.ร.ม.ฑ.นครศรธีรรมราช (The establishment and the 
closure of schools in Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat). Document dated 24/01/1928 to 
31/12/1929. 
 
MOE 54.1/1468 เรื$อง ผูจั้ดการโรงเรยีนตงฮั 5ว ตําบลทา่วงั ขอยา้ยสถานที3เลา่เรยีนไปทํา 
การสอน ณ ตกึ ๒ ชั #น ซึ'งไดก้ารสรา้งขึ#นใหม ่(The managers of Donghua School in Tha 
Wang asked for permission to relocate their school to the new building). Document 
dated, 15/05/1930 to 28/07/1930. 
 
MOE 54.14/48 เรื$องธรรมการมณฑลอยธุยาสง่ตน้ฉบบัและคําแปลใบปลวิ “ลทัธซินุบุน๋” 
ซึ#งตรวจพบที#โรงเรยีนจนี (Monthon Ayutthaya Education officer sent the manuscript and 
translation of the “Sun Bun doctrine” leaflet found in a Chinese school). Document dated 






MOE 54.5/20 เรื$องธรรมการมณฑลนครศรธีรรมราช หารอืเรื$องคร ูร.ร.อนุบาลจะตอ้งมคีวาม 
รูภ้าษาไทยตามลกัษณะครนูอ้ยร.ร.ราษฎรด์ว้ยหรอืไม ่ (Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat 
Education officer asked for an advice of elementary school teachers should have a 
command of Thai language based on the Private Schools Act). Document dated 24 
November- 5 December 1928.  
 
MOE 54.5/24 เรื$อง เปลี$ยนแปลงผูจั้ดการและครรู.ร. มฑ นครศรธีรรมราช (Asking to 
change the managers and teachers of the schools in Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat). 
Document dated 1930-1932.	
 
MOE 54.1/1474 เรื$องร.ร.ตา่งๆ มณฑลนครศรธีรรมราชขอลม้ร.ร.เลกิการสอน (The 
Schools in Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat asked for permission to close their schools). 
Document dated 1928. 
 
MOE 54.1/1471 สง่รายงานของผูจั้ดการโรงเรยีนตงซนักก๊หมนิ บอกเลกิการดํารงโรงเรยีน 
(The manager of Dongsunkokmin School asked for a permission to close his school). 
Document dated 16 June-25 September 1930. 
 
MOE 54.5/35 เรื$อง สง่ขอ้สอบ คําตอบ บญัชตีารางคะแนนสอบความรูแ้ละความเห็น 
เจา้หนา้ที)กบัรายงานรับครนูอ้ย (Sending exam, answer, score table and officer’s comment 
on receiving teacher). Document dated 2/09/1929 to 13/11/1929. 
 
MOE 54.5/58 เรื$อง ตั )ง ร.ร. ฝ่าเคี'ยวกง๋ลิ/ (Asking for permission to establish Fakiaogongli 
School). Document dated 1932. 
 
MOE 54.5/84 เรื$อง แจง้ความจํานงตั 2งโรงเรยีนมณฑลนครศรธีรรมราช (Asking for 
permission to establish schools in Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat). Document dated 
1933. 
  
MOE 54.5/31 เรื$องกระทรวงอนุญาตใหน้ายลูว่ี$ฝ่า แซลู่เ่ขา้เป็นครนูอ้ยร.ร.เตอืงฮั(ว (The 
Ministry of Education allowed Mr. Luwifa Saelu to be Chinese teacher at Tueanghua 
School). Document dated 27 May-25 July 1929.	
 
MOE 54.5/19 โรงเรยีนตา่งๆ มณฑลนครศรธีรรมราช ขอมอบฉันทะใหผู้จั้ดการ คนหนึDง 
ลงชื%อหนังสอืโตต้อบกบักระทรวงธรรมการแตผู่เ้ดยีว (Schools in Monthon Nakhon Si 
Thammarat asked for permission to give authorisation to only one manager to represent 
their schools). Document dated 25 April-18 October 1928.  
 
MOE 54.1/1464 สง่รายงานของผูจั้ดการโรงเรยีนเตยีงถอ่นฯ ขอปิดทําการสอน ๒ เดอืน 
(The manager of Tiang Thon O’iao School asked for permission to temporarily close his 
school for two months). Document dated 1930. 
 
MOE 54.1/1449 หนังสอืพมิพล์งขา่วเรื3อง ร.ร.จี#สา่ยเป็นคอมมวินสิต ์ 2472 (A newspaper 
published an article accusing Jisai School of being Communists in 1929). Document 
dated 1929.  
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MOE 54.1/1450 เรื$อง โรงเรยีนเอี+ยงใชถ้กูจับฐานคอมมวินสิต ์ (Iangchai School was 
accused of being Communists). Document dated 8/02/1929 to 18/02/1929.	
 
MOE 54.1/1478 เรื$อง จับครโูรงเรยีนมี$กงั หาวา่กระทําการเผยแผล่ทัธคิอมมนูสิต ์(Mikang 
School’s teachers were arrested of being Communists). Document dated 29/07/1930 to 
26/09/1930.  
 
MOE 54.8/2 มณฑลสรุาษฎรส์ง่แจง้ความตั 5ง ร.ร. ยกเหี&ยนชนดิ ร.ร.ราษฎร ์ ตําบลพนุพนิ 
อําเภอทา่ขา้ม จังหวดัสรุาษฎรธ์าน ี (Asking for permission to establish Yok Hian School 
at Phunphin, Thakham, Surat Thani). Document dated 7/05/1931 to 10/01/1931. 	
 
MOE 52.5/82 เรื$อง ผูจั้ดการร.ร.ราษฎรส์งขลาองักฤษศกึษาขอรับคําชี5แจงวา่ผูจั้ดการร.ร. 
ฟาเคยีว จะขบัไลไ่มย่อมใหใ้ชส้ถานที6ของร.ร.ทำการสอน (The manager of Songkhla 
English School asked for the instruction after the managers of Fa Kiao School no longer 
wanted to allow his school to utilise the school premises). 
 
MOE 54.11/62 เรื$อง รับและจําหน่ายครนูอ้ยมณฑลภเูกต็ (Registration and withdrawal of 
the teachers).  
 
MOE 26/1044 เลขานุการนายกรัฐมนตร ี ขอใหช้ว่ยสอบสวนความเป็นไปของสมาคมนัก 
เรยีนไทยในประเทศจนี (The Secretary of the Prime Minister wanted to investigate the 
association of Thai students in China). Document dated 1936.  
 
MOE 54.5/61 เรื$อง โรงเรยีนเป็งบิ$น ขออนุญาตปิดโรงเรยีนชั$วคราว (Pengbin School asked 
permission to temporarily close its school). Document dated 1932.  
 
MOE 54.1/1615 เรื$อง ผูจั้ดการโรงเรยีนไตท้ง้จะมกีารแสดงละครและศลิปหตัถกรรมเพื@อ 
ความรื'นเรงิและเกบ็เงนิบํารงุโรงเรยีน (The manager of Daitong School would have the 
plays and student fairs for celebrations and to collect money to support the school).  
 
MOE 54.11/71 เรื$องจังหวดัภเูกต็ขอใหพ้จิารณา รร สอนภาษาจนีเป็นพเิศษเพราะเหต ุ
ภาษาจนีเป็นสําคญัในการประกอบอาชพีทางพณชิยการของจังหวดั (Phuket province asked 
for the reconsideration of the law applied to Chinese schools in the province because it 
was an important tool of provincial commerce). 
 
MOE 54.11/63 เรื$องมณฑลภเูกต็สง่คํารา่งคําแนะนําการปฎบิตัติามพระราชบญัญัต ิ ร.ร. 
ราษฎรม์าใหพ้จิารณาเพื0อถอืปฎบิตัติอ่ไป (Monthon Phuket sent the draft of suggestions on 
how to follow the Private School Act).  
 
MOE 44/95 รายงานการศกึษา (สรุาษฎรธ์าน)ี (The Report on an Education in Surat 
Thani). Document dated 30 June-25 July 1933.	
 




(2) MOE 1/219 สง่สําเนาหนังสอืพมิพข์า่วสยาม ลงขา่วเรื5องการศกึษาให ้ จ.ว.ตา่งๆ (An 
article in “Siam” newspaper about education in many provinces).  
 
(2) MOE 21/44 กระทรวงการตา่งประเทศแจง้เรื1องสถานเอกอคัรราชทตูจนี ณ กรงุโตกโิอ 
ขอใหแ้กไ้ขรา่งพระราชบญัญัตโิรงเรยีนประชาบาล (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
informed about the calling from Chinese Embassy at Tokio to amend the Private School 
Act). Document dated 1936.  
 
(2) MOE 25/3473 เรื$องไหน้ายสอย มุง่วธันา พักราชการและไหก้ลบัเขา้รับราชการตามเดมิ 
(Allowing Soi Watthana who was given a suspension during the investigation to go back 
to his position). Document dated 1943.  
 
(2) MOE 25/3461 สง่สําเนาคําสั*ง (Sending a copy of instruction). Document dated 1939.  
 
(2) MOE 15/4 คําชกัชวนของกระทรวงธรรมการเรื3องใหใ้ชคํ้าวา่ “ประเทศไทย” แทนคำ 
วา่ประเทศสยาม (The persuasion of the Ministry of Education to use the term “Thailand” 
instead of Siam). Document dated 1939.  
 
(2) MOE 4/46 ระเบยีบกระทรวงศกึษาธกิารวา่ดว้ยการเคารพในขณะชกัธาตไิทยขึ5นสูเ่สา 
พ.ศ. 2482 (The rules of the Ministry of Education in 1939 regarding the salutation when 
the Thai national flag is raised). Document dated 1939.  
 
(2) MOE 13/14 หลวงครุนุติพิศิาล ขา้หลวงตรวจการแผนกธรรมการ รายงานตรวจราชการ 
ในจังหวดัชมุพรและจังหวดัสรุาษฎรธ์าน ี(The report on a tour of inspection in Chumphon 
and Surat Thani by Luangkurunithiphisan). Document dated 15/08/1940 to 26/09/1940.  
 
(2) MOE 15.2.1/2 เลขาธกิารคณะรัฐมนตรตีั 2งกรรมการสง่เสรมิการทําสวนครัวและเลี2ยงสตัว ์
(The Secretary-General to the Cabinet established a committee to encourage people to do 
edible gardening and raise meat animals). Document dated 25/07/1939 to 22/01/1939.  
 
(2) MOE 15.2.2/3 ขอความรว่มมอืสง่เสรมิไหร้าสดรหรอืองคก์ารตา่งๆชว่ยปลกูผักไหม้ปีร ิ
มานเพิ'มขึ*น (Asking for a co-operation to encourage people and organisations to increase 
the amount of vegetable produce). Document dated 21/12/1941 to 28/12/1941. 
 
(2) MOE 15.2.2/6 ขอความรว่มมอืขา้ราชการทําสวนครัวและเลี7ยงสตัว ์ (Asking for a co-
operation from government officers to do edible gardening and raise animals for meat). 
Document dated 13/08/1943.  
 
(2) MOE 15.2.2/9 ขอความรว่มมอืไหข้า้ราชการทําสวนครัวและเลี9ยงสตัวเ์พื?อเป็นตวัอยา่ง 
แกป่ระชาชน (Asking for a co-operation from government officers to do edible gardening 
and raise animals for meat to set a good example for people). Document dated 
27/05/1949 to 3/11/1949.  
 
(2) MOE 15.2.1/26 ใหเ้จา้หนา้ที*ของกระทรวงทบวงกรมตา่งๆ รว่มมอืในการขายกว๋ยเตี:ยว 
(Asking for the co-operation from government officers of each ministry to sell noodles). 
Document dated 12/11/1942. 
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(2) MOE 15.2.1/32 การขายกว๋ยเตี+ยว (Noodle selling). Document dated 14/10/1943 to 
23/12/1943.  
 
(2) MOE 15.2.1/28 สง่ระเบยีบการประชมุและอบรมสั4งสอนราสดรของกะซวงมหาดไทย 
มาไห ้ (Sending the meeting agenda of the Ministry of Interior on the people training). 
Document dated 3/06/1943 to 21/03/1944. 
 
MOE 3.13/4 นายเตก๊ฮวด ครโูรงเรยีนสายบรุ ี ขอเปลี8ยนชื8อเป็นนายฮวด (Tekhuad, a 
teacher of Saiburi School asked for a permission to change his name to Huad). Document 
dated 1914.  
 
MOE 3.13/2 นายเสง ครโูรงเรยีนวดับางพลใีหญข่อเปลี9ยนชื9อเป็นนายสําเนยีง (Seng, a 
teacher of Bangpliyai Temple School asked for a permission to change his name to 
Samniang). Document dated 1914.  
 
(2) MOE 15.2.1/1 ใหแ้นะนําขา้ราชการและลกูจา้งเปลี4ยนนามเป็นสําเนยีงไทยเสยีจงทั*วกนั 
(The instructions to have government officers and employees change their names to 
Thai). Document dated 5/06/1939 to 19/06/1939.  
 
(2) MOE 15.2.1/23 ไหเ้ตอืนขา้ราชการปฎบิตัติามประกาสสํานักนายกรัฐมนตรเีรื$องชื$อ 
บคุคล (Please warn government officers to follow the announcement of the Office of the 
Prime Minister about the name). Document dated 3/02/1942.  
 
(2) MOE 15.2.1/13 ขอความรว่มมอืใหช้ว่ยสง่เสรมิการแตง่กายของสตรไีทย (Asking for a 
co-operation to promote the instructions for Thai women about the dress). Document 
dated 14/03/1941.  
 
(2) MOE 15.2.1/20 ความสําคญัในการบํารงุวฒันธรรมของชาต ิ (The importance of 
cherishing the national culture). Document dated 1941-1942.  
 
(2) MOE 15.3/53 การอพยพพลเมอืงเพื,อบนัเทาภยัทางอากาศ (The evacuation of people 
for the air raid relief). Document dated 16/10/1943. 	
 
(2) MOE 26/584 ขอ้ดํารขิองจนีเกี/ยวกบัการศกึษา จะจัดตั 9งสมาคมจนีขึ9นในประเทศไทย (A 
plan about Chinese education of the Chinese government and a plan to establish Chinese 
education association in Siam). Document dated 18 May to 24 September 1946.  
 
(2) MOE 5/44 กําหนดจํานวนโรงเรยีนราษฎรส์อนภาษาจนีและเรื9องผลงานของกระทรวงศกึ 
ษาธกิารสมยั พลเอกมงักร พรหมโยธ ี (A quota on the number of Chinese schools and 
work of the Ministry of Education during Mangkorn Promyodhi). Document dated 11 







ม. 18/8 พวกจนีมกีารประชมุทําการเคารพซนุยดัเซนและ ตํารวจหา้มปราม (The Chinese 
paid tribute to Sun Yat-sen and they were prohibited by the police). Document dated 
13/06/1929.  
 
ม-ร.6 น.25/49 พวกจนีคดิจะปิดสนิคา้ญี0ปุ่ น (The Chinese boycotted Japanese merchandise). 
Document dated 26/08/1915. 
 
ม-ร.6 น. 20.19/94, คำสนทนาระหวา่งนายเซยีวฮดุเสงกบัชาวญี3ปุ่ นเรื$องจนีบอย คอ๊ตสนิคา้ 
ญี#ปุ่ น (The conversation between Seow Hood-seng and a Japanese on Chinese boycott of 
Japanese merchandise). 
 
ม-ร.7 ม/17 เรื$องจนีปิดสนิคา้ญี$ปุ่ นและหยดุงาน และใหค้นไทยทํางานแทน (The Chinese 
boycott of the Japanese merchandise, Chinese strike and having Thai people take their 




The Ministry of Interior  
MOI 20.18/47 ตรสุปีใหม ่(Chinese New Year). Document dated 23/11/1915 to 8/05/1917.  
MOI 2.2.5/849 โรงมหรสพในตลาดอําเภอบา้นดอน จังหวดัสรุาษฎรธ์าน ี (The cinema in 
Bandon’s market, Surat Thani). Document dated 1936.  
 
MOI 2.2.5/856 เรื$องคณะกรมการจังหวดัสรุาษฎรธ์านขีอยกเวน้การใชร้าคาคา่เครื$องราชอศิ 
ศรยิาภรณข์องนายสายพราหมณะนันทนซ์ึ6งไดถ้กูเพลงิไหมพ้รอ้มกบัศาลากลางจังหวดัคราว 
ปะทะกบัญี)ปุ่ นกบัขอพระราชทานใหมแ่ทน (Surat Thani provincial committee asked for an 
exception to for the royal insignia of Mr. Sai Phramnanun which was burn together with 
the city hall during the fight with the Japanese troops and asked for a substitution). 
Document dated 12/01/1942.  
 
MOI 2.1/24 ขา้หลวงสงขลาประชมุราสดรเพื3อระงับการตื3นเตน้จากภยัแหง่สงคราม (The 
provincial governor of Songkhla called the meeting with people to make them calm from 
the peril of war). Document dated 1942.  
 
MOI 2.2.3/156 เรื$องขา้หลวงประจําจังหวดัสรุาษฎรธ์าน ีรายงานเรื%องนายกรัฐมนตรไีปตรวจ 
ราชการที'จังหวดั (The governor reported about the inspection of the Prime Minister in 
Surat Thani). Document dated 26/05/1940.  
 
MOI 2.2.3/155 เรื$องขา้หลวงประจําจังหวดัสรุาษฎรธ์านรีายงานเหตผุลเพื$อขอลบลา้งการ 
ตําหนโิทษ นายเลี'ยง ลหีะหตุ หวัหนา้แผนกเบ็ดเตล็ด กองกลาง ป. เมื$อครั )งเป็นนายอําเภอ 
บา้นดอน (Surat Thani’s governor sent a report to remove the punishment of Mr. Liang 
Leehahut when he was the district officer of Bandon). Document dated 8/10/1936.  
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MOI 2.2.5/564 คณะกรมการจังหวดัภเูกต็เสนอความเห็นเรื3องเห็นควรประกาศใชพ้ระราช 
บญัญัตคิวบคมุการฆา่ขายโค กระบอื แพะ และสกุรในทอ้งที?จังหวดัภเูกต็ (The provincial 
committee of Phuket suggests that the Act for the Slaughter of Animals for Food should 
be enforced in Phuket). Document dated 12/08/1940. 
 
MOI 2.2.5/854 คณะกรมการจังหวดัสรุาษฎรธ์าน ีรายงานเรื9องอธบิดกีรมมหาดไทยไปตรวจ 
ราชการที'จังหวดัสรุาษฎรธ์าน ี (The director-general of the Ministry of Interior visited 
Surat Thani). Document dated 1941. 
 
(1) MOI 3.1.4.6/57 ดร. หวงจนิหง ผูอํ้านวยการสํานักแถลงขา่วสถานเอกอคัรราชทตูเดนิ 
ทางไปเยี)ยมจังหวดัภาคใต ้ (สรุาษฎรธ์าน ี นครศรธีรรมราช ตรัง สงขลา ยะลา นราธวิาส) 
(Dr. Huang Jinhong, the new agency’s director of the Chinese embassy, visited Southern 
provinces (Surat Thani, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Trang, Songkhla, Yala and Narathiwat)). 
Document dated 28/08/1957 to 22/10/1957. 
 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
(2) MFA 7.1/1 การเนรเทศจนีไปยงักวางตุง้ (The deportation of the Chinese to 
Guangdong). Document dated 17/07/1939-30/08/1939.  
 
(2) MFA 7.1/4 การออกกดเพื)อมไิหค้นไทยอพยพออกจากประเทสไทย (The prohibition 
on the evacuation of Thai people from Thailand). Document dated 1941.  
 
(2) MFA 7.1/64 สํานักงานคณะกรรมการตามพ.ร.บ. อาชญากรสงครามขอใหต้ดิตอ่เพื6อได ้
ถอ้ยคําพะยานจากนายทสโุบกาม ิ และพลเรอืตรชีากอนจ ุ เพื$อประกอบการดําเนนิคดจีอม 
พลป.พบิลูสงคราม (The Committee appointed by virtue of the War Crime Act requested 
the statements of Mr. Teiji Tsubokami and Rear-Admiral Naomasa Sakonju to be used as 
evidence in the War Crime action which had been brought against Field-Marshal Phibun 
Songkhram), memorandum of an interrogation of Mr. Tsubokami, dated 2/05/1946.  
 
(2) MFA 7.1.9/11 เรื$องสง่บญัชชีาวตา่งประเทศที$ชกัธงคราวทหารไทยยดึเมอืงเชยีงตงุได ้ 
(Sending the list of foreigners who hoisted the national flag when the Thai army occupied 
Kengtung). Document dated 1942.  
 
(2) MFA 7.1.9/15 เรื$องแจง้ผลการประชมุคณะกรรมการการตา่งประเทศประจํากระทรวงกลา 
โหม 28 พ.ค. 2486 (The meeting report of the foreign affairs committee from the 
Ministry of Defence on 28 May 1943). 
 
(2) MFA 7.1.1/2 การแลกเปลี)ยนผูแ้ทนทางทตูระหวา่งรัฐบาลไทยกบัรัฐบาลนานกงิ (The 
exchange of the diplomatic representatives between the Thai and Nanjing governments). 
Document dated 11/07/1942 to 15/01/1944.  
 
(2) MFA 7.1/49 การรว่มมอืกบัฝ่ายญี/ปุ่ นในการโฆษณาชวนเชื/อ (The co-operation with 




(2) MFA 7.1/59 ขอ้ความแปลจากหนังสอืพมิพจ์นี (ไดรั้บจากกรมโฆษณาการ) (The 
content translated from Chinese newspapers). Document dated 9/08/1944 to 3/10/1944.  
 
(2) MFA 7.1.9/42 คดฆีาตกรรมนายตนัซวิเมง้ อดตีขา้ราชการจนีผูน้ยิมญี:ปุ่ น (Murder of 
Tan Siewmeng, a former Chinese government officer who flavoured Japan). Document 
dated 1946.  
 
(2) MFA 7.1/63 การกกัคมุชนชาตญิี.ปุ่ นในประเทศไทยและการแจง้ใหส้ถานเอกอคัรราชทตู 
ญี#ปุ่ น ณ กรงุเทพฯ หยดุปฎบิตัหินา้ที# (Internment of Japanese civilians in Thailand and 
Notification that the Embassy of Japan in Bangkok had been requested to cease 
functioning). Document dated 13/09/1945 to 20/10/1945.  
 
(2) MFA 7.1.9/33 เรื$องกรณีปะทะกนัดว้ยกําลงัอาวธุปืนระหวา่งคณะจนีหนุ่มกบัตํารวจไทย 
ที#นครปฐม (A clash between a group of Chinese men and Thai police who both used 
firearms). Document dated 1946.  
 
 
The Secretariat of the Cabinet  
(2) SOC 0201.24.2/1 เรื$องเทยีบหลกัสตูรและอตัราเวลาเรยีนประถมศกึษาใหแ้กโ่รงเรยีน 
ราษฎร ์(Curriculum matching up and the number of units or hours required in primary 
school lectures for each course to private schools, Rene Perros). Document 1934.  
 
(2) SOC 0201.77/2 เบ็ดเตล็ด (หลายเรื,อง) เกี,ยวดว้ยจนีในประเทศไทย (Miscellaneous 
stories about the Chinese in Thailand).  
 
(2) SOC 0201.46.3/31 เรื$องพระราชทานเครื$องราชอสิสรยิาภรณแ์ดข่า้ราชการและพอ่คา้ 
ประชาชนผูม้คีวามชอบตา่งๆ (Giving insignias to government officers, merchants and 
people who benefited the country). Document 1946.  
 
(2) SOC 0201.98/12 รายงานคณะผูแ้ทนรัถบาลไนการไปเยี7ยมขา้ราชการและประชากรภาค 
ไตย้ามฉุกเฉนิ (The report of the government representatives on the visit of government 
officers and people in the Southern in case of an emergency). Document dated 
19/12/1941 to 25/03/1942.  
 
(2) SOC 0201.82.2/3 คนในบงัคบัจนีขอแปลงชาตเิป็นคนในบงัคบัไทย (Chinese subjects 
asked for permission to change their nationality to Thai). Document dated 19/03/1939 to 
4/11/1941.  
 
SOC 0201.4/31 เพลงิไหมจั้งหวดัสรุาษฎรธ์าน ี (The conflagrations in Surat Thani). 






The Supreme Command Headquarters  
SCH 2.6.9/2 การรับแลกธนบตัรดอลลา่รท์หารญี3ปุ่ นที3ใชก้นัในจังหวดัภาคใตป้ระเทศไทย 
(Offering the Japanese military dollars circulated in the southern provinces). Document 
dated 27/12/1941 to 3/12/1942. 
 
SCH 2.7.4/25 สห.ญี#ปุ่ นจับคนไทยและจนีทั 2งในจ.พระนครและตา่งจังหวดัซึ3งสงสยัเป็นปฎ ิ
ปักษ์ตอ่ญี+ปุ่ นโดยพละการ (The Japanese military police arbitrarily captured both Thai and 
Chinese people in Bangkok and other provinces that were suspected of operating against 




NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12 กองทพัไทยญี+ปุ่ นที+รกุไลอ่งักฤษเคลื+อนที+ สนัตภิาพเอเชยีใกล ้
จะถงึแลว้ รกุๆชาวไทยเพื6อชาต	ิ(The Thai and Japanese armies, which would drive out the 
British for peace in Asia, were impending. Thai people! Attack (the British) for the 
nation!). 
 
NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12 กองทพัญี)ปุ่ นที)จะชว่ยไทยมาถงึแลว้ ญี)ปุ่ นไทยรว่มกําลงัเขา้สู ้
องักฤษ ตเีอาดนิแดนที0เสยีไปกลบัคนืเถดิ (The Japanese troops who want to help 
Thailand have just arrived. Let Japan and Thailand collaborate to fight against England to 
get the lost territories back.) 
 
NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12 ธนบตัรดอลลา่รท์หารญี1ปุ่ นที1ใชก้นัในภาคใต ้ (A Japanese 
military note used by the Japanese soldiers in Southern Thailand).  
 
NAT 59M0054 รัชกาลที) 5 เสด็จประพาสนครศรธีรรมราช (King Chulalongkorn visited 
Nakhon Si Thammarat).  
 
ภอ. 002 หวญ 25/22 NAT-P008446 สะพานสรุาษฎรธ์าน ี(A bridge at Surat Thani). 
 
NAT, ฉ/ท/1064 สภาพตลาดบา้นดอน จังหวดัสรุาษฎรธ์าน ีที9ถกูอคัคภียัเผาผลาญ ภาพนีB 
ถา่ยเมื(อ 19 มถินุายน พ.ศ. 2496 (Bandon’s market after a fire, 19 June 1953).  
 
NAT, ฉ/ท/1065 ประชาชนชาวตลาดบา้นดอน จังหวดัสรุาษฎรธ์าน ีขณะรอตอ้นรับจอมพล 
ป. พบิลูสงครามและคณะในโอกาสที6มาตรวจบรเิวณเพลงิไหมท้ี6ตลาดบา้นดอน เมื6อวนัที6 19 
มถินุายน พ.ศ. 2496 (People of Bandon’s market, taken while they were waiting to 
welcome Phibun and his committee in Bandon for inspection, 19 June 1953).  
 
NAT, ฉ/ท/1061 จอมพลป.พบิลูสงคราม นายกรัฐมนตร ีทา่มกลางประชาชนชาวตลาดบา้น 
ดอนที&มารอตอ้นรับ เมื&อวนัที& 19 มถินุายน พ.ศ. 2496 (People of Bandon’s market 
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